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PRESENTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is truly a pleasure for me to present the proceedings of this 
second edition of the Special Workshop on Law and Literature, held last 
September 18, in Beijing, as part of the 24th World Conference of 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR). 
The workshop was organized under the guidance of Enrico Pattaro, 
former president of IVR and founder of the Italian Society for Law and 
Literature (ISLL). Also contributing to the workshop’s organization was 
the president of the ISLL, Carla Faralli, while its coordination was my 
own work. In Beijing we were honoured to have the workshop chaired by 
Vincenzo Ferrari, president of the Italian Society for the Philosophy of 
Law and a sociologist of law of international acclaim: I heartily thank 
him for his participation. And I also thank all my colleagues for helping 
to make this a successful workshop: this is a thank you I extend not only 
to those who joined us in Beijing to discuss their papers but also to those 
who contributed their papers in absentia, as it were, showing their 
commitment to the workshop and its subject matter. 
In continuity with the previous workshop, organized by Jeanne 
Gaaker and François Ost, the participants were given absolute freedom to 
choose their own topic and approach (Law in or Law as Literature), so 
long as they did not discount the epistemological and methodological 
concerns that L&L currently deems essential in those countries where 
L&L is a more recent development, as in Europe and Latin America. 
Besides, a methodological discussion becomes all the more important in 
this case, where scholars are coalescing around L&L from a variety of 
different backgrounds. 
I should scarcely mention that the workshop bore fruit, with an 
array of contributions that hold the promise of future development. 
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The short space afforded by a presentation will not make it possible 
to point out all the observations and insights that have come together in 
this collection of contributions, each of which is best read on its own 
terms. There are, however, some broad remarks that can be made which 
to a greater or lesser extent cover most of the contributions. 
There is broad agreement that can be observed as to what to expect 
out of L&L. What comes out with greater driving force from these 
readings, taken as a whole, is the idea that L&L can serve us in good 
stead, more so than other tools, in doing an about-face, turning around 
the way we analyze and construct the law. This is to say that L&L 
enables a deep criticism of dogmatic legal reasoning, a criticism that 
really takes modernity and modern thought as its primary object. The law 
such as we experience it —distant from a pure theory of law and from its 
possible realization, as well as from any legal-economic framing of it—
reveals itself through literary discourse to be gappy, wanting, innocent of 
its own recourse to a language dense with metaphor, like a system that is 
developing pathologies. 
As we say this, we must maintain the distance that separates L&L 
from a certain self-absorbed strand of postmodernism, which until some 
time ago was fashionable, almost like an affectation. Indeed, because 
there emerges from this unmasking ability the further possibility of going 
back and considering the law as one of the components of culture and as 
a nonexclusive locus social normativity, we can go back and observe the 
law as ius (as spontaneous normativity, as living law), just as, in parallel, 
we can observe society as an essential source of community, thus 
developing new skills with which to make better the world of daily life. 
In this sense, L&L stands as something more than a fecund mode of 
research: it should also develop into a curriculum —not only at 
university— so as to enable future lawyers and officials, as well as 
citizens at large, to hone their ability to understand and critically interpret 
the law. 
Another broad point as concerns the essays in this collection is that 
we can observe in this work an overall refining of the cross-disciplinary 
method being used. Indeed, it is a valuable set of theories and analytical 
models that have been worked out and presented at the Beijing 
workshop, suggesting that the cross-disciplinary approach has yet to 
achieve its full potential. It was quite invigorating in this sense to take 
part in a world congress for the philosophy of law and find myself in the 
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company of anthropologists and sociologists of law, as well as among 
constitutional and comparative lawyers, literati, and younger scholars. 
In fact, just as it is appropriate for us to proceed along different avenues, 
and with the high degree of specialization that characterizes scientific 
research, so we should each be seeking to share experiences as scholars 
investigating the same object from different angles. What I have in mind 
is not just jurists and literary scholars working closer together, but also a 
deeper exchange among the different legal disciplines, on the one hand, 
and the literary ones, on the other. Indeed, elements valued as original 
from one perspective may turn out to be quite predictable from another, 
and vice versa, and the way to avoid such a disconnect is by promoting 
better cooperation. That, coupled with an attitude of openness, may just 
be what is needed to effect the radical change in direction we all hope to 
achieve when it comes to analyzing, constructing, and interpreting the 
law. And meetings like the Workshop on Law and Literature held at the 
24th IVR Conference, as well as other similar initiatives the ISLL will be 
happy to coordinate, offer an opportunity to move in precisely this 
research direction. 
I can only close by extending my heartfelt thanks and warmest 
regards to those who took part in the workshop and those who will want 
to join the discussion that draws its impetus from this initiative. 
 
 
M. Paola Mittica 
July 14, 2010 
 
  
BENJAMIN A READER OF BAUDELAIRE: IMAGES OF MODERNITY 
THROUGH TIME, MYTH AND THE LAW 
by  
Vera Karam de Chueiri 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Verse-nous ton poison pour qu’il nous réconforte! 
Nous voulons, tant ce feu nous brûle le cerveau, 
Plonger au fond du gouffre, Enfer ou Ciel, qu’importe? 
Au fond de l‘inconnu pour trouvez du nouveau! 
 
(Baudelaire 1997, Le Voyage) 
 
 
The most sophisticated civilization and the most “modern”  
culture are not part of my private comfort; some of them  
are the very means of my production.  
 
(Benjamin 1931) 
 
 
 
Introduction  
Benjamin, a German reader of Baudelaire who arrives in Paris by means 
of Baudelaires’ verses tells us about an experience of space and time, which can 
be translated by “modernity”. Time already belongs to modernity’s own 
representation so that modern times or temps modernes is —not by chance— 
the picture of modernity. (Modern) time and its movement (re)defines (modern) 
space.  
It is noteworthy that in another Franco-Germanic dialogue Deleuze 
(1996, vii) refers to Kant’s first great reversal in the ‘transcendental aesthetic’ 
of the Critique of Pure Reason remarking that time is no longer related to the 
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movement, which it measures, but movement is related to the time which 
conditions it: This is the first great reversal in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Movement is subjected to time. For Deleuze (Ivi, viii), Kant’s new definition of 
time implies completely new determinations of space and time. It is no longer a 
question of defining time by succession, nor space by simultaneity, nor 
permanence by eternity. Permanence, succession and simultaneity are modes 
and relationships of time. Thus, just as time can no longer be defined by 
succession, space cannot be defined by coexistence. 
The priority of time over space can be related to the fact that time is the 
form of all intuition, that is, it is directly the form of inner intuition and 
indirectly the form of outer intuition. Heidegger, in Being and Time, says the 
question must first be asked whether and to what extent in the course of the 
history of ontology in general the interpretation of being has been thematically 
connected with the phenomenon of time. We must also ask whether the range of 
problems concerning temporality, which, necessarily belongs here was 
fundamentally worked out or could have been. Kant is the first and only one 
who traversed a stretch of the path toward investigating the dimension of 
temporality —or allowed himself to be driven there by the compelling force of 
the phenomena themselves (Heidegger 1996, 20).. 
This step back to the “transcendental aesthetic” of the Critique of Pure 
Reason shows us briefly the commitment of modernity with time/temporality, 
by one of the most exemplar representative of its (modernity’s) early 
manifestation. The discussion in this paper is, then, driven by this commitment 
of modernity with temporality. 
When Benjamin addresses his critical analysis of modernity, for what it is 
meant part of the nineteenth century and the first four decades of the twentieth 
century, he is concerned with a time whose spatial representations can be Paris, 
Berlin or Moscow. Benjamin’s writings and thoughts in order to (re)think 
modernity take into account these urban images (Bilde).   
This paper focuses on Benjamin as an interlocutor of Baudelaire and 
hence on the urban atmosphere of Paris which both talk about: Baudelaire in the 
lyric of his poetry and Benjamin as a reader of Baudelaire as well as an “exiled” 
(living) in Paris. Benjamin proceeds from the conviction that the allegorical 
poetics of Baudelaire constituted a privileged vantage-point from which to view 
the plight of a “self-alienated humanity” in the era of industrial capitalism 
(Wolin 1982, 231). That which is concerned in Benjamin’s view of modernity is 
precisely a question of time and of an alteration in its relation to space. 
Then, back to the Germanic-Franco dialogue, Benjamin and Baudelaire, 
there is time conditioning the movement of the commodities, the movement of 
the machines and the movement of the passants through the Parisian passages. 
Pictured by Benjamin’s eyes especially on the lyric of Baudelaire’s verses one 
sees the contradiction or the dialectics of modernity: Samples of bourgeois 
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movements, the movement of the masses and the rhythm of the revolutions. As 
Benjamin observes, “[…] Baudelaire’s own poetry […] supported the 
oppressed, though it espoused their illusions as well as their cause. It had an ear 
for the chants of the revolution and also for the ‘higher voice’ which spoke from 
the drum roll of the executions. When Bonaparte came to power through a coup 
d’état, Baudelaire was momentarily enraged. ‘Then he looked at the events from 
a 'providential point of view' and subjected himself like a monk’”.1  
Modernity is time redefining itself in a promising but scaring way where 
all that is solid melts into air.2 The turbulence of the streets, mass and 
bourgeoisie, commodities and the new arts which hesitate between becoming or 
not commodities, new techniques, the iron made “arcades” of Paris, all of these 
movements in the urban site are constitutive of the “new/novelty” that is in the 
core of modernity.  
Yet, the assumption of the “new/novelty” as a central category to 
recognize modernity is not free of problems and contradictions. Modernity’s 
(pre)tension of being eternal is the first and perhaps most insurmountable 
contradiction. On the one hand, the condition of the “new/novelty” implies a 
permanent movement which, on the other hand, no longer continues in the 
perspective of the eternal. There is a tension between what aims at being 
unchangeable and eternal and, at the same time, is meant by the transitoriness 
and contingency of actuality. Here remains one of modernity’s dilemmas. In the 
essay called Modernism,3 Baudelaire talks about a man who has a higher aim 
than that of a simple flâneur, that is, a more general aim, distinct from the 
ephemeral pleasure of the circumstance. Such man is a lonely fellow with an 
active imagination traveling through the huge desert of men. He seeks for 
something one can call modernity. According to Baudelaire there is no better 
word to express such idea, to extract the eternal from the transitori.4 “La 
modernité – anticlassique et classique. Anticlassique: en tant que contraire du 
                                                 
1
 Benjamin (1992, 26) quotes Paul Desjardins. 1887. “Charles Baudelaire”. La revue 
bleue 19. 
2
 “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned and man is at last compelled 
to face with sober, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind”(Marx- 
Engels 1976, 487). 
3
 Modernism is the third essay of “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” 
(Benjamin 1992). In the French edition of this book modernism is translated by 
modernité. The relation as well as the distinction between modernism, modernity and 
modernization will not be discusses here. Nevertheless, in the French edition (1997), the 
German word in the glossary is Die Moderne (modernity). So, even using the English 
translation of Charles Baudelaire I rather consider the German word and its French 
translation to which I will refer as modernity. 
4
 “By modernité I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose 
other half is the eternal and the immutable” (Baudelaire 1981). 
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classique. Classique: en tant qu’exploit héroïque de l’epoque qui imprime sa 
marque sur son expression” (Benjamin 1997, 311 [J 38a, 1]). 
Benjamin criticism is first concerned with revealing the “new/novelty” 
(the ever-new) as the always–the-same and secondly with unmasking the 
always-the-same as nothing but the transitory and temporary. The whole idea of 
modernity is, in this sense, entangled by this paradox. 
The image of a hero could be a good representation of these “modern 
times”. A time which promises adventure, power, happiness, revolution but also 
threats with the destruction of that which one have known, gained, and been. 
The heroic attitude redeems from the “old”, that is, the hardness of social roles 
in the feudal society, the pre-(iron)-capitalist society, the so-behaved art 
expressed in the figurative paintings,  the romanticism in literature and so forth. 
Baudelaire identifies the hero in the figure of the artist. Both (the hero and the 
artist) embody this new subject who signifies this new time. Modernity is after 
all the time of this subject whose actions shaped the “new/novelty” through the 
changes he or she has unchained. The subject is an agent of changes which, at 
the same time, are changing him. “The hero is the true subject of modernism” 
(Benjamin 1992, 74). Therefore, to experience modernism it is necessary a 
heroic attitude.  
This heroic attitude or this heroic desire that signifies the modern subject 
radically expresses itself through one of the manifestations of modern passion 
that is the suicide. “Modernism must be under the sign of suicide, an act which 
seals a heroic will that makes no concessions to a mentality inimical towards 
this will. This suicide is not a resignation but a heroic passion. It is the 
achievement of modernism in the realm of passions” (Ivi, 75). We are 
condemned to this heroism that gives rhythm to Baudelaire’s verses. Benjamin 
himself performs the modern hero. His suicide on the Franco-Spanish border, at 
Port Bou, on September of 1940 is nothing but the tragic fate of our condition 
as moderns.  
Indeed, Benjamin tells us about this radical modern passion as the sign, 
which crosses over our lives turning them especially modern (and tragic). 
Humanity is thus fated to its damnation: Everything that we can expect as 
“new/novelty” is, since then, a reality that is already present. It is a time in 
which progress is nothing but the phantasmagoria of history itself, the eternal 
recurrence of the same. Modernity is seen in the reproduction of the always-the-
same under the appearance of the production of the everlastingly new. In other 
words, the representation of modernity through its elements can be seen in the 
image of the eternal recurrence. Modernity, in this way, is the image of a world 
commanded by its own phantasmagorias: The repetition of the same. So, death 
and transitoriness in the realm of modernity’s passion and beauty have to be 
understood in the eternity of such repetition. “L’humanité sera en proie à une 
angoisse mythique tant que la fantasmagorie y occupera une place” (Benjamin 
1997, 22).  
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Benjamin also identifies in Baudelaire’s poetry, the passion, which 
defines the content of modern life. The interweaving of passion, poetry and 
thought is in Benjamin’s works as well as in his life. His analysis of Baudelaire 
is nothing but an analysis or the experience of a time that is beaten by the 
rhythm of passions, machines, commodities, and masses, that is, the (modern) 
time of the “metropolis”. 
Then, reaffirming the purpose of this paper is to show how Benjamin 
approaches modernity as an experience of time seen through its urban 
representations or rather through modernity’s mythic aspects. Such approach is 
based on Baudelaire’s writings which are deeply involved with the Parisian 
social life of the nineteenth century and on Benjamin’s own experience as a 
Berliner admirer of Paris with a fair metropolitan soul. 
There are two kinds of narratives, which reciprocally crisscross here: 
Baudelaire’s poetry and prose and Benjamin’s critique of them. The poems and 
their reviews flow in the rhythm of the perceptions of their narrators. They both 
are free narratives comparing to the academic narrative that bounds papers, 
thesis and dissertations. The narrative of the paper tries to be faithful to this 
modern commitment that makes Baudelaire and Benjamin accomplices of a 
project yet free in the way they narrate it. Then, this paper takes modernity as its 
leitmotif first focusing on Paris as the capital of nineteenth century as well as 
the center of capital (time I). It also focuses on the Parisian arcades (time II) to 
where Baudelaire arrives and from where Benjamin departs in acknowledging 
the paradox of modern times: Heaven and hell. Finally, it relates (modern) time 
to myth and both to (modern) law stressing the element of violence Benjamin 
talks about in referring to the law. 
  
Time I: Paris, the capital of nineteenth century and the center of capital 
 
Benjamin was attracted and repelled by the urban centers. As a Berliner 
he grew up in between this cloudy metropolitan atmosphere. The air of promise, 
excitement, exhilaration and development of the metropolis seduced him to the 
same extent that threatened him with a present of exploitation, alienation and 
despair. The daily life of the city, especially Paris to where Benjamin decided to 
go with the rise of the National Socialists in Germany, became the very means 
of his intellectual production. Benjamin finds in Baudelaire’s writings, 
especially in his poetry, the picture of Paris in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, which symbolizes the time —modernity— that both reflect about. 
Baudelaire offers images of a time, which Benjamin’s eyes capture and around 
which the narrative of this paper flows (in order to think its own time, that is, 
the present time of this narrative). In fact, The Paris of Second Empire in 
Baudelaire is a reading of the past through which Benjamin talks about the 
transformation of the Weimar Republic during the raise of the National 
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Socialism. In his analysis, Benjamin superposes two distinct historical epochs 
comparing their images, so that future generations could know their own epoch. 
The challenge of this paper is either this movement, this passage, which makes 
one goes back and forth between Paris’ nineteenth century and Berlin’s first 
half of the twentieth century in order to know modernity or it is to decipher 
one’s own present time as a reader of Benjamin. 
Benjamin identifies (and experiences) in the threshold of the twentieth 
century a tension between, on the one hand, the development of productive 
forces and new techniques and on the other hand culture which does not follow 
this rhythm of development of productive forces, moving away from the 
capitalist reality. In other words, cultural production hesitates in becoming 
commodity and as such to join the market as the place where everything that 
circulates assumes the character of commodity. Cultural production rests on the 
threshold of the market. It is between this hesitation of an immoderate 
development of the market and a cultural sphere that remains in the threshold of 
this development that Benjamin draws the figures which represent the 
phantasmagoric of Baudelaire’s poetry and that critically expresses modernity: 
The bohème, the flâneur and the modern hero. 
Benjamin takes the idea of phantasmagoria from Marx’s analysis of 
fetishism in the Capital in which he holds that in the capitalist system social 
relation among men take the phantasmagoric form of a relation among things. 
In fact, phantasmagoria is an illusion that distracts men from their own reality. 
It shows the illusory character of culture in a society dominated by commodity. 
Benjamin (1997, 258: fn. 7) refers to phantasmagoria to mean every cultural 
product that hesitates in becoming commodity: “Chaque innovation technique 
qui rivalise avec un art ancien prend pendant quelque temps la forme sans 
transparence et sans avenir de la fantasmagorie: les méthodes de construction 
nouvelles donnent naissance à la fantasmagorie des passages, la photografie fait 
naître la fantasmagorie des panoramas, le feuilleton s’accompagne de 
physiologies, l’urbanisme à la Haussamann, dans sa brutalité, s’oppose à la 
flânerie fantasmagorique”.  
The first image (of fantasmagorie) is that of the bohème: An 
indeterminate, disintegrated and fluctuating mass that Benjamin identifies in 
Baudelaire’s writings, in his prose and poetry, when he refers to the 
bourgeoisie. The same bourgeoisie to whom Baudelaire dedicates his “Salon de 
1846” and later on he attacks when he invests against the school of bon sense. 
“And so it is to you, the bourgeois, that this book is naturally dedicated; for any 
book which is not addressed to the majority —in number and intelligence— is a 
stupid book” (Baudelaire 1981, 43). Benjamin also recalls Marx in his 
description of conspirators, the occasional and the professional conspirators that 
he finds in the Empire of Napoleon III. These political types had some habits, 
which characterized them as the bohème. As says Marx: “their uncertain 
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existence, which in specific cases depends more on chance than on their 
activities, their irregular life whose only fixed stations were the taverns of the 
wine dealers —the gathering places of the conspirators— and their inevitable 
acquaintanceship with all sorts of dubious people place them in that sphere of 
life which in Paris is called la bohème” (Benjamin 1992, 12). The conspirators 
also erected and commanded the barricades. However, they were not the only 
people there. Behind the cobblestones, especially with regard to the event of the 
Commune in 1871, there was a mixed mass of bourgeois and proletarian types. 
Baudelaire mentions the barricades in his poem Dans l’adresse à Paris which 
was supposed to conclude Les Fleurs du Mal but remained as a fragment. He 
remembers the barricade’s “magiques pavés dressés en fortesses” (Id., 1997, 
29).  
Marx addresses his attention to Blanqui, a central figure of the barricades, 
to whom he refers as an alchemist of the revolution and who “'fully share[s] the 
disintegration of ideas, the narrow-mindedness, and the obsessions of the earlier 
alchemists'. This almost results in Baudelaire’s image: The enigmatic stuff of 
allegory in one, the mystery-mongering of the conspirators in the other” (Id. 
1992, 17). In another parallelism that Benjamin stresses between Marx and 
Baudelaire we are sent to taverns and absorbed by the aroma of the wine, thanks 
to the chiffoniers, alchemists of the taverns, by means of whom the bohème 
stayed in the taverns as if they were their home.  
 
On voit un chiffonier qui vient, hochant la tête, 
Butant, et se cognant aux murs comme un poète, 
Et, sans prendre souci des mouchards, ses sujets, 
Épanche tout son couer en glorieux projets. 
 
Il prête de serments, dicte des lois sublimes. 
Terrasse les méchants, relève les victime, 
Et sous le firmsment comme un dais suspendu 
S’enivre des splendeurs de sa propre vertu. 
 
Oui, ces gens harcelés de chagrins de ménage, 
Moulus par le travail et tourmentés par l’agê, 
Éreintés et pliant sous un tas de débris 
Vomissent confus de ‘énorme Paris  
(Baudelaire 1997, Le vin des chiffoniers) 
 
According to Benjamin, the chiffoniers, even not being part of the 
bohème, could be recognized among the bohemian types such as the littérateur 
among professional conspirators. A spirit of revolt and a suspicion about the 
future were shared by all of these men. It is remarkable that the chiffoniers do 
not even belong to this community of outsiders, that is, their misery is such that 
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they do not belong to the “community of those who do not belong” (Frey 1996, 
153). 
Yet Benjamin points up the poet and his political idiosyncrasies as well 
as the situation of the man of letters in the society. In picturing the man of letter 
in his searching for a place in the capital of nineteenth century and the center of 
capital, Benjamin refers to another Baudelaire’s phantasmagoria, that is, the 
image of the flâneur. Baudelaire sees the man of letters as having a similar 
attitude to the conspirator: He, the man of letters, conspires with language itself. 
The figures that represent the bohème are outsiders, are types that have 
little to do with one another but which are linked by the fact that they have been 
excluded from society. As Frey says (Ibid.): “the bohème thus has the structure 
of a constellation. […] For Benjamin, the constellation is an order of 
relationships that was concealed by an existing order and is divulged by the 
isolation of its elements. Isolation itself is what establishes the connection. 
Discontinuity here is not the suspension of one order so that another becomes 
visible; rather, what is discontinuous is similar to itself as such”. In this sense, 
the chiffoniers who do not even belong to the outsiders (who recognize 
something of themselves in them), give the idea of the bohème as a 
constellation. The chiffoniers are the outside appearance of the outsiders. In fact 
the bohème, the constellation, brings all these excluded types together. 
In connection with the bohème is the flâneur. “Baudelaire knew the true 
situation of the man of letter was; he goes to the market place as a flâneur, 
supposedly to take a look at it, but in reality to find a buyer” (Benjamin 1992, 
34).  
Paris was an excellent place for strolling. After all, it was the capital of 
the capital. However, with the replacement of wide pavements by narrower ones 
it became dangerous to stroll because of vehicles and the little protection from 
them. “Strolling could hardly have assumed the importance it did without the 
arcades” (Benjamin 1992, 36). The arcades or passages were such an invention 
in the second half of nineteenth century. A picture of the development of luxury 
covered by glass, marble-panelled passageways, the passages in Paris were the 
house of the flâneur. As Benjamin says, the place of little métiers: “as for 
himself he obtains there the unfailing remedy for the kind of boredom that 
easily arises under the baleful eyes of a satiated reactionary regime” (Ibid.). The 
arcades were the devices of the physiologies, the device of the feuilleton, they 
became essential for this kind of modest-looking, paperbound literature. They 
changed the boulevards into an intérieur and the street became a dwelling for 
the flâneur. The physiologies pictured the Parisians who were habitués of the 
arcades as friendly types helping to fashion the phantasmagoria of the 
metropolis. “The walls are the desk against which he presses his note books” 
(Benjamin 1992, 37).  
The flâneur rambles in the metropolis without destination. This type, 
according to Benjamin, became an unwilling detective in times of terror. He 
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searches for a crime. Detective stories also fashioned the phantasmagoria of 
Parisian life. Baudelaire himself adopted the genre, which first arrived in France 
by means of Poe’s stories. Poe’s The man of the crowd is for Benjamin an X-ray 
of the detective story. “A man who arranges his walk through London in such a 
way that he always remains in the middle of the crowd” (Benjamin 1992, 48). It 
is hard to identify this man among the crowd turning him even more suspected. 
For Baudelaire this man is the flâneur.  
This genre of literature transformed the city into a place of danger, of 
fearless and of daring people. “What are the dangers of the forest and the prairie 
compared with the daily shocks and conflicts of civilisation? Whether a man 
grabs his victim on a boulevard or stabs his quarry in unknown woods —does 
he not remain both here and there the most perfect of all beasts of prey?” (Ivi, 
39)  
The crowd that appears in Poe’s poem has a straight relation to the city. 
Benjamin stresses this relation analyzing Baudelaire famous poem A une 
passante: 
 
La rue assourdissante autour de moi hurlait. 
Longue, mince, en grand deuil, douleur majestueuse, 
Une femme passa, d’une manière fastueuse 
Soulevant, balançant le feston et l’ourlet; 
 
Agile et noble, avec sa jambe de statue. 
Moi, je buvais, crispé comme un extravagant, 
Dans son oeil, ciel livide où germe l ‘ouragan, 
La douceur qui fascine et le plaisir qui tue. 
 
Un éclair… puis la nuit! – Fugitive beauté 
Don’t le regard m’a fait soudainement renaître, 
Ne te verrai-je plus que dans la éternité? 
 
Ailleurs, bien loin d’ici! trop tard! jamais peut-être! 
Car j’ignore où tu fuis, tu ne sais où je vais, 
O toi que j’eusse aimée, ô toi que le savais! 
 
For Benjamin, the crowd which Baudelaire does not explicitly mention 
(“la rue assourdissante autour de moi hurlait / car j’ignore où tu fuis, tu ne sais 
où je vais”) determines the events described in the poem. It is beautiful how 
Benjamin interprets the poem in the sense that the crowd is not the refuge of a 
criminal but it is that of love which eludes the poet. This very crowd brings the 
apparition who fascinates him (the poet) to him. The delight of the city-dweller 
is not so much love at first sight as love at the last sight (Benjamin 1992, 45). 
The poet who looks to the crowd without really looking to it because “une 
femme passa, d’une manière fastueuse / soulevant, balançant le feston et 
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l’ourlet”. Yet, an unexpected pleasure and excitement is there in the multitude 
(“ne te verrai-je plus que dans la éternité?”). The object of desire comes out 
from the crowd. This is modernity shaped by the big city: The excitement of the 
ephemeral (love). However, what is love but the possibility of the eternal? 
Again, we find ourselves confronting the paradox of heaven and hell, given by 
the very idea of modernity. Gilloch (1997, 146) writes: “the erotic becomes a 
momentary act of seeing, of voyeurism. The glimpsed remains unfulfilled. For 
the poet the city is the site of temptation: It is the home of Tantalus”.  
The arcades were where the flâneur would find entertainment, fun, and 
novelty. “To promenade without purpose is the highest ambition of the flâneur” 
(Ivi, 153). He is that bourgeois type who strolls through the passages searching 
for diversion.  
Baudelaire (1981, 9) sees the flâneur as a man of the crowd comparing 
him to Poe’s character: “His passion and profession are to become one flesh 
with the crowd. For the perfect flâneur, for the passionate spectator, it is an 
immense joy to set up house in the middle of the multitude, amid the ebb and 
flow of movement, in the midst of the fugitive and infinite”. In Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire5 Benjamin does not accept Baudelaire’s view of the flâneur as a 
man of the crowd. The flâneur is not just one more among the crowd as if he 
was wedged there. He is a pedestrian who “demanded elbowroom and was 
unwilling to forego the life of a gentleman of leisure” (Benjamin 1992, 129). At 
the same time he enjoys the crowd which offers him pleasure, enchantment and 
makes him an accomplice, he does not feel himself as belonging to it. It is 
essential for the flâneur to dissociate him from the crowd, the ignoble mass. His 
individuality is taken to be a heroic attitude, a resistance from being devoured 
by the mass. “For Benjamin, the flâneur is heroic in his arrogant retention of an 
aloof independence and a disdainful individuality” (Gilloch 1997, 153). 
The crowd helps to turn invisible that which is to be visible in order to 
shape the bourgeois type embodied by the flâneur. Bourgeoisie has an extreme 
necessity of being recognized in its individuality: A class that, obviously, does 
not want to be seen as a collectivity. The most distinguished type of bourgeois 
who, as a flâneur, walks on the streets of Paris doing nothing is the dandy. This 
very bourgeois figure is someone who dares the time of competition determined 
by the rhythm of the market. His laziness in a time beaten by the sound of serial 
production is a kind of paradoxical heroism. After all, he is not a man of the 
marketplace but he goes to the arcades in order to sell his product, that is, his 
“fashionable” idleness. “The flâneur-as-idler is thus doubly phantasmagoric: In 
                                                 
5
 Benajmin wrote his first essay on Baudelaire called The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire as a first draft of the third part of a major work called Passagenarbeit. After 
he submitted the essay to Adorno in order to become a member of the Institute, Adorno 
raised some issues and the debate between them resulted in another essay Benjamin  
(1939) wrote called Some Motifs in Baudelaire. 
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what he writes (the physiologies) and what he does (the pretence of aristocratic 
idleness and the reality of bourgeois commercial interest)” (Ivi, 156). 
For Benjamin, whether a man of the letter or a dandy in his aristocratic 
costume, the flâneur takes the Parisian arcades in order to see and to be seen 
and then be bought as any other commodity in the marketplace. The flâneur is 
rendered by the intoxication of the commodity. The flâneur, like a prostitute, 
offers himself as a commodity in the marketplace. Intoxication, prostitution and 
the big city: Modernity in the (de)humanizing perspective of its fate.  
However, at one moment these reversed types of the metropolis such as 
the flâneur (seen in all of his representations), the prostitute and the gambler are 
the true heroes of modern life. They are images of anti-heroes, phantasmagorias 
that reveal that which is to be in capital of the capital. The true modern hero is 
nothing but commodity. Benjamin reads Baudelaire stressing these deceiving 
characters of the metropolis who are heroes exactly for being the anti-heroes.  
We are at the point of a great irony: The hero in the modern metropolis is 
that who is intoxicated by it to the same extension he is stimulated by it. Opium, 
absinthe, narcotics, intoxication and pleasure, hell and heaven: Modernity. 
The modern hero is one who while embodying the tendencies of modern 
capitalism, is simultaneously engaged in an inevitably struggle against them. 
The heroism of modernity takes the form of self-deception while it deals with a 
universe of paradoxes and illusions. As I mentioned in the introduction of the 
paper the most paradoxical and illusory heroic attitude of this modern subject is 
the deprivation of his own life: “the resistance which modernism offers to the 
natural productive élan of a person is out of proportion to his strength. It is 
understandable if a person grows tired and takes refuge in death. Modernism 
must be under the sign of suicide, an act which seals a heroic will that makes no 
concessions to a mentality inimical towards this will. This suicide is not a 
resignation but a heroic passion” (Benjamin 1992, 75).   
 
Time II: The passages (arcades) 
 
Around 1822 it arrives in Paris the magasin de nouveautés. The new 
condition of industrialization raises a new form of commerce that takes place in 
this new architecture of glass and iron and gaslight: “invention du luxe 
industriel; des couloirs au plafond de verre et aux entablements de marbre; […] 
un monde en miniature” (Benjamin 1997, 65 [A 1, 1]). The Passages are really 
the sign of modern times. Besides the architectonic resource with an arched 
roof, passage also means a short extract from a book, movement, transition. It is 
always a way through which one (we) is (are) taken, in which one (we) is (are) 
exposed. Modern time is the time of the passages/exposition. 
Therefore, the Passages through where one sees the urban life of the 
metropolis happening is the central image for Benjamin (re)thinking of 
modernity. It is not by chance that in the beginning of 1927 Benjamin engages 
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himself in a project dedicated to the critical revelation of the modern metropolis 
as the phantasmagoric site of mythic domination, calling it The Arcades Project. 
It was in fact an exposé in 1935 about Paris, the capital of nineteenth century 
that somehow established the axis of the whole project. Later, he rewrote its 
main section under the title Paris of Second Empire in Baudelaire and On Some 
Motifs in Baudelaire. Yet, the project as a whole remained suspended and 
unfinished with Benjamin’s heroic and tragic death which, paradoxically, ends 
by giving a meaningful end to it. 
It is possible to say that the Arcades exposé adopted a very close 
standpoint to the study of the seventh century in the Trauerspiel. Its theoretical 
main point is the concept of the “prehistory” of the nineteenth century 
(Urgeschichte des 19ten Jahrhunderts). The exposé was to introduce the 
nineteenth century into the present. Benjamin intention was to reveal elements 
of prehistory “such as myth, fate and the always-the-same beneath the apparent 
phantasmagoria of nouveuté, the fantastic array of commodities and innovations 
that swept the nineteen century under the banner of ‘the modern’” (Wolin 1982, 
174). He aimed at demonstrating how modern(ity) itself regressed (!) to the 
level of prehistory.  
Benjamin sees the phantasmagoric proliferation of new commodities 
(which distinguished urban life under the conditions of nineteenth century 
capitalism) as regression to the notion of eternal recurrence or mythical 
repetition. That is, it represents a return to the notion of cyclical time which was 
dominant in prehistoric times. From the privileged point of consumption, full-
scale commodity production signified the reversion to a Great Myth: The 
reproduction of the always-the same under the semblance of the production of 
the perpetually new (Ibid.). Benjamin’s analysis of Baudelaire’s poem Les Sept 
Viellards talks about the new/novelty as that which is revealed as the 
phantasmagoria of always-the-same.  
 
Fourmillant cité, cité pleine de rêves, 
Où les spectre en plein jour raccroche le passant! 
Les mystères partout coulent comme des sèves 
Dans les canaux étroits du colosse puissant 
… 
Tout à coup, un vieillard don’t les guenilles jaunes 
Imitaient la couleur de ce ciel pluvieux, 
Et don’t l’aspect aurait fait pleuvoir les ânomes, 
Sans la méchanceté qui luisait das ses yeux, 
… 
Son pareil le suivait: barbe, oeil, dos, bâton, loques, 
Nul trait ne distinguait, du même enfer venu, 
Ce jumeau centenaire, et ces spectres baroques 
Marchaient du même pas vers un but inconne. 
… 
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Â quel complot infâme étais-je donc en butte, 
Ou quel méchant hasard ainsi m’humiliait? 
Car je comptai sept fois, de minute en minute, 
Ce sinistre vieillard qui se multipliait! 
 
Que celui-là qui rit de mon inquiétude, 
Et qui n’est pas saisi d’un frisson fraternel, 
Songe bien que malgré tant de décrépitude 
Ces sept monstres hideux avaient láir éterne! 
 
Aurais-je, sans mourir, contemplé le huitième, 
Soisie inexorable, ironique et fatal, 
Dégoûtant Phénix, fils et père de lui-même? 
-Mais je tournai le dos au cortège infernal 
[...] 
 
The old man with a repulsive aspect appears eight times. The magic 
circle, as Benjamin (1997, 55) says, never ceases: “Car je comptai sept fois, de 
minute en minute, / Ce sinistre vieillard qui se multipliait! […] Aurais-je, sans 
mourir, contemplé le huitième?” It is the anguishing phantasmagoria that occurs 
to the individual in the “fourmillant cité, cité pleine de rêves / Où les spectre en 
plein jour raccroche le passant! Baudelaire qualifie l’aspect de cette procession 
d’infernal. Mais le nouveau que toute sa vie a guetté, n’est pas fait d’une autre 
matière que cette fantasmagorie du ‘toujours le même’”. 
The passages can be seen as lustful streets where the desire is the desire 
to consume and to be consumed.  
The passages which inspired Benjamin’s exposé let us with the sensation 
of Benjamin’s fascination with the ruins of nineteenth century, (the ruins of) 
modernity made visible by the allegorical images he finds in Baudelaire’s 
poetry, especially images of Paris. 
The allegorical image consists in the devaluation of the intrinsic 
meanings of things for the sake of its own arbitrary meanings. As commodity 
turns objects and persons into lifeless abstractions so does allegory. Through 
reification allegory manifests the perfect technique for the poetic representation 
of capitalist society. It shows the transformation of social relations between men 
into lifeless relations between commodities. “The allegorical mode of intuition 
is always built in a devaluated phenomenal world. The specific devaluation of 
the world of things which occurs in the commodity is the basis of the allegorical 
intention of Baudelaire” (Wolin 1982, 67-8). Allegory as a way of representing 
an element by something else leads to a multiplicity of meanings, that is, any 
object, person or relationship can mean anything else. If each thing can mean 
anything then a lack or emptiness of meaning occurs. “The commodity is in the 
realm of artifacts what the allegory is in the realm of words” (Gilloch 1997, 
135). 
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The sentiment that expresses the modern experience of devaluation 
follows in Baudelaire’s verses:  
 
Paris change! Mais rien dans ma mélancolie 
N’a bougé! Palais neufs, échafaudages, blocs, 
Vieux fauburgs, tout pour moi devient allégorie, 
Et mes chers souvenirs sont plus lourds que des rocs. 
 
Paris is not the same. “Le vieux Paris n’est plus (la forme d’une ville/ 
Change plus vite, hélas! Que le couer du mortel)”. There is an atmosphere of 
sadness considering that what the city was and there is a lack of hope 
considering that what it is coming to be. That is, antiquity and modernism are 
connected in catastrophe. Precisely progress is the catastrophe Baudelaire refers 
when he sees a “changed” Paris. 
For Benjamin, Baudelaire was an allegorist who sought to link the 
experience of commodity to that of allegory. In the way Baudelaire refers to the 
decay of Paris and tells us about it through the allegorical images of his poems, 
commodity as well embodies the allegorical and in the cycle of production it 
ends by its decadence/ruination. Obsolescence is the necessary condition for 
producing.  
The capital of the capital: Images of seduction; heaven and hell (and the 
necessary melancholy to picture them in verses). Paris as the urban site of 
Baudelaire and Benjamin’s narratives is the space of ruin. However, there is a 
positive feature in the allegorical narrative. Benjamin (1985, 223) says that one 
of the strongest impulses of allegory is the appreciation of the transience of 
things and the concern to rescue them for eternity. Ruination and redemption, 
history overcomes myth.  
 
 
1. Time and Myth 
 
Paris as the privileged image to (re)think modernity is the site of the 
mythic. Benjamin is touched by this feature of the metropolis. In fact, he wants 
to show that the traditional historical image is not dialectically built but 
mythologically given.  A new historical image has to be free of its mythological 
weight. In the realm of myth time looses its historicity and becomes 
homogenous and uniform.  
As Gilloch (1997, 9) says, myth “appears to have at least a fourfold 
significance for him (Benjamin): As fallacious thought, as compulsion, as 
tyranny, and as a metaphorical device”. It generally refers to archaic forms of 
perception and experience which can be seen as (1) fallacious ideas, illusions 
and fantasies. As a (2) compulsion, myth is the opposite of truth and human 
freedom. It points out the powerlessness of human beings with regard to the 
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omnipotence of nature. In this sense, in the domain of myth one’s humanity is 
subject to the fate and whim of gods. In the sense of (3) tyranny, Benjamin uses 
the term myth to show how modernity in order to reverse the human subjection 
to nature ends by being characterized by the continuity of mythic forms. That is, 
instead of accomplishing the supreme ends of reason, generally conceived as 
giving birth to an autonomous and independent subject with regard to nature, by 
means of a rational understanding and a scientific knowledge, modernity is a 
new epoch of illusion and barbarism. As Adorno and Horkheimer points out 
men really want to learn from nature how to use it in order to wholly dominate 
it and the other men. Benjamin sees modernity as prehistoric. It constitutes “a 
perpetual relapse into the always-the-same of myth” (Wolin 1982, 211). As a 
(4) metaphor Benjamin alludes to mythological characters to parody modern 
bourgeois neoclassicism. 
The twofold sentiment that most characterizes Baudelaire and Benjamin 
in their “texts-images” about the city is that of love and hate. The same 
ambivalence drives Benjamin’s understanding of myth. On the one hand the 
images we have of the modern metropolis are built on modern myths such as 
technological innovations, industrial lines of production, serial production, 
exhibitions and fashion. The promise of continual progress and endless 
improvement are among the mystification of the metropolis in the era of 
capitalism. The subject in such context lives in the realm of repetition. Serial 
production and fashion are nothing but manifestations of recurrence. “L’éternel 
retour est la forme fondamentale de la consience mythique, préhistorique. (Elle 
est une conscience mythique parce qu’elle ne réfléchi pas)” (Benjamin 1997, 
143 [D 10, 2]). Modern capitalism is thus seen as an intensification of myth and 
modernity has not progressed beyond it. As Benjamin (Ivi, [D, 10, 3]) says, 
recurrence is the essence of the mythical event.  
Modernity is mythically understood as the unchanging of that which is 
always the same. “C’est un monde caractérisé par une rigoureuse discontinuité, 
le toujours Nouveau n’est pas quelque chose d’ancien qui demeure, ni quelquer 
chose de passé qui revient. Mais une seule et même chose traversée 
d’innombrables intermittences” (Ivi, [G°, 19]). Yet, myth is redeemed in 
Benjamin’s dialectical conception as far as he finds in the surrealistic image of 
the metropolis —as a (dream)scape— the critical power of awakening: 
“dialectical thought is the organ of historical awakening. Every epoch not only 
dreams the next, but while dreaming impels it toward wakefulness” (Id. 1992, 
176).  
  
 
2. Time, Myth and the Law 
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How this idea of myth applies to (modern) law? It is worthy thinking the 
constitution of the law and its time as a time of contraction and contradiction, as 
modern time itself. By constitution I mean its founding moment through which 
we have access to it. This very moment is neither legal nor illegal; a moment of 
suspension according to Schmitt, or of a coup de force or performative violence 
according to Derrida, which no previous law could guarantee. Here violence, 
force, power, and the law entangle us —or perhaps we have never been 
otherwise. In fact this is the particular trait of modernity concerning its time and 
its law. Then, how to distinguish violence from force, authority, power, and the 
law? How to distinguish violence from violence (a distinction between the 
violence that institutes and the violence that conserves and enforces the law)?  
The fact that this difficulty (or undiscerning violence) cannot be 
eradicated does not condemn us to obscurity or paralysis but to an enduring 
paradoxical situation with regard to the force of law, its origin, and constitution. 
As Fish (1989, 520) says, “the force of the law is always and already 
indistinguishable from the forces it would oppose […] there is always a gun at 
your head. Sometimes the gun is […] a gun; sometimes it is a reason, an 
assertion whose weight is inseparable from some already assumed purpose; 
sometimes it is a desire […]; sometimes it is a need you already feel; sometimes 
it is a name […] whose power you have already internalized. Whatever it is, it 
will always be a form of coercion, of an imperative whose source is an interest 
which speaks to the interest in you. And this leads me to a second aphorism: 
Not only there is always a gun at your head; the gun at your head is your head”. 
Ultimately, the foundation of law is by definition unfounded and there is no bad 
news on this. Following Derrida (1990, 945) this structure in which law is 
essentially deconstructible “whether because it is founded, constructed on 
interpretable and transformable textual strata (and that is the history of law 
(droit), its possible and necessary transformation, sometimes amelioration)” or 
because it exceeds the opposition between founded and unfounded (this is 
Derrida’s “mystical” limit of violence, authority, power, and law) is what makes 
deconstruction possible. And it is this very possibility (of law, of deconstruction 
and of deconstructing the law) that incites us to weave a more intricate web 
whose ethical and political knots entangle us in the question of justice and 
democracy. These difficulties contrary to what one could imagine are 
possibilities for a deconstructionist approach of law that provokes or invokes 
our responsibility “without limits, and so necessarily excessive, incalculable, 
before the memory; and so the task of recalling the history, the origin and 
subsequent direction of concepts of justice, the law and law” (Ivi, 953).  As 
Derrida nicely says, the task is not merely philologico-etymological or 
historical, but ethico-politico-juridical.  
What I want to stress in this last section of the paper is how this violence 
which is at the origin of law and remains in its existence is related to myth and 
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particularly how Benjamin (1971) does it in a text called Pour une critique de la 
violence. “Myths are absolute and comprehensive representations that exhibit 
[…] a 'violence of mythic subsumption'” (McCall 1996, 185). This mythical 
violence pertains to powerful structures such as law. One may perceive the 
violence that precedes the law and it is at its origin yet the violence that 
conserves it is hardly perceived. Manifest and non-manifested violence can be 
related to the violence that precedes and founds the law and the violence that 
conserves it. This latter appears to be natural and normative and then invisible. 
As McCall (Ivi, 187) says, violence “appears to come from heterogeneous sites, 
both representable and not, both 'manifested-focused' and 'invisible-pervasive'”. 
Benjamin (1971) in his critique of violence articulates myth and (modern) law 
through the notion of a mythic-legal violence.  
For Derrida (1990, 997), the violence that founds the law must 
encompass the violence that conserves it and it cannot brake with it: “It belongs 
to the structure of fundamental violence that it calls for the repetition of itself 
and founds what ought to be conserved, promised to heritage and tradition, to be 
shared. A foundation is a promise. Every position (Setzung) permits and 
promises (permet et pro-met), it positions en mettant et en promettant. And even 
if a promise is not kept in fact, iterability inscribes the promise as guard in the 
most irruptive instant of foundation. [...] with this, there is no more a pure 
foundation or pure position of law, and so a pure founding violence, than there 
is a purely conservative violence”. There is a différantielle contamination 
between them and this very idea is at the core of law. 
If in or to Derrida it is the mythical element that leads to 
deconstructibility of law here we are before an attitude or a passage whose 
origin is a non-origin as far as it does not situates itself or determinates itself in 
or out of the law. That is, we are before a moment or an attitude or a passage of 
exception.  
Benjamin (1988, 257) in his eighth thesis on history says: “The tradition 
of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not 
the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in 
keeping with the insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring 
about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the 
struggle against Fascism”.6 According to Agamben (1998, 62), that which 
                                                 
6
 See too Benjamin (1988, 257): “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state 
of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a 
conception of history that is in keeping with the insight. Then we shall clearly realize 
that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our 
position in the struggle against Fascism. One reason why Fascism has a chance is that in 
the name of progress its opponents treat it as a historical norm. The current amazement 
that the things we are experiencing are 'still' possible in the twentieth century is not 
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Benjamin calls real (wirklich) “state of emergency” produces an inversion, that 
is, to the law that is merely force and then indeterminable and not enforceable 
there is life that opposes itself and then transforms itself entirely in law. Such 
inversion relates the exception to a messianic time, a time of promises; this real 
state of emergency which is the messianic time in its own form. Benjamin 
affirms that the “state of emergency” in which we live is not the exception but 
the rule. Here messianic time appears as the interruption of the law for the 
restoration of its originary structure. The messianic time is, paradoxically the 
time of the suspension of the law for its own restoration. It is the aporia modern 
law face which means the procrastination of time or its deferment to the time 
that remains.  
According to Derrida (1990, 993), “this moment of suspense, this epokhé, 
this founding or revolutionary moment of law is, in law, an instance of non-law. 
But it is also the history of law. This moment always takes place and never 
takes place in a presence. It is the moment in which the foundation of law 
remains suspended in the void or over abyss, suspended by a pure performative 
act that would not have to answer to of before anyone. The supposed subject of 
this pure performative would no longer be before the law, or rather he would be 
before a law yet not determined, before the law as before a law not yet existing, 
a law yet to come, encore devant et devant venir”.  
Benjamin talks about a mythical manifestation of violence which is 
identical to the violence of law and the insidious quality of its historical 
function.  He opposes this mythical violence to pure and immediate violence 
which could be able to suspend the former. “La violence mythologique est 
violence sanglante exercée en sa propre faveur contre le simple fait de vivre ; la 
violence divine est violence pure exercée en faveur du vivant contre tute vie. La 
première exige le sacrifice, la seconde l’accepte” (Benjamin 1971, 144).  
Pure, immediate and divine violence is present in everyday life through a 
sacralized manifestation. It is an instructive violence. It is a violence that 
manifests itself in exposing and deposing the relation between violence and the 
law. Benjamin (Ivi, 147-8) affirms: “C’est sur la rupture de ce cercle magique 
des formes mythiques du droit, sur la suspension du droit, y compris les 
violences auxquelles il renvoie, comme celles qui renvoient à lui, finalement 
donc de la violence de l’État, que s’instaurera une nouvelle ère historique. Si 
déjà le régne du mythe est présentement, ici et là, battu en brèche, ce nouveau 
ne se situe pas dans un horizon lointain si difficile à concevoir qu’une parole 
contre le droit s’éliminerait d’elle-même. Mais si la violence, elle aussi, voit, 
au-delà du droit, son statut assuré comme violence pure et immédiate, la preuve 
alors sera faite qu’est également possible, et de quelle manière, cette violence 
                                                                                                                       
philosophical. This amazement is not the beginning of knowledge-unless it is the 
knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable”.  
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révolucionnaire dont le nom est celui qui doit être donné à la plus haute 
manifestation de la violence pure parmi les hommes […]. Mais il faut rejeter 
toute violence mythique, la violence fondatrice de droit, qu’on peut appeler 
violence gouvernante. Il faut rejeter aussi la violence conservatrice de droit, la 
violence gouvernée, qui est service de la gouvernante. La violence divine, qui 
est insigne et sceau, non point jamais moyen d’exécution sacrée, peut être 
appelée souveraine”. 
Benjamin stresses the relation between between divine violence and 
mythical-legal violence yet he “concentrates on the bearer of the link between 
violence and the law, which he calls bloss Leben” (Agamben 1998, 65). 
According to Agamben (Ibid.) divine violence “establishes an essential link 
between bare life and juridical violence”. The clash between divine violence 
and mythical-legal violence exposes and deposes violence showing that “la 
renonciation à la violence de droit, [...] renvoie à la culpabilité du simple fait 
naturel de vivre, laquelle, de manière innocente et malchanceuse, livre le vivant 
à l’expiations qui le 'libère' de sa culpabilité – et aussi bien libère le coupable, 
non pourtant d’une faute, mais du droit” (Benjamin 1971, 144). 
For Benjamin violence is the object of his critique as far as it is 
inseparable from moral concerns and it is not by chance that he discusses it as 
an engagement of law and justice. Moreover, Benjamin is attentive to the 
engagement of law and violence appropriate to the modern rule of law model 
and that mythical violence is precisely the mode of state-imposed violence. As 
McCall (1996, 206) nicely puts it: “violence of law, like that of myth, has to do 
with just this constitution and marking of bodies”. 
For Benjamin modernity in the manifold of its manifestations is the time 
and the site of myth. The urban scenario of the metropolis, the urban types of 
Paris and the political scenario of most Europeans nation-state show the 
paradox of this time of enlightenment and obscurity. Yet Benjamin is very 
aware of the contradictory aspect of modernity and then his critique is, 
somehow, an attitude of deconstruction or destruction or annihilation of its 
mythic forms. If one can say that the mythic reverses in the allegorical, this 
latter represents the very annihilation of the former. For, mythical-legal 
violence reverses in the rule of law which is also the very possibility of its 
critique and deconstruction. 
 
 
4. Some Final Words 
 
Modernity, modern times, capitalism, at the same time that freed men 
from the hardness of social roles in the pre-capitalism feudal society generated a 
social organization, rudely alienated, lacerated by economic exploitation and 
social indifference able to destroy each value —moral, cultural,  political— 
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raised by this very modern social organization. Thus, capitalism in promoting 
the self-development of the individual, in making him free has also developed 
in him anguish, frustration, unconfidence and despair.  
Modernity could be translated as a time in which everything can be 
bought, everything can be exchanged, everything happen in the rhythm of 
violence and in a violent rhythm. To such image (of hell) is opposed an image 
of satisfaction, pleasure and enchantment such as the Parisian passages. The 
flâneur, the physiologie, the poet, the dandy, the prostitute, the rag-picker, all 
peripheral types in the realm of capitalism but who do not succumb to it, are the 
heroes of modernity as well as Benjamin and Baudelaire. A mixture of 
melancholy and amusement but after all a “modern” deeply conviction that we 
can be redeemed from hell through liberation is what both pursue. In this way, it 
would be necessary to restore the sense in which modernity might signify 
criticism and revolution in order to face the dangers of the own modern world.  
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LAW IN /AS LITERATURE AS AN  
ALTERNATIVE HUMANISTIC DISCOURSE.  
The Unavoidable Resistance to Legal Scientific Pragmatism or 
the Fertile Promise of a Communitas Without Law? 
by 
José Manuel Aroso Linhares 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this essay is not only to recognise and identify a certain 
«common ground» explored by different interlocutors in the Law and Literature 
debate —a «ground» which, with its interpretative assumptions and practices, 
constitutes a specific (and unintentionally overlapping) construction of 
meaning— but also to illuminate this identification under the reflexive impulse 
of a well-known formulation by Klaus Lüderssen’s, preserved here in its 
original interrogative form (1991, 24, fn. 39): «The Law and Literature 
Movement — eine Herausforderung von Law and Economics?»1  
Stimulated by the possibilities of this interpellation, my intention is not, 
however, to insist on the primary methodological —interpretative or 
adjudicative— opposition between a quantitative and, supposedly, rigorous 
translation of comparability (or expectations of legal comparability) and a 
deconstructive celebration of casuistic singularity (and différance) —the 
opposition that constitutes the core of Lüderssen´s reflection (2002, 37-41). 
Neither is it to explore the anthropological programmatic and polarised contrast 
developed by Robin West (herself the well-known protagonist of a devastating 
debate with Posner): The contrast between a certain «economic man» and a 
                                                 
1
 «Is the Law and Literature Movement a challenge posed by Law and Economics?» 
(mine trans.) The first version of «Literatur — gesteigerte Realität» (Lüderssen 1991, 
11-25) includes an explicit reference to a future essay identified as «The Law and 
Literature Movement — eine Herausforderung von Law and Economics?» (Ivi, 24, note 
39). The interrogative form disappears however when this essay is finally published in 
the second edition-version of Produktive Spiegelungen. See «Law and Literature als 
Herausforderung von Law and Economics» (Id. 2002, 32-47). 
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certain «literary person», or better put, between the «excesses of an economic 
man run wild», which «emerge from economic legal analysis», and the 
possibilities of a «literary person», if not even of a «literary woman», that 
emerge (or are beginning to emerge) from literary legal analysis. 2  
Besides these two major specifications of the Law and Literature 
enterprise —with its emphases on the possibilities of law as literature and law 
in literature, respectively, or more accurately, on interpretive and literary 
jurisprudences (Minda 1995, 153-159), if not indeed on hermeneutic and 
literary interdisciplinary projects (West 2008, 1)— I should also insist that my 
aim is not even to reproduce or to reconstruct the global «cognitive dissonance» 
(D’Amato 1990, 164) between Law and Economics and Law and Literature, but 
rather to revisit the Lüderssen’s challenge by replacing its two explicit 
interlocutors.  
But what does replacing the involved interlocutors mean? It means not 
only expanding the question, but also causing an explicit turn in its dynamic 
accentuation. The main problem would thus be the resistance offered by a 
certain view of interdisciplinarity —the one which sees Law as a part of the 
«noble republic of letters», «not complete unless it draws nourishment» 
(«assistance» and «edification») from the «sources of external knowledge» that 
«the humanities» (including philosophy and literary criticism) as such 
provide— to another view of interdisciplinarity —the one which is determined 
by the hegemony of the social sciences and by empirically explanatory models 
(if not explicitly by the prediction that the future of the «rational study of law» 
demands as protagonist «the man of statistics and the master of economics»), as 
if the path could be cleared by remembering the disagreement between Learned 
Hand and Oliver Holmes Jr. about the «future direction of Law»:3 Without 
forgetting that to expand these plausible interlocutors means now to enlarge 
either the targets of resistance (opponents) or the front of resistance itself. 
 
(a) To enlarge the opponents’ axis… in what sense? So that this axis may 
include (and overlap with) all the possible positive answers to a maximizing 
intertwined challenge between effective social macroscopic strategies and 
microscopic tactics… and these answers under the unifying mask of a basic 
generalized bet (-pari!) on a scientifically informed Zweckrationalität (and 
Zweckprogramm). As if we could recognize a manifold legal instrumentalism or 
pragmatism coherently assumed, seriously taken as an ultimate model of 
integration… and this recognition might include and absorb Pound’s social 
engineering and Posner’s pragmatic judge, but also Hans Albert’s technological 
teleologism, and Vermeule’s pragmatic justification of a New Textualism, 
without excluding some overtly ideological representations of the political 
                                                 
2
 See «Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast» in West 1993,  251-264. 
3
 An exemplary «tale of two speeches» is told by Balkin-Levinson 2006, 155-160. 
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judge (as the tactic executor of a certain constitutional strategy or as the tactic 
performer of alternative emancipatory strategies) still informed by a «scientific» 
or «pseudo-scientific» concept of public reason, basing his choices on the social 
empirical effects that alternative decisions are likely to have. 4 
 
 (b) To enlarge and unify the targets means however, as I have already 
said, to grant a meaningful development to the possibilities of the promised 
resistance, to the point that these, at last identified and justified as humanistic 
approaches (or «humanistic» interdisciplinary projects), may recognize 
themselves not only as immediate productive outgrowths of the linguistic 
literary turn (and The Law and Literature Movement) but also as participants in 
other complementary or sometimes alternative trends such as narrative critical 
jurisprudences, law as musical and dramatic performance, legal iconology or 
ars legis, law and film and law and culture movements. A meaningful 
outgrowth, I insist, and a no less meaningful spectrum: from Boyd White’s 
“communitarian” narrativism (and communal lawyer) to Balkin’s 
transcendental deconstruction (and performative triangle); from Martha 
Nussbaum’s poetic judging (and literary judicious spectator) to Costa 
Douzinas’ ethical diké (and momentary principle of Justice); from John 
Denvir’s jurisprudence of comedy (and comic view of Law) to Richard 
Delgado’s legal counter-storytelling (sustained by a specific voice-of-colour 
thesis); from Martin Jay’s iconic creative tension between alterity and 
commensurability5 to David A. Black’s reconstitution of legal and cinematic 
narrative regimes and its productive interactions; from Richard Weisberg’s 
morally relevant deconstruction and «reconstruction» of specific procedural 
narratives to Naomi Mezey’s defense of a particular intertwinement between 
law as culture and culture as law.  
Although certain that this is a «common ground» (a kind of a defensive 
front) from which we should not exclude Robin West’s approach, even though 
she expressly teaches us that «adjudication despite a superficial resemblance to 
literary interpretation is not primarily an interpretative act»,6 it is also a 
«common ground» from which we have to exclude Dworkin —even though his 
                                                 
4
 The formulation of “public reason” is by Martha Nussbaum, in Poetic Justice (1995, 
xviii-xix): «The aim of this book is […] to present a vivid conception of public 
reasoning that is humanistic and not pseudo-scientific, to show how a certain type of 
narrative literature expresses and develops such a conception, and to show some of the 
benefits this conception might have to offer in the public sphere…». 
5
 As a «call for a compromise [between] seeing and unseeing justice» (Jay 1999, 33-34). 
See also Douzinas-Nead 1999, 12. 
6
 «Adjudication is in form interpretive, but in substance it is an exercise of power in a 
way that truly interpretive acts, such as literary interpretation, are not…» (West 1993, 
93).  
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fidelity to the aesthetic hypothesis to the «use of literary interpretation as a 
model for the central method of legal analysis» (Dworkin 1986, 158) and, more 
clearly still, his representation of hard cases deciding determined by the chain 
novel example, seem at first sight to recommend the opposite integrative 
solution. But wee shall return to this apparently paradoxical parallelism and its 
differentiation nucleus: A differentiation, we shall see, that is far from being 
irrelevant.   
Once exposed to this crude resistance story —or at least to the promise of 
a concertatto involving such heterogeneous protagonists (different voices that 
address themselves to shared unified targets!), it behooves us immediately to 
ask, using a formulation by Rorty’s, if it is productive or «interesting» to 
identify such a common ground and its parallel interdisciplinary claims (and 
these concentrated in a plausible front) with the inclusion and exclusion 
processes that configure this ground, and the reduction of complexity that its 
axis of intelligibility necessary engenders. The sequence that follows is an 
attempt to specify and answer this question, or at least to privilege it as a 
leading thematic choice. 
 
 
1. Let us begin by beating a path through shared territory: As if scouting it 
around meant, here and now, to pay attention to the different voices that inhabit 
it (to ear them, privileging their explicit formulations). As we might expect 
from a resistance front story, it is a negative feature —i.e., an explicit 
convergence still of the opponents about the law’s typical conceptions we have 
to reject— that constitutes the main topos. Invoking the binomial 
society/community (societas/communitas, Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft), we could 
say that this permanently revisited topos corresponds to the conclusion-claim 
that the experience of societas (and the collective identity that this experience 
constructs as totality and artifact) is one perspective or one interpretative 
«tradition» among others, with its own understandings of «person, nature [and] 
the good» and a specific catalogue of virtues (Taylor 1989, 601).  
To see this experience as one among others means, as a matter of fact, to 
reject exemplarily all the conceptions of Law that, assuming the exclusivity of 
society’s approach and its «acultural way of understanding the rise of 
modernity»,7 project (or specify) this exclusivity onto or/as a dogmatically pre-
                                                 
7
 «[A] “cultural” theory of modernity is one that characterizes the transformations that 
have issued in the modern West mainly in terms of the rise of a new culture. The 
contemporary Atlantic world is seen as one culture (or group of related cultures) among 
others, with its own specific understandings, for example, of person, nature, the good, to 
be contrasted to all others, including its own predecessor civilization (with which it 
obviously also has a lot in common). By contrast, an “acultural” theory is one that 
describes these transformations in terms of some culture-neutral operation. […] [The] 
  26 
determined search of a unique language. Which unique language? To say it with 
Boyd White (1999, 103), the one that formalism sustains —reducing law to a set 
of self-sufficient rules, and the legal enterprise to an internal use of textual 
materials and traditional skills—, but also the one that instrumentalism or 
pragmatism justify —«imagining» law as a «branch of public policy, in which 
legal questions are collapsed into questions of social or political preference»— 
(See also Id. 1990, 22-45, 46-85). A unique language nevertheless that, in any 
of these poles, independently of the different institutional stages where it is 
performed, addresses itself always to us (et pour cause!) as an explicit 
nonnarrative mode of speaking (White 1987, 56-57): A nonnarrative mode 
which —condemning its implicit addressees to the story of an «ex nihilo 
creation» (Walzer 1995, 54) if not too the model of a consummated 
contractuality (Goodrich 1990, 149-175, 319-323) constructed through a 
selective convergence of Kant’s and Bentham’s arguments (MacIntyre 1988, 
353)— justifies not only a unilateral experience of democratic citizenship 
radically obfuscated by a supposedly scientific conception of public reason 
(Nussbaum 1995), but also a self-repressing jurisprudential enterprise: A «legal 
discourse» which, as «literature» and as «rhetoric», is unavoidably committed 
to the repressing of its «literary quality» or to the forgetting of its «textual 
organization and aesthetic arrangement» (Douzinas-Nead 1999, 10). 
 
 
2. Be that as it may, to resist simultaneously rule-centered formalism and 
legal scientific instrumentalism (brought together as calculating forms of 
reason), demands not only an alternative type of discourse or rationality but 
also a renewed experience of community. Stimulated by this new reformulation 
of our basic challenge,8 we should immediately ask if our draft of a common 
                                                                                                                       
changes are not defined by their end-point in a specific constellation of understandings 
of, say, person, society, good, they are rather described as a type of transformation to 
which any culture in principle serve as “input”…» (Taylor 1989, 601-602). «[The] 
project of founding a form of social order in which individuals could emancipate 
themselves from the contingency and particularity of tradition by appealing to genuinely 
universal, tradition-independent norms was and is not only, and not principally, a 
project of philosophers. It was and is the project of modern liberal, individualist 
society» (MacIntyre 1988, 335). 
8
 A reformulation that expands a step further the circle of the plausible opponents, 
bringing together formalistic internal and pragmatic external attitudes to the point of 
allowing Boyd White (1999, 103) to denounce them as two possible specifications of an 
outside view : «Of course the law can be imagined, sometimes usefully, in each of these 
ways […] —as a set of rules (to be obeyed or desobeyed) […] and as a branch of public 
policy, in which legal questions are collapsed into questions of social science or 
political preference […]—  […] especially when viewed from the outside». 
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ground can in fact globally and positively reveal anything else of relevance 
about the alternative ways and their institutional background. Which means of 
course asking if we are in a position to show these alternatives meaningfully as 
a real shared ground, before the effective exploration of the correlative paths 
conducted by each of the possible convergent voices gives rise to an 
unavoidable emergence of differences, that will fragment and destroy the 
promised unity. Taking this question seriously, I would risk answering that it is 
possible to recognize some other common features, even though not positively 
as many as we might expect. 
 
2.1. The call to this facet of interdisciplinarity, which we may qualify as a 
cultural or humanistic one, involves as a matter of fact two basic 
complementary common challenges: The first one committed to the return-
reinvention of a communitarian context [α)], the second one concentrated in the 
possibilities of an autonomous praxis-prattein and its rationality types [β)]. The 
articulation of these challenges favours, in turn, a sequence of other relevant 
convergences [γ)]. 
α) The first commitment corresponds, on one hand, to the shared claim of 
freeing the communitarian context or its interpretative enterprise from the 
necessity of an ontological (or onto-anthropological a-historical representation 
—saying it positively, to the demand of reinventing the experience of 
communitas, assuming (for once) the plenitude of its symbolic-cultural 
attributes; on the other hand, to the search of a constitutive dialectic equilibrium 
between community and society.  
The first attempt justifies the community’s horizon as a specific cultural 
project: Not only revealing a determinant bond with an explicit experience of 
historicity as “a radical constitutive historicity”, but also recognizing the 
positive circularity that makes this experience possible, so that this 
communitarian project —nuclearly incompatible with an abstract 
predetermination— may offer itself always inescapably and simultaneously 
either as the foundational context or as the reinvented correlate (the correlate-
ordinans) of a changeable stabilizing praxis. What kind of praxis? A 
historically open praxis, which may only aspire to be recognized as a plausible 
“valid” actualisation of the project’s intentions when submitting them to 
specific contexts or to pragmatically or rhetorically precise situations (i.e., when 
constituting and transforming these intentions). 
The second complementary claim establishes an exemplary counterpoint 
between two unmistakable cultural projects of collective identity, which are also 
two irreducible typical faces of a certain teleological turn —both of them 
responsive to the present circumstance, both of them facing the claims of 
pluralism, fragmentation, difference: So that the society project may be the one 
which assumes the basic equivalence (if not the quantitative commensurability) 
of all the subjective needs, ends and interests, and treats them as preference 
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claims… and imposes the exclusive answer of a possible set of hierarchizing 
decisions, but also the social-political artefact that legitimises collectively these 
decisions; so that the so-called community project may open up our experience 
(and our possibilities of practical deliberation) to the consideration of an 
integrative horizon of shared practical commitments and responsibilities, in 
order to sustain and explore an insurmountable dualism between subjective 
goals and human goods, between ends and values —or at least to reveal the 
importance of «non-commensurable» «qualitatively distinct and separate» 
ultimate ends, each one pursued «for its own sake» demanding as such a set of 
plausible specifications.9 
β) What about the rationality types? We may say that the resistance to the 
dominant axis of the episteme-techné or techné-episteme —which is also a 
resistance to the exclusivity and unilaterality of the society project, and to this 
one as the regulatory nucleus of an historically insurmountable evolutionary 
stage— affords us the privileged occasio of reinventing the equilibrium of 
Aristotelian intellectual virtues as a major experience of plurality:10 Here and 
now as the opportunity to pursue the interrupted emancipation of praxis-
prattein for once radically freed from the theoretical predominance of sophia, 
which is also the opportunity to reformulate the challenge of phronêsis. What 
kind of reformulation? A very specific one. Certainly not the reformulation 
which bets on the radical autonomy of phronêsis (and explores its internal 
hermeneutic and/ or argumentative possibilities), but the one which, 
reappraising the concern with «the ultimate and the particular» 
(Aristoteles/Gadamer 1998, 42-43 [VI, 9, 1142a, 25]), brings phronêsis and 
poiesis together through the specific mediation of aesthesis: A reformulation 
that explores the possibilities and promises of a certain «perception» or «sense-
perception»’s analogy as a productive reconciliation of normative and aesthetic 
arenas —made possible by the return of law and legal thought to rhetoric and its 
«imagistic language» (Douzinas-Nead  1999, 8) or by «literary imagination’s 
interpretative sense of life» (Nussbaum 1995, 1-12)— but also as the 
opportunity (the only one that today remains for us!) to «awake the 
jurisprudential enterprise from its positivistic slumber and make jurisprudence 
again the prudence or phronêsis of law».11 Which means recognizing a very 
                                                 
9
 The quoted formulations are by Nussbaum (1999, 179-188): «Virtue Ethics…» and 
(Ivi, 182-183): «The Anti-Utilitarians; Expanding Reason’s Domain». 
10
 A paradigmatic consecration of plural rational types, if not of a certain plurality 
theorem. See «Aristoteles oder die Selbständlichkeit von Vielfalt» in Welsch 1991, 277-
284. 
11
 «The aims of literary jurisprudence and of legal iconology are not dissimilar; but 
while the former closes the eyes to open the ear to the ars legis the latter insists that 
law’s captures the soul by addressing the totality of the senses…» (Douzinas-Nead 
1999, 11). «In acknowledging the ars legis, the aesthetic dimension of law, we open the 
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specific path, followed by such different interlocutors as Boyd White and 
Douzinas, Nussbaum and Balkin, without forgetting that this path is made 
possible by an eloquent (selective) dialectic convergence of Aristotelian and 
Kantian arguments, the latter certainly recomposed on the basis of a new hard 
nucleus, named Kritik der Urteilskraft… 
γ) Once one recognizes the convergence of these two challenges and the 
alternative pathos they invoke, a few words are enough to catalogue the steps-
topoi they justify. These involve, as a matter of a fact, a sequence a possible 
«landings», to be successively accessed (and more or less intensely inhabited) 
as one presents and explores certain assumptions: the normative and regulatory 
—if not the subversive12— potential of the linguistic-literary turn;13 the defense 
of narrative as the archetypal form of practice;14 the assumption that the 
construction of meaning and the circulation of signs have either stabilized or 
been transformed through the interpretative communities’ decisions of writing 
and rewriting15 —the assumption at least that interpretative pragmatics and/or 
performance involve the methodological priority not so much of a reading 
situation as of a microscopic rhetoric circumstance experienced as the 
possibility of «establishing or losing community» (Boyd White 1985, 3)—; last 
but not least (we’ll see why), the representation that legal textual materials are 
constitutively wounded by indeterminacy.  
 
                                                                                                                       
institution to the ethics of otherness and the justice of the senses or of Justitia, the 
feminine principle of transcendence that challenges the patriarchy of sublime Law…» 
(Douzinas 1999, 67).  
12
 See Derrida (1985, 134): «La littérature est peut-être venue, dans des conditions 
historiques qui ne sont pas simplement linguistiques, occuper une place toujours ouverte 
à une sorte de juridicité sub-versive […], une juridicité [qui] suppose que l’identité à soi 
ne soit jamais assurée ou rassurante. Elle suppose aussi un pouvoir de produire 
performativement les énoncés de la loi, de la loi que peut être la littérature et non 
seulement de la loi à laquelle elle s’assujetit. Alors elle fait la loi, elle surgit en ce lieu 
où la loi se fait…». See also Nussbaum 1995, 1, 9 (reading Dickens’s Hard Times). 
13
 Boyd White (1985, 122-123, 131; 1990, 16-20) writes: “We must read law as a kind 
of literature, we must read literature as a kind of law”. See also: (Id. 1994, 275 ff.) 
«Reconstuting Self And World: The Creation Of Authority As An Act Of Hope»; (Id. 
1999, 52-72) « “Law and Literature”: No Manifesto», and (Ivi, 89-110): «Meaning in 
the Humanities and in the Law». 
14
 Boyd White (1985, 175) again: “[…] The narrative as the archetypal legal and 
rhetoric form […], as the archetypal form of human thought in ordinary life”. 
15
 Decisions that, invoking the «promise» of a critical reconstitution of «topics» (Balkin 
1991; 1996), include a kind of basic rhetoricization of narratives. See too «Law’s Tales. 
Semiotics and Narratology as Storytelling», in Douzinas-Warrington-McVeigh 1991, 
92-110. 
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2.2. If I’ve just said that a few words would be enough to recognize these 
common positions, I must add that, as far as the several plausible answers are 
concerned, only a few words will be ultimately possible. As a matter of fact, 
every specification, being indispensable to construct a supposedly conclusive 
answer, exposes the shared ground to an explosion of different irreconcilable 
voices —differences we cannot pass over in silence, certainly because they 
present our humanistic approaches as divided between distinct ways of 
experiencing the interpretative enterprise.  
To characterize this enterprise and its conception of literary language, we 
are certainly still allowed to go on speaking about a dialectic constitution of 
meaning (Jauss), justified by the irreducibility of the authorial or creative 
artistic pole and the interpretative or performative aesthetic one (Iser), and 
supported by the presupposition (the endorsed reconstructed modus operandi) 
of an implicit «reading» judge. This call to the categories of reception 
aesthetics (even though taken in latissimo sensu) does not, however, avoid the 
internal tension between the discursive strategies of the intentio lectoris and the 
intentio operis (the latter disregarding the constitutive différance between 
effects and reading reception processes), as it does not avoid the oppositions 
between narration and performance, between the stabilizing possibilities (and 
the integrative strength) of a narrative-text and the contextual demands of an 
open textual notation “as a text that requires performance”,16 or even between 
different ways of understanding the internalist or externalist attitudes about the 
enterprise of law.  
Besides, to recognize an exemplary concentration of all these polarised 
tensions, it would be enough to invoke and contrast Boyd White’ and Balkin’s 
implicit judges: the former presenting himself/herself as a communal lawyer 
engaged in a specific way of life —telling a «shared story» in a «shared 
language»,17 but also viewing law from the inside as a culture of argument and 
carrying out a compositional and literary process of translation that entails an 
ethical commitment (justice as translation);18 the latter justifying 
                                                 
16
 «Law and music require transforming the ink on the page into the enacted behavior of 
others. In an important sense, there is only “law (or music, or drama) in action”, in 
contrast to poetry or fiction, whose texts do not require public performance but can be 
read silently to one’s self…» (Balkin-Levinson 1999, 1518).  
17
 Boyd White (1985, 98) writes: «The law is a way of creating a rhetorical community 
over time […]: [it is] a culture that makes us members of a common world. This culture 
is not reducible to rules, but it is objective, in the sense that it can be found and 
mastered and in the sense as well that it cannot be disregarded or unilaterally changed. 
Like the text produced by a single mind, the text produced by the culture has a genuine 
force and reality notwithstanding its irreducibility to rules or to scientific 
“knowledge”». 
18
 See again by Boyd White (1990, 229 ff.), «Translation, Interpretation, and Law», and 
(Ivi, 257 ff.), «Justice as Translation»; also Id. 1999, 69-71 (V), 97-102 (II) : «For 
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himself/herself as a performer or as a performance director —understanding the 
limitations and interests of her co-performers and her audiences and «tailoring 
her interpretation accordingly» to correspond to a certain «duty of fidelity and 
responsiveness», both to the author or composer of the text and to the audience 
or community in which he or she performs (Balkin-Levinson 1998, 1), that is 
experienced as a kind of indefinite (rather than infinite) duty, presupposing the 
intelligibility horizon of an ethics of Otherness.19 We are aware, however, that 
the interpretative spectrum is far from being reduced to these poles. Isn’t our 
                                                                                                                       
whatever the merits of the social sciences as methods for making and informing social 
policy, they cannot be applied to what is more distinctive about what lawyers and 
judges actually do, which is to discover, determine, interpret and compose legal texts 
[…]. [Scientific] “methods” cannot simply be applied to the law, any more than its 
“findings” can. There must be a process of translation […] [which] is at heart 
compositional and literary, in fact a form of writing […]. Humanistic work can thus be 
seen as a species of “translation”…». See also (Ivi, 84): «As an ethics of tentativeness 
and respect for the other, arising out of the recognition that one’s statements and 
gestures can never have universal validity […] but also as the paradoxical duty, 
impossible to discharge with perfection, of simultaneously affirming respect for the 
other —the other language, the other culture, the other person— and asserting the value 
of one’s own experience and judgement, and one’s culture too…». And (Id. 1990, 268): 
«A world of difference is thus created; it is kept from the prison-house of “single 
meanings” —of thinking that meanings translate directly from text to text— by honest 
attention to language, to particularity of phrase and context; it is kept from the chaos of 
indifferent relativism —of thinking that nothing can be known or understood, no 
common values held— by a principle of humility and sincerity, or what I would call the 
ethic of the translator…». 
19
 And the external mediation of Deconstruction, as transcendental Deconstruction. See 
Balkin (1994, part III «Speaking in the Language of the Other», 5): «The encounter 
between deconstruction and justice has changed both parties; yet, of the two, 
deconstruction appears to be the more transformed. If deconstructive practice is to be of 
any use to the question of justice, it must become a transcendental deconstruction. It 
must exchange the logic of the infinite for that of the infinite. It must act in the service 
of human values that go beyond culture, convention and law. It must recognize the 
chasm that differentiates human values from articulated conceptions of it, and it must 
identify Deconstruction with that chasm…». And (Ivi, 7-8): «Thus, the scope of the 
duty owed to speak in the language of the Other depends on our definition of the roles 
of the parties —as victim or injurer, strong or weak— but this definition will in turn be 
affected by the scope of the duty to speak in the language of the Other. […] The scope 
of our duty to speak in the language of the Other does not exist before we decide what 
their respective roles are, but the roles each plays cannot fully be determined before we 
fix the scope of the duty; each feature of the situation provides the proper context in 
which the other feature is to be judge. Because of the mutual dependence and 
differentiation of these contexts, the scope of the duty toward the Other is 
indefinite….». See also «Ideology» (Id. 1998, 99 ff.) and «Transcendence» (Ivi, 142 
ff.). 
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shared ground also inhabited by a political judge who wants to be a privileged 
listener of narratives, paying attention to stories of marginal identities and 
contributing to the microscopic destabilization of hierarchies,20 and by a judge 
who wants to become a literary judicious spectator, going behind «empathy» to 
focus our attention on «individual singularity», to treat the other «as a unique 
person with one’s own narrative history»,21 or even by a judge who wounds us 
as a spinner of  alternative tales, answering aesthetically and ethically to the call 
of the suffering Other, assuming the task of a specific justice as dike as a 
“momentary principle of Justice”?22 
When one gets to this degree of differentiation, the opposition is no 
longer played out only between different ways of experiencing the interpretative 
enterprise or the literary turn —or between different ways of understanding 
rhetoric and the practical continuum (justified by the intertwinement of 
prhronêsis and aesthesis, law and ethics), or even between different 
«evaluations» of modernity’s heritage (including the need of identifying a 
postmodern path), but between radical different conceptions of community (and 
of the return to community). 
On one hand, with Boyd White and Nussbaum, although with different 
outcomes, we have communitarian meaning stabilized in the collective 
identities of a community of memory and a community of ideas,23 or in the 
unequal dialectic process these communities construct. James Boyd White 
oscillates, as a matter of fact, between the foundational share of common stories 
and a common narrative pragmatics and the care-Sorge with intercultural 
dialogue which is also the «bet» on an ethics of translation (Boyd White 1985; 
1990); while Martha Nussbaum invokes the integrative horizon of a 
democratically participatory and republican citizenship (a typical community of 
ideas!), claiming that this experience of citizenship finds its constitutive 
experience in a kind of concrete universalism or cosmopolitanism which values 
the presupposed horizon as a patrimony of incommensurable goods, still 
opening itself to the emotions and singularity of difference.24   
On the other hand, with Cls and postmodern jurisprudence scholars, one 
experiences community as a microscopic reinvented promise permanently 
sought and deferred —as the construction of meaning (the cultural articulation 
                                                 
20
 A political judge sensitive to Critical Race Scholars’s arguments. See «Legal 
Storytelling and Narrative Analysis» in Delgado-Stefancic 2001, 37 ff.  
21
 See «Poetic Judging» in Nussbaum 1995, 72-78, 79 ff., 90ff., 99-118. 
22
 See «Another Justice» and «A Well-Founded Fear of the Other: the Momentary 
Principle of Justice» in  Douzinas-Warrington 1994, 132-185, 211-241. Also 1991a, 
117-120, 142-147. 
23
 To say it invoking the ideal types proposed by Fowler (1995, 88 ff.). 
24See an exemplary synthesis in Nussbaum 1994, without forgetting the corrections 
introduced in Nussbaum 2008, 78 ff.  
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and the integrative order-ordinans) that a specific praxis pursues and recognizes 
when invoking the reunited or separated spells of a certain political morality 
(based on the Foucaultian experience of a capillary immanent tissue of powers 
and resistances), of an aesthetics/anaesthetics of the sublime (justified through a 
Lyotardian reinvention of Kant’s reflexive judgment) and of a radically 
autonomous ethics of alterity (committed to the Derridian translation of 
Levinas’s infinite responsibility).25    
 
 
3. But let us go back to our leading question. When differences are so 
overwhelming, is it productive or «interesting» to identify such a common 
ground? I would insist it is. Certainly because it’s only when one pays attention 
to the diversity of the implicated voices, assuming the need of going beyond a 
basic “crude” diagnosis of connections and affinities, that the character and the 
limits of the sought human alternative become at last clear. One may even add 
that this is so because the awareness of an irreducible pragmatics of plurality 
(sometimes clearly the celebration of an invincible différend) paradoxically 
opens up the way for us to experience other troubling not to be confessed 
affinities between the reunited voices, which in turn contribute to the structural 
perpetuation of the differences!   
 
3.1. As a matter of fact, all the humanistic approaches that we have 
brought together reproduce a-problematically what we may denominate with the 
unexpected help of Kelsen’s and Posner’s formulations a conception of law as 
frame (Rahmen)26 or an open area discursive strategy.27 Not only because all of 
them treat law as an ensemble of textual materials to be read or to be performed, 
but also because all of them wound these materials (standards, policies, rules, 
canons) with an a-problematic indeterminacy thesis, justifying indeterminacy as 
                                                 
25
 I have systematically explored some possibilities-trends of these promises of 
community, specially in Linhares 2001,  92 ff. and 181-211 (the Foucaultian 
contribution), 221 ff. and  462-507 (the Lyotardian’s aesthetics of sublime); see also Id. 
2008, 551-667 (the Derridian trend) and 2007a; 2007b. 
26
 See Kelsen (1960, 349): «Das Ergebnis einer Rechtsinterpretation […] kann […] nur 
die Feststellung des Rahmens sein, den das zu interpretierende Recht darstellt und damit 
die Erkenntnis mehrerer Möglichkeiten, die innerhalb dieses Rahmens gegeben sind». 
27
 See Posner (2008, 9): «Legalism’s inability in many cases to decide the outcome […] 
and the related difficulty, often impossibility, of verifying the correctness of the 
outcome, whether by its consequences or its logic […], create an open area in which 
judges have decisional discretion —a blank slate on which to inscribe their decisions— 
rather than being compelled to a particular decision by “the law”. How [the judges] […] 
fill in the open area is the fundamental question that this book addresses, though lurking 
in the background and occasionally coming to the fore is the question how they should 
fill it in…». 
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a decisive parameter of the interpretative enterprise. Which means recognizing 
that the juridically autonomous “internal” treatment of these wounds and blind 
spots28 —i.e., the juridically relevant «capacity» of dealing with this situation of 
uncertainty (Boyd White 1985, 21-23, 25-26, 42, 192-212; 1990, 84-86)— 
arrests itself drastically with a process of determination of limits: A process that 
—with more or less meaningful stabilizing effects— is, so to speak, already 
predetermined in the abstract representation of these materials, and 
consummates itself without remission in the construction of the frame, the 
frame that confines (allows) an ensemble of virtually plausible legally 
equivalent alternatives, simultaneously renouncing interference with the open 
area or the blank slate it contains. Thus the choice between those alternatives 
must be pursued through decisional jurisdictional discretion, taking seriously a 
decision paradigm, which means invoking different foreseeable effects, but also 
an evaluation of these effects justified by an horizon of intentions, expectations 
and possibilities of determination which are explicitly non-juridical —those that 
the literary or performative imagination justifies with the constitutive aid of 
humanistic arenas such as literary and ideology criticism, moral and political 
philosophy, ethical and ecological  studies, semiotics and… grammatology. 
Without forgetting that this indeterminacy thesis specifies itself in a 
sequence-chain of exemplary positions, such as: 
(a) the reproduction of the binomial easy/hard cases (the first ones 
corresponding to the exceptional methodological situation of a frame which 
allows only one possible decision);29 
(b) the rejection of the intelligibility category of the legal system (whose 
possibilities are reduced to those justified by formalistic understanding);30 
(c) the complementary assumption of a continuum between legal 
materials, which is also a deliberate confusion between principles and rules, 
                                                 
28
 If not points of rhetorical or argumentative loosening or condensation. See the 
development proposed in: «Hermes versus Hercules» in Douzinas-Warrington 1991a, 
55 ff.; and Ivi, 193-196, «The Books of Judges», 4 and «Suspended Sentences», (e), 238 
ff.; see also 1991b, 117; 1994, 250 ff. (III-V).  
29
 So Nussbaum (1995, 117): «Does literary judging make a difference? Not in all 
imaginable cases, obviously. Sometimes the legal issues tell clearly one way or another; 
sometimes the facts are so simple and uncontroversial that literary imagining is not 
important...». 
30
 See Boyd White (1990, XIII): «At least until recently the image of law most widely 
accepted among legal academics […] was that of a set of rules passed by the legislature 
or articulated in judicial opinions […] perhaps coupled with the more general rules 
called “principles” that inform the lesser ones…». Again (Id. 1985,  29): «So that law is 
in this sense objectified and made a structure […] and the question “what is law?” is 
answered by defining what its rules are, by analysing the kinds of rules that characterize 
it». 
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principles and policies as «standard forms of legal justification» (Balkin 1996, 
8-11); 
(d) a consequent impossibility of justifying an autonomous 
methodological problem. 
Let’s add two words only about the third item. It is in fact surprising that 
all these discursive strategies assume constitutively a community project, as a 
return to values or human goods, or at least to «non-commensurable» ultimate 
ends, without paying attention to the specificity of legal principles and at least 
discussing this specificity. There is in them even an explicit hostility to an 
autonomous mobilization of arguments of principle, which we could exemplify 
invoking once again the exemplary polarised proposals of James Boyd White 
and Costas Douzinas: Boyd White (1985, 29; 1990, XIII) as he confines the 
relevance of the assumption of the legal system to a rule-oriented formalistic 
approach, named law as rules plus principles theory —which means also 
reducing principles to «more general rules»; Douzinas (-Warrington 1994, 237) 
as he denounces the violence against singularity and difference that arguments 
of principle and the interpretative presupposition of law-worked-by-principle 
radically aggravate —which means also denouncing Dworkin and Drucilla 
Cornell as hermeneutical positivists.31  
 
3.2. The conclusion seems unavoidable. Shouldn’t we recognize after all 
that our humanistic approaches only get to generate an effective alternative to 
legal instrumentalisms or pragmatisms when they converge —partially but no 
less paradoxically— with these privileged opponents, that is to say, when they 
a-problematically reproduce an indeterminacy thesis and an open area 
conception concentrated in a certain hard cases theory? I would say that there 
are two different problems that converge here. 
3.2.1. The first one concerns the efficiency of resistance itself. Is the 
resistance to Zweckrationalität, that these reunited interlocutors are in a position 
to oppose, a fragile one? I would say it is… because of the reinvention of praxis 
and practical thinking they offer (if not because of the practical world they 
presuppose). This fragility does not however reside in the more or less happily 
explicit renunciation to an order-ordinata of Being and its ontological mirror. 
As we have already seen, it is the circumstance of this renunciation that opens 
up, on the contrary, the opportunity for an unique (for once constitutively 
autonomous) practical philosophy!  
This fragility resides rather in the specific paths or routes that, in the 
name of that autonomous status, praxis and its intellectual virtue (phronêsis) 
seem here constrained to follow. As if the loss of sophias’s theoretical 
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 The first one, besides, «motivated by the desire to answer positivism’s 
embarrassment», if not to «purify positivism’s scandal». See «Hermes versus Hercules» 
in Douzinas-Warrington 1991a, 23-24, 55-7; and 1994, 199 ff. (III). 
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predominance has condemned contingence and mutability to a practical 
continuum, and this one involved an holistic ethical commitment where 
energeia and kinesis, praxis and poiesis, but also êthos (ήθος) and éthos (έθος), 
ethos and pathos, would be definitively reconciled and without distinction 
melted. But also as if this holistic experience justified an immediate rejection of 
all the persistent attempts that —persuasively projected in several legal thinking 
trends not certainly by chance to sustain some well-known internalist 
attitudes— accentuate either a praxis of hermeneutical re-contextualisation, or a 
topical problematically committed conception of practical arguments… and 
either one or the other of these poles searches for and justifies an autonomous 
prudential subject/subject’s rationality. 
These options shape (constrain) our humanistic approaches, not only 
preventing the possibility of establishing a clear counterpoint between moral 
and intellectual virtues,32 but also favouring a certain concept of ultimate goods: 
a concept that —thanks either to the persistence of a selective dialogue with 
Aristostelian onto-teleologism (White, Nussbaum), or to the protagonism of an 
emancipatory critic of ideology (Balkin, Douzinas)— cannot really avoid a very 
troubling continuum with means-ends rationality. As if the problem was still 
only one of competitive uncertainty, developed in the immanence of pure ends, 
and the single positive difference to be found might be that of mitigating the 
rigid equivalence of these ends with the introduction of some plausible 
hierarchies (commensurable/non-commensurable, instrumentally pursued/ for 
their own sake pursued ends). Not certainly arbitrary hierarchies, but those 
sustained by altruistic ideological convictions (Balkin) or practical-existential-
aesthetic bets (Douzinas), but also recognized thanks to the restitution of 
subjective ends to cultural systems and horizons —the cultural contexts from 
whose possibilities they were supposedly extirpated (White, Nussbaum). 33 
3.2.2. The other problem to pay attention to has to do with a kind of a 
misjudgement (if not with the misjudgement par excellence) that all the open 
area discourses cultivate. I mean the kind of misjudgement that inscribes the 
claim of legal autonomy, whatever mask it puts on, exclusively in the 
prescriptive realm of normativism and formalism and formalistic legal thinking, 
                                                 
32
 See the well-known reconstitution of Aristotle’s «practical wisdom», «akin to sense-
perception», proposed in Nussbaum 1986, 291-306, «Non-scientific Deliberation». 
33
 See in particular Boyd White (1985, 42): «Our motives and values are not on this 
view to be taken as exogenous to the system (as they are taken to be exogenous to an 
economic system) but are in fact its subject. The law should take as its most central 
question what kind of community we should be, with what values, motives and aims; it 
is a process by which we make ourselves by making our language». And (Ivi, 21-23): 
«The only rational “ends”, the only ends we can confidently use as guides to conduct, 
are conceptions of ourselves and of our relations with others, not materially describable 
states of affairs».  
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reducing the possibilities of an internal juridical attitude (the experience of law 
as an autonomous dimension of practice and an autonomous field of 
knowledge) to the corresponding program of isolation of an abstract self-
sufficient normative cosmos (freed from the dynamics of social reality or 
reducing it to an ensemble of discrete facts, as such foreseen in the rules’ 
hypothesis).  
It is this reductive misjudgement that allows our humanist front to treat 
Dworkin as a more or less overt formalist, and that after all imposes that the 
alternative to legal pragmatism and its interdisciplinary choice has to be sought 
(and found!) thanks to the propulsive impetus of another interdisciplinary 
claim: A claim that preserves the framing task of legal materials, also plunging 
into the open area and choosing one of the consented alternatives… merely 
substituting the explanatory dominance of the social sciences by the privileged 
contribution of humanistic arenas (and literary or performative invention). Thus 
the transitive decision alternative to be chosen may be the one whose effects 
better contribute to defend the judgement’s authority in the «language of 
community itself», if not also to the creation of meaning of a communitarian 
ethics of translation (Boyd White 1985, 191), to the singular celebration of 
«emotions» as «forms of intentionality» (Nussbaum 1999, 180),34 to the 
microscopic pursuit of an indefinite duty toward the Other (Balkin 1994, part 
III), to a plausible «ethical acting against the grain of the pure interpretative 
moment» (Douzinas-Warrington 1991a, 146)… even to the political 
authoritative performance of a «jurisprudence of empathy», if not a 
«jurisprudence unmodified» (West 1996, 243-244).35 
This last accentuation confronts us as a matter of fact with the explicit or 
implicit need to search for the homo humanus (or the humanity’s project) that 
our circumstance demands… beyond Law or at least renouncing Law’ specific 
«thirdness» (tértialité in Levinas) and its comparison claim (its dialectics of 
personal autonomy and limited communitarian responsibility). To justify this 
need is indeed to assume a kind of constitutive paradox: The one which strikes 
us when we notice that… if it is true that all these reunited voices are eloquently 
committed, in the name of Law or at least because of Law’s relevance, to a 
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 Nussbaum 1999, 180: «Emotion and desire are not simply mindless pushes, but 
complex forms of intentionality infused with object-directed thought; they can be 
significantly shaped by reasoning about the good...». 
35
 «A perfect legal system will protect against harms sustained by all forms of life, and 
will recognize life affirming values generated by all forms of being. Feminist 
jurisprudence must aim to bring this about and, to do so, it must aim to transform the 
images as well as the power. Masculine jurisprudence must become humanist 
jurisprudence, and humanist jurisprudence must become a jurisprudence 
unmodified…». (West 1996, 243-244, «Conclusion: Toward a Jurisprudence 
Unmodified») 
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specific urgent reinvention of praxis and practical discourse —a reinvention 
which may be able to resist Zweckrationalität’s hypertrophy, it is not less true 
that all the different parallel answers that these attempts construct only get to 
impose themselves as plausible, more or less successful, alternatives when they 
renounce Law —or when they dilute Law in a practical holistic continuum, 
where its project loses sense and autonomy. 
Is this all we have to say about the presumed common ground and its 
constructive endeavour? Isn’t this a disappointingly aporetic conclusion? Or at 
least a conclusion which, in its best light, condemns us to the alternative-call of 
an ethical answer…or perhaps better, to the challenge of a certain political 
contingent institutionalisation (the one which may be able to ear attentively this 
call)? I wouldn’t say it is. Certainly because to insist on this conclusion does not 
constrain us either to accept or to reject outright these parallel attempts, even 
less to forget their meaningful reflective patrimony (or the problems’ diagnosis 
they contribute to unveil). The awareness of this paradox rather invites us to ear 
carefully these proposals, recognizing however that we should not so promptly 
renounce, as they do, betting on Law’s autonomy… or reinventing this 
autonomy claim in our specific circumstance, to give it the chance of an 
indispensable continuous practical renovation. To go on betting on law as an 
autonomous task or an autonomous way of life means today either paying 
attention to plural multifarious contexts of realisation, or rejecting the open area 
discretion with all the presuppositions this discretion invokes. Without 
forgetting that to reject this area (to admit the need of an autonomous juridically 
plausible answer) means, in turn, to explore the possibilities of a 
multidimensional open legal system: a system of principles and rules, in 
permanent constitutive dialectics with singular, unrepeatable practical 
controversies, where normative principles (experienced as autonomous jus) are 
(luminously!) seriously taken and circularly reconstituted as an irreducible 
foundational stratum.36 
Now this bet inverts the emphasis that the drawing of our common ground 
has presupposed since the beginning. It inverts it, on one hand, to receive (to 
welcome) the experience of narrativity and performance (and its imaginative 
respect for singularity and difference) as a precious «informative» input among 
other interdisciplinarily constructed informative inputs —a contribution which 
is indispensable to recognize our practical circumstance and its cultural 
articulations, but also and in particular to pay attention to the specific sensitivity 
to singularity that these cultural articulations experience (and to assume the 
possibilities and the relevance of the different realization contexts). It inverts it, 
on the other hand, to free the legal materials from their exclusive framing task, 
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 I invoke here the specific legal system’s conception proposed by Castanheira Neves: 
See specially Neves 1993, 78-81, 152-157, 188-196, 278-283 (ßß); 1995, 155 ff., 
167-180. 
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i.e., to make them and their constitutive realisation responsible for plausible 
successful answers to concrete inter-subjective controversies, which also means 
assuming a specific humanitas project —a project which is to be pursued in an 
historical context, and which is as such conditioned by all the involved 
(political, economic, cultural) contextual factors, a project however that is not 
necessarily (rather on the contrary!) condemned to lose its identity or its 
distinctiveness.  
Does not this mean concluding that the way of combining the specific 
contributions of law and literature, legal thinking and literary criticism, legal 
practice and literary realisation, seems to be much more adequately assumed by 
Dworkin (who never forgets the distinctiveness of the legal enterprise) than by 
all the voices that we have selected as exemplary frequenters of a certain 
common ground? I would say it does. To agree on the path to be taken (where 
literary stimuli are mainly used as resources to expose and defend the law’s 
fidelity to arguments of principle) does not however mean to agree entirely and 
unconditionally on the proposed answers and the mobilized resources (to begin 
certainly with the argument that defends the centrality of interpretation in the 
adjudicative process). But this is naturally another discussion! 
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CLARICE LISPECTOR AND FORGIVENESS: 
INCIDENCES AND COINCIDENCES 
by 
Mônica Sette Lopes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At first I thought about starting this text with an eccentric declaration: I 
don’t like Clarice Lispector (Tchetchelnik-Ukraine 1920, Rio de Janeiro-Brazil 
1977). However, such a conclusive statement would prevent any improvement; 
hence I shall refrain from declaring it. 
But, if the statement was true, then what’s the reason behind this text? 
How can one not like this mysterious writer; who turned herself into a 
genuine Brazilian, making writing the essence of her own life?  
Perhaps there really is a vestige of rejection that has got history, time, 
place, and disseminates in an academic discord, as if it were impossible to 
dislike what everyone must like. Not to like Clarice Lispector is a problem and 
to state that will either solve it or make it worse. 
I shall do exactly as she. I shall answer the question that is at the end of 
the book, which is the reason for this rejection and for the blame that might not 
be forgiven among the accepted versions of right and wrong, on the field of 
erudite forms of expression.  
I was about ten years old when a friend gave me one of her books, A 
mulher que matou os peixes (The Woman Who Killed the Fishes) (Lispector 
1999). I remember taking it on a vacation trip and feeling frustrated for simply 
not liking it as I read through each page; a feeling compounded by the fact that 
the book was a present given from a dear friend. I’ve always looked for an 
answer for that feeling. On the one hand, perhaps I would answer ‘No’ when 
Clarice asks the readers if they forgive her for not feeding her son’s fishes for 
three days, which leads to their death. However, this is perhaps hypocritical, for 
one day I killed my yellow pet canary in a similar show of negligence, 
something for which I too might seek forgiveness. This story, with all its 
banalities of human cruelty, can flourish in its randomness and become trivial in 
due course (Arendt 2004). 
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The purpose, therefore, might only be to illustrate the way in which the 
need to forgive can unite us as humans; so too the need to be forgiven. Because 
inside the sources of these two tiny and sparing stories is laid bare the human 
disposition: a potential to not only make mistakes, but rather deliberately 
behave badly; the stigma of sin that potentially embraces us in its weak arms. 
We are all prone to falling, and as such we need forgiveness; we need to be 
given the opportunity to get rid of the stain. 
A mulher que matou os peixes is a typical children’s book, but it is also 
an insignificant point among the literary compositions of this great writer. It is 
illustrated. It is short. Its language appears deliberately childish, devised with a 
certain audience in mind and with the express intention of creating complicity 
between author and reader to the point where the childish tone borders on the 
forced, as if the writer is at pains to create the intimacy of a friendship that 
would not otherwise exist.  
The problem is announced on the first page: 
 
For I killed two little red fishes that don’t harm anyone and are not 
ambitious; they just want to live. People also want to live, but fortunately 
they also want to enjoy life and to do something good. (Lispector 1999, 
1)1 
 
The explanations start immediately after this well presented 
argumentative line when she guarantees that the reasons will come at the end of 
the book: 
 
I am not yet brave enough to tell you now what’s happened. But I promise 
that at the end of the book I will tell you and you, who’s about to read this 
sad story, will forgive me or not. You will ask: why only at the end of the 
book? And I will answer: It’s because at the beginning or at the middle I 
will tell you some other stories of pets that I had, just so you will see that 
I couldn’t have killed the fishes on purpose. (Ibid.) 
 
The suggested form is the same as a judgment. Facts are explained. The 
connection within the parameters is condensed into rules of conduct and is 
reviewed, be it rightly or wrongly. The arguments for a request for forgiveness 
—the final goal— are synthesized. Guilt is left to be apportioned by the reader. 
The thought is analogical: the various steps of life must be considered and 
compared. Equality and difference will have to be evaluated in the context of 
the death of the little fishes and the limits that govern human behaviour 
(Kaufmann 1976). The judgment expressed by the writer about herself will not 
                                                 
1
 This edition’s pages are not numbered. Therefore, the informal numbering from the 
first page of the narrative will be considered. 
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be enough to impose a result. An appreciation of the stark facts is fictitiously 
made. 
All the intercalated stories talk about suffering, loss or death of animals. 
The causes vary: whether it’s the need to move abroad which means she must 
leave the dog with friends or the need to give it away because of the noise, or 
the monkey that is already ill when she gets it and dies in a few days, or the 
small chicks that appear fragile. There are stories about some of her friend’s 
animals like the dog, Bruno, who killed another dog because he got jealous of 
his owner and, for this reason, was killed by the neighbourhood dogs: 
 
Bruno soon noticed that he was being surrounded by several big and 
strong dogs. Bruno knew that the dogs’ law is the revenge. He wanted to 
escape but he couldn’t break the circle. [...] The dogs suddenly attacked 
Bruno all at once, making justice themselves, because, as I said, in the 
dogs’ world they carry judge and police. (Lispector 1999, 18-19) 
 
Children’s stories prepare an ethical background that is rehearsed and 
tested throughout people’s character formation. It’s common for them to have a 
morality around good and evil and to play up to children’s feelings, making 
them incorporate the concepts even if it means confronting them with feelings 
of fear, repulsion and dislike.2 
On the above mentioned passage she compares revenge and forgiveness. 
Dogs don’t forgive. They don’t talk about it. They take revenge. They kill. 
Animals are traditionally used as characters to serve the mimetic process 
in that they are used as pedagogic resource. They are different —for a start they 
are not human; however, they can easily be used as a metaphorical symbols of 
the human disposition, a disposition inhabited by revenge and forgiveness; 
dialogue and death. 
Carlos Mendes de Sousa (2004, 176) reinforces, as from the book, the 
idea of coincidences or sharing: 
 
There is a game at play in which a larger explanation scale is involved, 
this game is expandable to different derivations, in comparison to the 
coincidences of the significant values and to the tendencies to mentally 
create or understand these coincidences. 
                                                 
2
 It will not be lazy to re-read the Chesterton of Ortodoxia that talks about the 
communication of values through this kind of narrative (Chesterton 2001, 67-90). At the 
same pace, it’s interesting the comparison made by Vilma Arêas between the work of 
Clarice Lispector and the similarities with the children’s classic of the Countess of 
Ségur, mandatory reading for girls from a certain generation, that was my own, together 
with the Poliana of the happiness game, always overcoming the annoyances of life. The 
Sofia of innumerous disasters also lived with the (bad) girl that killed the fishes (Arêas 
2004, 234). 
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To interpret these coincidences demands this analogical exercise in that it 
puts to the test the effects life choices have on others, and hence it will always 
be a measure of us, of our sharing with these others.  
For this reason, the writer puts Bruno at the centre of the picture of 
revenge and paints in that picture a scene of voracity. The dogs are 
anthropomorphised, displaying the sort of institutionalised characteristics found 
in humans (in the dogs’ world they “carry judge and police”). As such this 
metaphorical approach insures that the text is grounded steadfastly in reality. 
And this approach is no accident: Clarice Lispector had a Law degree.3 The 
diversity, in this circumstance symbolised by the animal, is a representation of 
the human equality under the light of a potential fall and dissuasion. The human 
imagery carries the perpetual anger inherent in revenge and can also carry judge 
and police. Is this a coincidence or is it perhaps planned? 
Law can be understood as a set or a system of rules of conduct that 
generate a framework of traditions that are formally established (to try) to 
prevent conflicts, or at the very least, solve them when they arise. However it is 
not always possible to explain away the oft misguided desire for revenge or 
thirst for power as merely arbitrary facets of the human soul. The anger for 
revenge has the same strength as the desire to interfere or change the past in 
which the forbidden occurred. That’s why punishment is never enough; why 
compensation rarely sates, why the penalty is never enough and why the Law’s 
time is always too long. 
Bruno’s story, drafted by the cruelties of the wildness, reflects the border 
between conflicting ancestral sociability; between good and evil; between right 
and wrong; between compassion and revenge. Ricouer talks about it by 
questioning the link between forgiveness and the idea of justice: 
 
On another instance, forgiveness cannot be put over justice, all the 
manifestations of compassion, of holiness, even in the inner of the 
administration of justice, as if justice, touched by grace, aimed in its own 
sphere that extreme to which after Aristoteles we call equity? Finally, I 
could [...] suggest the following idea: wouldn’t it be convenient to 
forgiveness to walk with justice in its effort to eradicate in the symbolic 
level the sacred composition of the revenge [...]? It’s not a matter of 
simply trying to dissociate it from the wild revenge, due to the reason that 
blood calls for blood, and intends to call itself justice. Deeper into the 
symbolic level, the game played is the separation between Dike, human 
                                                 
3
 She explains the fact backwards (Lispector 2004, 59): “San Tiago Dantas (a Brazilian 
Law Philosopher and professor) once told me he couldn’t resist to the curiosity and 
asked me what after all I was doing at a Law School. I told him that Criminal Law 
interested me. He replied: ‘Oh, well, I propmtly guessed. You became interested by the 
literary part of Law. A real jurist likes Civil Law.’ How I miss San Tiago Dantas...”. 
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justice, and Themis, the last and tenebrous refuge of the equation between 
Revenge (with capital letters) and Justice (equally with capital letters). Is 
it not forgiveness’ work to act over this sacred harm the catharses that will 
reveal a sacred wholesome? (Ricoeur 1995, 208)4 
 
The thought combines with the matrix of Christianity that adapts the 
occidental concepts around forgiveness and justice. Chesterton (2001, 127) 
links it to charity, the fascination with which lying in “the simple tenderness to 
men in their quality of men” and, therefore, of closeness or equality: 
 
Charity is a paradox, like modesty and courage. Thickly speaking, charity 
means one of these two things: to forgive unforgivable acts or to love 
people who don’t deserve to be loved. 
 
He highlights that, in Christianity, good things manifest with greater 
enthusiasm by virtue of understanding the human paradox that puts together 
horror and purity. Christianity manages to separate crime and criminal: 
 
We shall forgive the criminal up to seventy seven times. As for the crime, 
we must never forgive it. [...] We should be stricter with theft than what 
we used to be, and a lot more compassionate with the thief than what we 
used to demonstrate until now. There was room for anger and love to 
become. (Ibid.) 
 
What space, therefore, does the Law reserve for charity and forgiveness? 
Is there room in legal practice to incorporate love in conduct; to separate anger 
as destiny from the attribute of legal rule? 
The sanction is the formal replacement of revenge taken over by the 
impersonal hands of the State (Falcón y Tella- Falcón y Tella 2005). It doesn’t 
always represent the banishment of conflict. Most of the time, it artificially 
superposes it. It’s not good practice to question the functionality of the sanction 
in places of judicial erudition. It’s as if this were not right. In these places, the 
sanction is; it simply is. 
However, there’s more to the game. 
It digs the visibility of dialogical factors that could supersede the conflict 
where the solution demands negotiation and understanding; adjustment without 
absolute boundary, like on the associations of private relations in which the 
extinction of the harm or the reestablishment of the previous situation can be the 
subject of the frontal negotiation in which all sources are manifested with the 
colours of truth.  
This path gains other obstacles in certain areas of judicial apprehension. 
When a crime happens, these negotiations are, to some extent, impracticable by 
                                                 
4
 To make a profound study of this conception of the sacred see Agamben 2004. 
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the nature of penal actions and relations formed by the criminal law and its 
cogency. In these cases, there is no possibility for forgiveness, put pure and 
simply, an idea espoused by Aristotle (Ética a Nicômaco). However, even 
though the judgment is essential in them —inside the structure built to make a 
justice that slips through the hands of the victim— there is a process where the 
stage of knowledge has an eviction of the execution, surpassable by the 
conspiracies’ order. The reason for this is found in the concrete actions vital for 
the achievement of the results, which only happen if the interface like the other, 
is initially represented by the criminal and, subsequently, by the condemned, to 
carry the understanding of the participation in which each of us falls in step 
with the destinies of life. To talk about forgiveness, about charity, about 
surpassing can seem imprudent or inadequate in the realm of legal techniques. 
It’s not enough, however, to lock the condemned in jail. He is still alive in there 
with all the problems that we cannot hide. And, for this reason, the effectiveness 
of the instruments and techniques employed reflect our humanity and our 
fallibility, or at the very least, demand that we put ourselves in others’ shoes 
and face up to reality. Penitentiaries work in a routine in which the days pass 
just as they would in the world outside.5 Nothing is hidden. No one hides. 
The dialogue is the exit that can bring, in a dynamic facing of the 
variables in the private campus, a way for forgiveness and for resettlement. 
Think about family, labor and ownership and property relations in the 
controversies that surround the Law or are at the heart of society’s dissolutions, 
to take but a few examples. In each of these cases, even when the solution 
imposed by decision consigns an ideal of legal technique in its maximum 
adjustment, there will always be a need for practically accommodating actions 
in order to extinguish the difference between the parties. Even if the sanction is 
satisfactory, even if it is correctly followed, the transposition of conflict goes 
beyond it to the point where it embraces the idea of reciprocity and forgiveness. 
The walls of the hearing rooms keep the voices of bitter and of voices of relief 
simultaneously. 
 There is very little in the theory of the sanction to emphasize the positive 
angle that can allow the harmful to be replaced with the beneficial. It might be 
that this possibility reveals itself at some stage during the orality that guides the 
dialogue between the parties, their solicitors and the judge as they attempt 
conciliation, which involves the dialectic of the argumentative exposition. But 
this is not a guarantee of success. To revive the conflict is an agony; to see 
yourself once again in the clutches of defeat. Law and its custodians get 
attached to the magnanimous picture of a sanction as the final destination of 
legal rule when the law is broken. The execution of the coerciveness, however, 
does not constitute a unique or automatic act, but rather a process of unexpected 
                                                 
5
 Once again, literature can be a good way to feel the extension of the problem. See 
Varella 1999, this extraordinary perspective of the real life behind bars. 
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dynamism that demands the reinforcement of dialogue and the triumph over the 
conflict, latent and renewable, for the effectiveness of its implementation. 
Remember, once again, the penitentiaries, their jails, their routine and the costs 
that the perpetuity of their maintenance demands. 
The compensation, the expiation and the urge for justice must keep this 
dialogue open for the assimilation of past the and for the liberation of its effects 
inside the universe of possibilities. Nothing is simple or easy. Even if one cares 
only for the operation or the achievement of the sanction the effects will come 
only from an immeasurable effort. Adding to it the need to surpass the origin of 
the conflict, an addition of actions specifically focused on the lived 
circumstances that increase the demands and the work is at stake. 
 Normally a judgment, a penalty, an indemnity or a millimetric definition 
of what belongs to each one is wanted, almost as if it were possible to replace 
the past. The impossibility to do this and the operational difficulty of the formal 
structures created to do this conjure the feeling that human justice is always 
insufficient and that it inoculates conflict  beyond what would be necessary.  
The starting point can be the separation referred to in Chesterton: 
mankind is always on a tightrope on which it oscillates between the paradoxes 
and the spheres of excess. We are all steeped in good and evil. For this reason, 
Law must absorb the simultaneous violence of anger and love, like vectors of 
the understanding of its effective fragility in the implementation of justice, as 
the strength that is required to reset the stream of life of each and every person 
comes from the past. 
The importance of the narrative, therefore, gets firmer as it permits the 
review of the stories. It liberates the imaginative strengths in favour of a 
comprehension situated in what has happened. It is the revival that can even 
bring the confession (or else, the declaration of the total factual source) and the 
prayer for forgiveness (or else, the anti-revenge), and it is the revival that 
establishes a transformation in the theoretical-practical transition as referred by 
Ricoeur, which affords this frontal protection: 
 
The first transition from theoretical to practical is made by hand, whilst 
certain fictions describe the human action in itself. Or, to say the same 
thing in the opposite way, the first way that the man tries to understand 
and to take the diverse for himself in the practical way is via a fictional 
act. (Ricoeur 1986, 247) 
 
While telling different stories and transcribing a similar need, Clarice 
Lispector strives to make an argument by way of the dialogue that she tries to 
establish with the reader; the person who puts themselves in the same position 
as her son, whose fishes she left to die. She intends to achieve the essential 
relevance (wrong and right concurrently) which is the demand of whoever 
wants to know the contents and the morality of a given behaviour (Lopes 2009). 
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The description, therefore, comes to its culminating point. The writer 
assumes the deviation’s main role. She describes what happened yet refuses to 
confess to her crime, refuses to shoulder any responsibility. It wasn’t on 
purpose. It wasn’t her (my) intention. 
 
Well, now it’s time to tell you everything about my crime: I’ve killed the 
fishes. I swear that it was not on purpose. I swear that it was not my fault. 
If it was, I would say. My son went on a trip for a month and asked me to 
take care of two little red fishes inside the aquarium. But it was too much 
time to leave the fishes with me. It’s not that you can’t trust me, but I’m 
such a busy person and I also write stories for big people. (Lispector 
1999, 24-25) 
 
The confession is a call for uniformization, for the mimetism in relation 
to the other individual that joins the description. It’s as if she’d said during the 
imagined dialogue, ‘Look, I’m just like you, so pay attention, this could happen 
to anyone!’ 
The writer attempts to rationalise her actions by way of her confession, 
whereby the nature of the task and her inability to meet its challenge meant that 
she was doomed from the beginning. It is not her fault that she failed. She 
should never have been put in that position.  
She hopes to be forgiven, but is conscious that it is not the same as the 
omission, pure and simple, because omission would give place to a predominant 
shadow or obscurity, as emphasised by Ost (1999), who would capture the idea 
of a non-justice.6 He talks about an omission that carries the past in itself, that 
preserves it and that, for this exact reason, fixes a promise of non return, of 
progress for the future: 
 
From memory to progress, the path, however, is not right. It doesn’t just 
fly by, as it was seen, by good omission, by the pacifying omission and by 
the selective omission that chooses what’s needed in the addition of the 
past. But it also asks for the return of forgiveness that not caring about 
keeping or selecting the past, changes it while engraving it in the prospect 
of a new future. (Ost 1999, 136) 
 
                                                 
6
 François Ost (1999) divides in four the forms of how time and Law institute 
themselves reciprocally: a) Turn on the past; b) Turn off the past; c) Turn on the future; 
d) Turn off the future. Thou the adjective is not adequate to law books, this is a 
wonderful book, because it reinforces the need to simultaneous knowledge of each one 
of these ways of temporal insertion of justice and, then, makes a concentrate critics of 
its perspectives. The chapter in which he deals with turning off the past is where the 
idea of forgiveness is dealt with in more depth.  
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There is an occidental tradition, as inherent in Christianity, which 
associates confession with forgiveness. I confess to be forgiven. I confess and I 
am forgiven. I must address the facts and admit my transgressions before I can 
even begin to think about absolution or redemption. Perhaps in this most simple 
need to listen to the absolute revelation of the incident there is a clue which 
points towards the urge to confess being an unquestionable ideal. Confession, 
then, would be like a repose, a relief; assured by a logic without diversions. 
He’s confessed therefore that is what happened.  
How to explain, therefore, in the imaginary field, translated by a 
communicative technique that doesn’t easily absorb the legal concepts that no 
one is obliged to confess?  
The great split from a knowledge scope in the law’s action heading to 
truthfulness is set up.  
The writer agrees to cooperate. If it were her fault, she would say. She 
would confess. This affirmation gives credibility to the idea which reduces and 
justifies the request. There is no forgiveness without memory, because only 
memory can make forgiveness possible. It happens only where history is 
acknowledged. 
Once again, Ricouer (1995, 207) sheds light on this fact: 
 
Forgiveness is some sort of memory healing; the achievement of its grief, 
shared and with no debts, memory is freed for big projects. Forgiveness 
gives memory a future. 
 
In order to be forgiven it is necessary to capture the true history. It is 
necessary to acknowledge the facts; to confess them. The past can then fade 
away and leave an altogether bigger task in its wake. 
In her final declaration the writer seeks to rationalise her shortcomings: 
 
They might have starved, just like us. But we talk, complain, the dog 
barks, the cat meows, all other animals talk by making sounds. But fishes 
are as mute as a tree and had no voice to complain and call me. And when 
I went over to look, there they were, still, skinny, red —and unfortunately 
already dead by starvation. Are you angry at me because I’ve done that? 
Then forgive me. I was also really angry about my distraction. But it was 
too late to regret. I ask that you please forgive me. From now on I will 
never be forgetful again. Will you forgive me? (Lispector 1999, 25) 
 
Through her dialogue she attempts to make the reader confront what 
she’s done. She awaits an answer, after having exposed all of her arguments and 
given the facts. On a flash. With the dialectic knowledge (a complex interaction 
of yes and no), she intends to change the past. The present dialogue wants to 
supersede the impossibility of speech in the conflicting scene. The fishes are as 
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mute as a tree. Like a tree that does not speak; that does not opine; that does not 
complain. But yet like us it gets hungry. It dies just like us. 
The writer, however, can speak, can opine, and can complain. Her call for 
forgiveness is reasoned. It is argued. She integrates each passage and its 
foundations. She is conscious that there might be something revolutionary, a 
chance of a new beginning, of a year-zero (Ost 1999, 137), something touched 
upon by François Ost, who spurred on by Ricouer (1995, 207) says: 
 
The tolerated mistake translates the benevolence of the indulgence, the 
forgotten mistake reveals the absence of moral conscience and the 
dismissal of justice, but the forgiven mistake opens a new history —a 
history that breaks the everlasting return of the pulsation of death based in 
a crime-revenge cycle. (Ibid.) 
 
The year-zero is the absolute beginning born anew. It synthesises the 
complex essences of various superseded, contiguous pasts such that a path 
forward can be beaten towards a new future and hence a new life. That’s how 
conflict is confronted by justice. There is no pure, aseptic, hygienically arranged 
rule capable of freeing itself from the accumulation of immoderations. The 
process itself, formal or instrumental armour of the achievement of justice, is 
made of the dialectic sediment of information and contradiction (due process of 
law) in which the conflict gains new tunes and the need for its banishment stays 
at the hands of the arguments like an almost unreal possibility. Justice’s final 
pronouncement is only ever sought as a last resort.  
François Ost, however, analyses justice in a far deeper way, placing in it 
the context of real life, whereby forgiveness occurs only once one has overcome 
the conflict and fits everything back together, a process which means addressing 
every small angle in the totality of their senses; in the plenitude of the dialogue: 
 
If forgiveness is beyond justice, one can say, it’s beneath justice. There is 
relaxation, fatalism and even cynicism in the forgetfulness; in the 
forgiveness, on the contrary, there is the overflowing, the sublime and 
even the joy. One is above all justice's virtues, the other is bellow. One 
operates over the dark side of the law where the political calculation and 
the individual interest act, the other shines over the luminous side while 
cleared by an ethic inspiration. Free, offered without compensation, 
forgiveness re-sends to heroism the moral conscience, in certain cases, in 
the religious registry, above the exuberance of a joy that opposes love to 
hate. (Ivi, 136) 
 
This is a justice that diverts from the merely positivist method. This is a 
justice that runs away through a narrow, rough gap. It’s very difficult to deal 
with this justice where each person is an individual; full of stories, engaged with 
life. The absolute unity of troubles demands care, even when the answer is no; a 
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senseless action; a conviction. No, there is no justice. Even so its attributes 
demand that there is an overflow of goodwill. The reason must be understood. It 
must be understood so that the sanction is not another’s death, but instead a 
recovery of their life. And so it should be. 
Forgiveness is swallowed up by the legal system, remaining hidden at the 
corners, like a mechanism; a prohibitive fact; an exercise of freedom that is 
rejected by the formal legal structure in which the sanction is the magnificent 
fact; the great revelation. Ricouer’s question (1995, 208) “Is it not forgiveness’ 
work to act over this sacred harm the catharses that will reveal a sacred 
wholesome?” is not inserted in the conjecture’s order. This idea cannot be 
linked to the form of the law, the form of the decision or the form of the 
administrative acts.  
Forgiveness demands face to face confront. The one who forgives enters 
into the soul of the forgiven through the power of his exposure, looking into the 
eyes, the vision melting; exposed. As if a fragmentation of time were possible, 
one in between the other, in between us; with the conscience, the knowledge 
that we are responsible for each other (Lévinas 1991; Martins Filho 2009). 
There is a word that needs to be addressed in order to forgive. It only has 
a meaning when it gets to the ears or to the eyes of the forgiven. I forgive you. 
I’ve seen this several times at the hearing room. After the obstacles were 
revealed, after new bases for the future were established by the agreement, I see 
people returning to be who they once were. I saw this especially in a sequence 
of two separate hearings over the course of a few months. At the first hearing 
there was bitterness, an accusation of moral harassment and one of verbal 
abuse. At the following one, an agreement was reached and, after the term was 
signed, there was at last recognition of transgressions: the wild word, said by 
the employer, really went beyond the normal limits. For this, the apology was 
clearly made known —and there were smiles all round at the hearing session, as 
if they had somehow recovered the lost time. Face to face. The nearly symbolic 
indemnity has only absorbed the formality in its tradition leaving the sanction to 
take its place: A mechanism to overcome the conflict, to recover the time. 
Cecília Meireles proclaims in her poem Palavras aéreas (1989, 182-184, 
in “Aerial words”), that the word is a dream of courage, defamation, furiosity 
and defeat. If it elaborates the freedom of the souls, it is the finest retort of 
humans’ poisons; as fragile as glass as yet more powerful than steal. And so too 
is justice when is employed to cover both the fragile and the powerful. 
It is not easy to shoehorn the idea of forgiveness into justice. Law does 
not allow forgiveness. The theorists treat it only as a peripheral; an almost 
irrelevant matter. The  advocacy market is repulsed by it because it removes the 
litigation and the demands. The legal system does not formally encourage it by 
superposing revenge’s visibility through sanction. This word does not serve 
legal language as an operational concept for the performance in the dynamic. 
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To overcome the conflict and combine it with forgiveness it is necessary 
the recapitulation of the contingencies under a view that is not appropriate in 
legal language, not least since it retrieves the simple fact line in which legal data 
are just analysed as a risk; as the power of incidence and application. The 
dialogical for forgiveness demands a reciprocal interaction and a confrontation 
of the bare circumstances. It delineates, however, a translation as pointed by 
Gaaker (2007, 33): 
 
The revaluation of the humanist in law highlights the consequences of our 
engagements with language as a compositional practice in which the 
stories of parties in a lawsuit area translated into legal language. 
Subsequently, through the intervention of the judge and the judicial 
decision, such stories are rendered into a new reality for the parties 
involved. 
 
The translation is made in words that have meanings stemming from Law 
and that do not confront the matter’s entirety in the way required by other 
processes of conflict solving which are brought to the human life by the daily 
routine. The interpretation of the circumstances which characterizes 
adjudication lies on explanations, models and how the decisions are exposed 
and understood. It must be considered that only very seldom the controversies 
embrace mainly legal matters, Most of the time the legal language is applied to 
the apprehension of facts. But these facts are transformed or traduced into legal 
language. Even the collateral aspects brought forward in the argumentative 
version of the orality, in which all the risks are made explicit (the own legal 
ones, the ones that are linked to it, the peculiar life risks), are ignored, at the 
sentence writing, for being judicially irrelevant. Most of the time the informally 
expressed argument at the hearing room is ignored because it doesn’t find 
support when translated into the narrowness of legal language. Added to this 
there is a framing factor and/or the functionality of the Tribunals where 
judgments are prepared by assessors or assistants who did not help collect 
evidence and were not present during discussion of the variables. 
Only the framework of the pattern is attained by the Law: Crime must be 
punished, damage must be repaired and abuse must lead to penalty. 
The raw material with which you work is at risk of becoming a complex 
dough in which is spelt the automatic strength of the days. The processes and its 
techniques stay exposed like mandatory ingredients used in a recipe that’s been 
made and re-made over a thousand times. This situation becomes even more 
difficult when the raw material used is the word, this fragile and powerful 
human poison. 
Gaaker continues (Ivi, 33), emphasizing that legal concepts cannot be 
separated from the lives (including the professional ones) lived from then 
onwards:  
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[…] law is an institutional language that, given its substantive and 
procedural aspects, necessarily imposes its conceptual framework on its 
users. 
 
There is no doubt that some versions of forgiveness are absorbed by the 
conceptual frame. 
When the party lets the time run out, when it, conscious of what justice is 
beyond a mere presumption, decides not to deduce any pleading, the idea of 
forgiveness is often lost to the void. Not only does it exists behind the decision 
of not to get involved with the process and its formalities, but rather it also 
contrives in the legislative option as lapse, determines a deadline to consolidate 
the forgetfulness (Ost 1999, 140-143). 
It is also in the effects attributed by the legal system to the transaction or 
to the novation. As if continuing that way, they embrace the liberating power of 
forgiveness. When a dispute for mutual concessions is prevented or terminated 
(art. 840 of the Brazilian Civil Code) it necessarily has a place for forgiveness. 
A given aspect of the conflict is replaced. A new path is presented. It is possible 
to relax.  
What is at stake in any of these symbols is the reconciliation of the factual 
picture, a remodelling of reality focused on the implementation of the normative 
meaning. The remodelling of circumstances, from memory, and the open 
narrative to cheat the transaction are phenomena inherent in this process. 
The most intense question, however, persists in situations in which the 
power of decision is left to the judge. To the life story of each of the litigants, of 
the victim and the respondent, of the solicitors and the prosecutors, are added, 
then, the facts that are the process itself; the facts that come from the process. 
The process makes a meta-description of real life that paradoxically 
becomes part of it.  
The judge’s decision is inexorable and as such impossible to change. The 
decisions which consolidate the past become what they establish. For this 
reason, if they could be seen from the outside, as an entity composed by adding 
the sheets of paper that multiply in the confusion of the lawsuit records, they 
would reveal something about how the Law is that goes beyond the trivial 
conception. It’s what Laé (2001, 23) emphasises on the composition: 
 
The narrative has no value to the jurist. What counts is the group of final 
decisions taken by the tribunal. The decisions, as source of the law, 
substitute by the group of narratives retold at the judgments, to think the 
event beyond the decision. If it gets restricted to the narrative, if it 
temporarily stays away from the decision and from the cumulative group 
of judgments, then it’s found out the common continent in a group of 
evaluations in the previous process: a correlation, a similitude, 
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dependence, a spiral. We know, however, that this proposal is 
suspiciously seen both in history and law. (Trans. by A.) 
 
The problem is, therefore, that the description about how the process is 
made isn’t completely revealed and hence is ignored as a possible source of 
knowledge about the Law. The history of the process and its difficulty doesn’t 
show itself as being part of the Law, except in the pasteurization of the merely 
conceptual discussion or in the media’s unfolded view. The law becomes an 
imagined story that doesn’t always appear to keep hold of what is peculiar to its 
nature. 
There is a very significant chapter from The Legal Imagination, in which 
James Boyd White debates the way in which each person sees or estimates the 
character of the group of people, explaining the importance of each factual 
scene’s assertions like in a harvest where the subject of proof is relevant and is 
dependent of its construction by the debate (White 1986, 109-145). He 
addresses the essential role of the narrative in justice; both its necessary 
introduction into the decision process and its place in its own legal 
epistemology. This passage might synthesize his conjectures:  
 
This is a world filled with emotion and moral significance, in which the 
business of life is the process of social relation and social judgment; one 
is constantly trying to fix one’s view of others, to do justice to one’s 
emotions and one’s judgments, but language always seems inadequate to 
express what one knows. This is a world that many people leave behind 
as they grow up. But it is with something like the feelings of the sixteen-
year-old that you are urged to look at what can be said about people in the 
language of law. Is this language fit only for the half-dead obese men of 
business, whose sole concern is for things? Or is it —can it be made to 
be— something else? Can we use this language to say what you want 
about people and their experience? (Ivi, 112) 
 
How can one turn the language of law into a way of communicating that 
interacts with people? Not least since language is something that belongs to the 
people, affording them the ability to voice experiences and tell of their lives.  
In a certain way Savigny had this same perception about Law (despite it 
being somewhat limited by the possible modes of thinking common to his era) 
when he posited  Law’s shortcomings and told of his wish that, through science, 
Law could survive, like the speech survives on people’s conscience (Savigny 
1970, 54). 
His dream (that is if jurists dream!) was a justice linked with science that 
communicated in a simple way, captivating its audience just as the stories 
captivate children.  
The conclusion of Savigny’s text follows this path: 
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It’s demanded, frequently, that a code must be popular, and Thibaut dealt 
with this criteria […]. The language which is the most efficient way for a 
spirit to communicate with another, also obstructs or restricts in several 
ways this spiritual communication; frequently, the greatest part of 
thinking ends up being absorbed by this mean, due to the ineptitude of 
what’s said or heard. But in face of a natural disposition or in face of art, 
this mean can be controlled in such a way that it stops being an obstacle 
to the ineptitude of both parts. So, thinking goes over the differences of 
character and of origin of the listeners and intercepts them in the common 
medium spiritual point. With this the ones who know become happy and, 
for the laics, everything become clear; both see the thinking on top of 
them as something superior, formative and feasible for both. Somewhere 
there was a miraculous image of Christ that had the quality to be one inch 
taller than the human standing by its side; but if a man of average height 
or a short man arrived, the difference was always the same, not bigger. 
We find this ingenuous and unique popular style in our best chronicles 
(just to talk about our own autochthonal literature), but can appear in 
several ways. If we turn to find it, then, various good things will be 
possible, among other things a good historiography and also a popular 
code. (Ivi, 168) (Trans. by A.) 
 
The quotation is lengthy, but symbolic, mainly when Savigny defends the 
role of science in the Law on the grounds that it is an essential factor for 
Germany’s unification and for the consolidation of its common right to be 
considered. It’s not a case, therefore, that science is unconcerned with the 
internalisation of its contents by the receivers on a great scale.7 It is not a case 
of science separated from culture. Jurisprudence must seek a speech that allows 
knowledge in the same way as metaphors in stories permit access to the human 
soul. It’s not easy work, naturally, but it transforms the conception that we have 
about what it’s like to talk about justice or to dissect its conceptual roots.  
White begins from the same assertion when he makes the connection 
between law and literature —something prefigured in Savigny— which carries 
the anxiety of the fragmentation that delineates all of the obviousness, that Law 
is a language: 
 
[a] set of resources for expression and social action, and that, accordingly, 
the life of the lawyer is at its heart a literary one —a life both of reading 
the compositions of others (specially those authoritative compositions that 
declare the law) and of making compositions of one’s own. The language 
in which we do these things is itself a literary one, for these activities take 
place on conditions of radical uncertainty. Our knowledge of the world, 
our sense of the meaning of within us, in our competence as users of 
                                                 
7
 The worry was also experimented by Jhering (2002). 
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ordinary language, not in any claim we make as scientists to observe and 
measure the external world. (White 1985, 77) 
 
The dimension of the external world attributed to Law scientists has a 
troublesome object that absorbs the connection between the concepts of reading 
and writing that rest on the judge’s peculiar duties, in the measurement that 
leads to the preparation of the case’s principle and to its vital dialogue with life 
that, as external source, articulates judicially by the conflict. On a scale of 
importance, based on how it interferes in the effective life, the judge’s 
description imposes itself on life, transforming it. It enters it either as salvation 
or agony, depending on the point of view of the audience that deciphers it. 
It is possible for the judgment to be the great place for the narrative 
proximity, thus, through it the sense of justice in a solid case is clearly defined. 
The narrative, therefore, is the wider point for the comprehension and, as a 
result, composes the essential elements of the process that leads (or can lead) to 
forgiveness.  
The substrate of reasons that lead to a certain decision consists of 
descriptions of the nature of facts and rules where a situation that has begun in 
the past is recreated; a situation which is at times surprising and unknown. Once 
again, this relativeness is instituting, as pointed out by Gaaker (2007, 37): 
 
All stories force us to define our position with respect to new and 
unexpected things, which we have to accept as 'true', if only for the 
moment. 
 
The solicitor and the prosecutor or the attorney as supporting actors seek 
to win the judges acceptance of the stories they tell, since the judge is the main 
author of the narrative on which the decision rests. He/She seeks the acceptance 
of the story told by them, seeks its complete assimilation by the message 
receiver and/or by the audience.  
Even for a moment the story that is consigned in the judgment will be 
considered as the true story, if targeted by the ballast of the text. The due 
process of law establishes channels of discourse. It’s the judge’s duty to notice 
the other, to listen to him, to take interest in his private story: 
 
The ideal judge would show that he had listened to the side he voted 
against and that he had felt the pull of the arguments both ways. The law 
that was made that way would comprise two opposing voices, those of the 
parties, in a work made by another, by the judge who had listened to both 
and had faced the conflict between them in an honest way. In this sense 
the judge’s most important work is the definition of his own voice, the 
character that he makes for himself as he works through a case. (White 
1985, 47) 
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The question, however, can be unfolded under forgiveness’ view: Does 
the party forgive the judge when he/she looses the case? Does the society 
forgive the judge if it cannot understand the reason in the applied technique of 
adjudication? Is the judge ever heard? 
Judgment is the place where the rendering of accounts takes place and it 
cannot be unheard. The soliloquy of the conviction formation process falls over 
the impositive power that hits the other; the other who must listen and 
understand who must necessarily make compromises based on that report, even 
if it contradicts the final limit of possibilities.8 
It all depends on how a narrative is assimilated, since it is a chronicle of 
facts and of rules assimilated to facts. Calvo (1996, 70) points the question:  
 
The epistemological statute of facts coincides then with a reality that 
exists by itself, without any other human mediation other than the effort 
to offer from it a mnemonic chronicle, memorably faithful, to enable the 
duplication, in an impeccable way, of what has happened. [...] 
But just pointing or describing is not enough to explain. One can supply a 
notorious information or even mark an explanation, this, however, does 
not offer the explanation, does not make the argument. And the narration, 
furthermore, requires the presence of the other who reads and listens. To 
narrate is not a soliloquy, nor an empty declamation, for this it will stop 
existing if, as if sucked by an empty bell, it becomes unheard. To narrate, 
to tell is to take account, and whoever doesn’t ‘take account’ doesn’t 
justify, nor in the judges case justifies himself.9 
 
The judge always seeks forgiveness, because he/she necessarily says no 
to one of the parties and hence denies their interests. The excuse, therefore, 
follows the same pattern of Clarice Lispector’s text when leading to the final 
question, which is subconsciously announced on the power of law enforcement; 
silenced by the power of res judicata. The argument addresses to the same 
desire for an overcome that is in the forgiveness:  
 
Justification lays down on law, redemption transcends it. Justification lies 
within history, redemption lies outside history as its ultimate meaning. 
The time of redemption is the future —it promises that the sum of our 
presents, once passed, will count for something. The organ and faculty of 
justification are the brain and its reason: Justification thinks and blames. 
The organ and faculty of redemption are the heart and its hope: 
redemption loves and excuses. The virtues of justification are justice and 
righteousness. The virtues of redemption are compassion and atonement. 
                                                 
8
 See the importance to pass on the assurance that the other is being heard in Friedman 
1984, 101. 
9
 See also the criticism to the ways of the narrative approach according to Dworkin’s 
version (Fish 1995).  
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The possibility of justice grounds the project of distinguishing between 
the just and the unjust. The possibility of redemption grounds the result 
(Wolcher 2004, 45). 
 
The argument redeems the judge. He uses all the jurisdictional formulas. 
He can close his ears to any other argument and immure himself. A judge 
doesn’t apologise for the possibility of making a mistake. This is never 
admitted. His doubt is a silent, never spoken one. Thus, it’s unknown how 
justice is made and it’s unknown what justice is. 
For law and justice, brain and reason are not enough. The thoughtful ear 
that apprehends the other, that inoculates the love that is owed to humanity 
without restriction, that demands that heart and hope think and act together as if 
each conflict could be embraced, rocked and caressed like a child that belongs 
to all of us and deserves a treatment that enables the permanence of life. 
Bobbio, in O elogio da mitezza (The Praise of Meekness), talks about a 
virtue that can interfere in the comprehension of the dynamic and leads to the 
transgression of the conflict: 
 
The mite (meek) is unresented, is not revengeful, doesn’t hate anyone. It 
doesn’t ponder past offenses, doesn’t bring hates back to life, and doesn’t 
reopen an old sore. To be in piece with yourself you must, before 
anything, be in piece with others. Will never throw wood at a bonfire 
made by someone else, but must never let itself burn, though impossible 
to extinguish it. Crosses the fire without burning, faces emotions storms 
without becoming angry, keeping the balance, the dignity, and the 
necessary availability. (Bobbio 2005, 71) (Trans. by A.) 
 
It would be good if judges told their stories, if they explained themselves 
with the same easiness held by someone who talks to the children or narrates 
their fables or explains how to solve a jigsaw puzzle.  
Because in the story of each judgment exists a connexion of each judge 
and justice’s personal history as something real that happens and disseminates 
in the lives of the people. It happens in the history of each of us. 
It was a little yellow canary that used to sing a lot; a gift from my father. 
It lived in a white cage at my flat. It used to have a little white partner. It had 
had babies of mixed colours (yellow ones, white ones) and was fed with cooked 
eggs: an ironic contradiction imposed by the urban food chain. 
I needed to move to another town and could not take it and found it a new 
home. For this, he was at the back seat.  
But it’s not always possible to anticipate the consequences of one’s 
choices. I thought I could save time and stopped somewhere else before 
reaching its final destination.  
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The closed window. The car heat. The little bird’s fragile body. When I 
came back I found it dead at the bottom of the cage. And until this day I haven’t 
an excuse. I have no forgiveness.  
Negligence, unconcern, lapse. Just for one split-second. And it’s always 
like that. It’s enough. The incapability to turn back the clock and undo the past.  
The fact might be fussy, but the problem that plagues justice is that it is 
an impossible feat to go back in time. Broken limits. Clock ticking. To go 
somewhere before the final destiny. Banality. Accident. Fate finished. The 
substitution of what should have been done by the replacement for the difficult 
implantation on the lived reality, the thereafter. For there are no words that can 
make life go back to the exact place. No words that can reverse it. No way in 
which that everlasting wish to hug that little pet as if it was still alive can come 
true. 
Perhaps I had already forgiven Clarice Lispector at the beginning. 
Perhaps I understood the meaning of her attitude from the first reading. What 
I’ve seen there, however, what I’ve never gotten over, was the risk to kill some 
fishes one day, like she did. By negligence. By tumult. By lack of attention. By 
negligence, unconcern, lapse. The risk of not following the rules. What was 
promised. And to be in her shoes. Seeking forgiveness. Without an alternative 
to recover the past. In need of an authorisation from someone else to get over it, 
as if it was the only chance to continue the way. Strengthened. As she says: 
sometimes it’s too late to regret. 
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INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS INTO REGULATION: 
AN ESSAY ON SADE’S CENT VINGT JOURNÉES DE SODOME 
by 
Alessia J. Magliacane 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Par contre nous tenons que le boudoir sadien s’égale à 
ces lieux dont les écoles de la philosophie antique 
prirent leur nom : Académie, Lycée, Stoa. Ici comme là, 
on prépare la science en rectifiant la position de 
l’éthique.  
Lacan 1999 [1963], 243 
 
En cela Juliette est vraiment l’enfant de l’ère nouvelle, 
pour la première fois, elle pratique consciemment la 
transvaluation des valeurs. 
Horkheimer-Adorno 2000 [1944], 113 
 
 
1. An ultimate quest of God’s voice 
 
Nous nous avançâmes dans la petite plaine sèche et 
brûlée où s’aperçoit ce phénomène. Le terrain qui 
l’environne est sablonneux, inculte et rempli de pierres: 
à mesure que l’on avance, on éprouve une chaleur 
excessive et l’on respire l’odeur de cuivre et de charbon 
de terre que le volcan exhale: nous aperçûmes enfin la 
flamme qu’une légère pluie, fortuitement survenue, 
rendit plus ardente: ce foyer peut avoir trente ou 
quarante pieds de tour: si l’on creuse la terre dans les 
environs, le feu s’allume aussitôt sous l’instrument qui 
la déchire…  
Sade 1966 [1797], 552 
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Note: le geste consiste en une sorte de haussement des 
bras dans un mouvement fait de blâme et de pitié 
impuissante. Il faiblit à chaque répétition jusqu’à n’être 
plus, à la troisième, qu’à peine perceptible. Il y a juste 
assez de place pour le contenir le temps que BOUCHE 
se remet de son véhément refus de lâcher la troisième 
personne. 
Beckett 1963-1974, 95 
 
La conscience sadiste prépare ainsi l’état d’âme 
romantique. La conscience libertine satisfait son besoin 
d’agir en assassinant le présent: complice du temps, elle 
reçoit de cet allié ses victimes; par contre, la conscience 
romantique, se sentant elle-même victime du temps, 
accepte cette condition malheureuse pour expier la 
présence détruite par sa sœur jumelle. Et elle s’en va 
pleurer dans les ruines.  
Klossowski 2001 [1935-1936], 87 
 
« D’une manière qui n’a rien de naturel… » « Des 
moyens qui sont encore plus sales que d’être 
déshonorée… » Je pensais à toutes sortes de postures, à 
toutes sortes de positions des mains et des pieds… 
Tanizaki 1963 [1956], 114 
 
 
Within the universal Sadean system, the law of the phallus points out the 
existence of a Nature destroying its creatures as the origin of delirium of 
omnipotence that is represented, at a very first time, by a Being supreme in 
cruelty (Etre suprême en méchanceté), of which Saint Fond makes the apology 
as a sort of divinisation of the incestuous-sodomite father, who is a sort of 
creator-destructor father of humankind.  
According to Klossowski (2001 [1933], 43), if the hero in Sade can admit 
the existence of a God-for-believers, it is worth saying that this God cannot be 
identical to the universe he created, being “très vindicatif, très barbare, très 
méchant, très injuste et très cruel”. 
This God is similar to the barbarian god of the Medianite tribe: Yahweh, 
before encountering Moses the man (Freud 1986 [1939]).  
Yahweh, he surely was a god of volcanoes: 
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C’est un démon inquiétant, avide de sang, qui rode la nuit et fuit la 
lumière du jour. (Freud 1986, 102 [1939])1 
  
Egyptian Moses gave a different representation of God, a sort of a 
spiritualized one, the idea of a unique divinity, loving all creatures and setting a 
path of truth and justice to men’s supreme goal. 
Thus: 
 
Notre Moise égyptien n’est peut-être pas moins différent du Moise 
madianite que le dieu universel Aton du démon Yahvé résidant sur la 
montagne des dieux. (Ivi, 105) 
 
The orthodox law sense of «mélange interdit» (Deutsch 1977, 91-92) —
to the first chief, the interdiction of simultaneously eating milk and meat 
(symbolizing the prohibition of the incest)—2 expresses, then, another sort of 
refoulement, corresponding to Freud’s analysis of the refoulement written on its 
verso: the compromise of Cadès which gave room to the final Mosean god’s 
triumph upon Yahweh, instead of the patriarch assassination. 
Cadès is the foundational lieu for this new religion, which is common to 
all tribes where Israel comes from. That is —even historically speaking— the 
legal foundation of monotheism as a religion.3 
                                                 
1
 «Il semble qu’en ce siècles obscurs, plus ou moins soustraits à la recherche 
historiques, les pays du bassin oriental de la Méditerranée furent le théâtre de fréquents 
et violents éruptions volcaniques, qui produisirent le plus puissant effet sur les 
populations. Evans avance l’hypothèse que la destruction définitive du palais de Minos, 
à Cnossos, fut également la conséquence d’un tremblement de terre. En Crète, comme 
probablement dans le reste du monde égéen, on adorait alors la grande déesse mère. 
Qu’elle se fut trouvée incapable à défendre sa demeure contre les attaques d’une 
puissance supérieure peut avoir contribué à son éviction par une divinité masculine, et 
dans ce cas le dieu des volcans eut plus le droit qu’un autre pour la remplacer. Zeus est 
en effet couramment qualifié d’ébranleur de terre. Il n’est guère douteux que ces temps 
obscurs virent le remplacement des divinités mères par des dieux (peut-être à l’origine 
leurs fils ?). Le destin de Pallas Athénée est particulièrement impressionnant. 
Probablement forme locale de la divinité mère, elle fut ravalée au rang de fille par la 
révolution religieuse, enlevée à sa propre mère et, par la virginité qui lui fut imposée, 
définitivement exclue de la maternité» (Freud 1986 [1939], 118, fn. 1).        
2
 «Faire cuire le petit dans le lait de la mère signifie remettre l’enfant dans le ventre de 
la mère, le placer dans la pleine et unique possession de la mère. Le fils appartient à la 
mère» (Fromm-Reichmann 1927, 175). According to Woolf (1945), the character of 
isolation results from the fight of Jewish monotheism against the paganism, an internal 
psychological and not only an external one.    
3
 « On s’efforça par contre de déplacer dans des temps anciens des prescriptions et des 
institutions du présent, de les fonder en règle générale sur la législation mosaïque pour 
déduire de là le caractère sacré et contraignant qu’on revendiquait pour elles. […] la 
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Paulian Christianity constitutes a progression, in Freud (1990 [1912-1913]), 
even if only to religious history, that is according with the return of refouled. At 
a cultural level —we can also say at Sade’s political level— it is nevertheless a 
regression: once the father lost, the son becomes god, that is Moses reborn to 
life and, behind him, the primitive father of the originarian horde as transfigured 
and taking the place of the father as the son. 
Without any doubt, Sade himself regarded the same movement by 
revealing the revolutionary act: The king sent to death that constitutes the 
parricide precipitating the nation onto the unforgivable (plongeant la nation 
dans l’inexpiable).  
From that, the social covenant, once the tyrant annihilated, exists on, 
unilaterally, only for the citizens. What for? Sade tries to demonstrate what for 
in his well-known pamphlet in Philosophie dans le boudoir (2002 [1795]) 
whose title is Français, encore un effort si vous voulez être républicains.  
Here comes the main focus, that on the divergence between Sade and the 
Revolution, Sade and the Terror, Sade and Robespierre: The revolutionary are 
taken into account for it by the substitution of the mère patrie to the sacred 
instance of the father, that is to say of the king (Klossowski 1967 [1947]). 
L’homme Moise is not simple “histoire”, like the bible (otherwise) is, but 
a sort of a counter historical theology, where the chain of tradition is replaced 
by the chain of unconscious repetition (Yerushalmi 1991, 53).  
 
Et c’est sans doute parce qu’il y voyait une force coercitive que Sade 
voulait substituer à la fraternité de l’homme naturel cette solidarité du 
parricide propre à cimenter une communauté qui ne pouvait être 
fraternelle parce qu’elle était caïnique. (Klossowski 1967 [1947], 73) 
 
Sade seems to run this chain until the bifurcation point between la 
conscience libertine sadiste et la conscience romantique (Klossowski 2001 
[1935-1936]) embodied by the mother’s betrayal as allied to the phallic law 
towards the primary Nature. 
The late before the object (from psychoanalysis to philosophy) shows to 
be fundamental: the romantic consciousness at the origins of the legal 
relationship fears the losing of the object, properly like the primitive horde of 
brothers did, and therefore it exactly appears as the inversion of Sadean 
consciousness.  
   
                                                                                                                       
religion de Yahvé avait subi une élaboration rétrospective qui l’avait conduit à 
concorder, peut-être à s’identifier avec la religion originelle de Moise. Et tel est le 
résultat essentiel, le contenu lourd de destin de l’histoire religieuse juive ». (Freud 1986 
[1939], 119-120) 
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Mais ce qui semble surtout ressortir de cette vision mythologique de deux 
humanités, l’une naissante directement de la nature, l’autre de la femme, 
c’est l’idée que l’introduction de la maternité dans le monde établit la loi 
de la reconnaissance de la créature envers le créateur (idée de Dieu), de la 
reconnaissance de la progéniture envers la mère, et qu’ainsi se trouve 
inauguré le règne des contrats indissolubles donnant aux uns les moyens 
moraux de se soumettre et d’enchaîner les autres ; le règne des notions 
religieuses, inspirées par la crainte et l’incertitude. (Klossowski 2001 
[1933], 42-43) 
    
Kantian law —law of acknowledgement (reconnaissance)— is 
introduced by maternal order. The obstacle to the hybridizing incest —which 
implies the exclusion of the father as law, that is distinction, division, order, 
centre of the monotheistic religion as the history both of a nomination 
(Genesis), and of Egyptian morals (Maat) which takes the place of disorder 
(Morenz 1962)— is not only the father but the chronological incoherence 
between the manifestations of the oedipal desire and the conquest of the skill to 
fulfil it.4 
The notion of Nature destructrice de ses créatures directly proceeds from 
this original conflict that is enlightened by Klossowski in the following poetical 
way: 
 
Elle représente la projection grandiose, sur le plan métaphysique, du 
moment traumatique où l’enfant se sentit trahi par la mère. Ainsi, ce qui 
était à l’origine un motif de souffrance devient, sur le plan métaphysique, 
la réparation même de cette souffrance. (Ivi, 47) 
 
While denying the long-time elaboration of its very self (soi), and by 
providing tout le possible which has become impossible once taken 
consciousness of the self (moi), the erotic imagination turns itself to 
aggressiveness —where the conscience itself proceeds from— despite of reality 
(au principe de). It is also worth to recall that, in this reality,  
 
le solitaire, le prisonnier Sade, privé de toute moyen d’action, dispose en 
fin de compte de la même puissance que le héros omnipotent dont il rêve : 
la puissance inconditionnée qui ne connaît plus de résistance, qui ne 
connaît plus d’obstacles ni en dehors, ni à l’intérieur de soi-même, qui n’a 
plus que la sensation de son écoulement aveugle. (Klossowski 2001 
[1936], 95-96) 
                                                 
4
 «Le sadisme de Sade serait donc l’expression suprême d’un facteur de haine 
primordial. Ou plutôt : la haine a choisi la libido agressive pour mieux pouvoir exercer 
sa mission : celle de châtier la puissance maternelle sous tous ses formes et d’en 
bouleverser les institutions». (Klossowski 2001 [1933], 31) 
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We see now Sadean hero as linked to his Mother Nature, cruel nature, 
pitiless, blood thirsty, which he identifies himself with, by excluding God-the-
father. Sadean hero is le père châtiant la mère en faveur de l’enfant, or breaking 
down with his wife for loving his child, or le père exécutant la mère 
conjointement son fils —like we are told in the history of Brisa Testa, which 
symbolizes for Sade’s regard the fulfilment of the passions that nature placed in 
men.5  
Sadean heroes recall Greek heroes. Classical Greece, in the Hellenic 
époque —writes Mircea Eliade (1989, 301-303)— saved for us a sublime 
outlook of heroes: 
 
En réalité, leur nature est exceptionnelle et ambivalente, voire aberrante… 
Quant à leur comportement sexuel, il est excessif ou aberrant : Héraclès 
féconde, en une nuit, les cinquante filles de Thespies; Thésée est 
renommé pour ses nombreux viols (Hélène, Ariane, etc.), Achille ravit 
Stratonice. Les héros commettent l’inceste avec leurs filles ou leurs mères 
et massacrent par envie, par colère ou, maintes fois, sans raison aucune, 
ils assomment même leurs pères et mères ou des parents […]. L’outrance 
des héros ne connaît plus de limites. Ils osent violenter même les déesses 
(Orion et Actéon assaillent Artémis, Ixion attaque Héra, etc.) et n’hésitent 
pas devant le sacrilège (Ajax agresse Cassandre près de l’autel d’Athéna, 
Achille assomme Troïlos dans le temple d’Apollon). Ces offenses et 
sacrilèges dénotent une hybris démesurée, trait spécifique à la nature 
héroïque.6  
 
It derives that incest in Sade is not connected to the appeasement of a 
long-time nostalgia for oedipal object, but to the abolition of the categories 
“infant” and “parent”; this hybris expresses itself within the terms of a 
hybridising, a meddle, a desire of catching up with the Chaos —literally 
speaking: fault, lack— where a new reality is supposed to arise from. 
 
                                                 
5
 «C’est donc précisément en lui donnant le rôle du héros noir, et non pas celui de 
l’homme vertueux et respectable, que Sade établi entre sa propre personne et celle du 
père une identification qui prend la forme d’une véritable vénération du père, comme 
contrepartie de cette haine vouée à la mère qui, elle, tient toujours le rôle de la femme 
honorable, afin d’être mieux foulée pieds». (Ibid.) 
6
 And : «En somme, les dieux ne frappent pas les hommes sans raison, aussi longtemps 
que les mortels ne transgressent pas les limites prescrites par leur propre mode 
d’existence. Mais il est difficile de ne pas transgresser les limites imposées, car l’idéal 
de l’homme est l’‘excellence’ (arete). Or une excellence excessive risque de susciter 
l’orgueil démesuré et l’insolence (hybris).» (Ivi, 274) 
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Est chaos exactement, ce qui est inséparable dans le phénomène à double 
face par lequel l’Univers à la fois se désintègre et s’organise, se disperse 
et se polynuclée... La genèse des particules, des atomes, des astres s’opère 
dans et par les agitations, turbulences, remous, dislocations, collisions, 
explosions. Les processus d’ordre et d’organisation (de l’Univers) ne se 
sont pas frayés un chemin comme une souris à travers les trous du gruyère 
cosmique, ils se sont constitués dans et par le chaos, c’est-à-dire le 
tournoiement de la boucle tétralogique. (Morin 1981 [1977], 57-58) 
 
Sadean hero casts a challenge because he sets renewed combinations, 
different forms, new species. He, as a demiurge, takes creator’s place in order to 
welcome the times of the “anal”, when every difference will be abolished.7  
He is an alchemist, and thus he  
 
bouscule le rythme [des] lentes maturations chtoniennes ; en quelque 
sorte, il se substitue au Temps. (Eliade 1977 [1956], 38)8 
 
At the same time, in his moral tales,9 properly defined as héroïques and 
tragiques (so, without hope content), under the empire of the law of the father, 
Sade outlines the different modes d’attente desctructrice du present.10  
These are stages in the interdiction of the chosen love: 
 
transformations dues, comme dans l’exfoliation du fantasme Un enfant est 
battu, à des déplacements pulsionnels par refoulement ou régression, et 
                                                 
7
 This is one of the prescriptions of the legal code of Cent vingt journées —remembers 
Chasseguet-Smirgel (1984, 228): «“Tout sera pêle-mêle, tout sera vautré sur des carreaux, 
par terre, et, à l’exemple des animaux, on changera, on se mêlera, on incestera, on 
sodomisera”. This subversion of the law is even more evident when we compare it to the 
biblical prohibitions (le Lévitique XIII, vesicles 6-18). For exemple, in the passion 20 of 
the third part of the code: “Pour réunir l’inceste, la sodomie et le sacrilège, il encule sa 
fille mariée avec une ostie”. As noted: “C’est tout au long de l’œuvre de Sade que ce 
procédé de détournement de la loi est utilisé: ce ne sont que prêtres libertins, moines 
débauchés, maîtres de pension dépravés. Jusqu’au Pape lui-même”». More specifically, 
on the relations between perversion, hybris and law, see Ivi, ch. VII. 
8
 The alchimist ideology is related « à une conception générale de la réalité cosmique 
perçue en tant que Vie et, par conséquent, sexuée, la sexualité étant un signe particulier 
de toute réalité vivante.» (Eliade 1977 [1956], 29) 
9
 See, among others, Faxelange ou les torts de l’ambition, Florville et Courval ou le 
fatalisme, Dorgeville ou le criminel par vertu, La comtesse de Sancerre ou la rivale de 
sa fille, Eugenie de Franval nouvelle tragique, now in Sade 2007. 
10
 By quoting Klossowski (2001 [1935-1936], 87): «[e]n amenant ce qui n’est pas 
encore dans ce qui n’est plus (Saint Augustin) ; en ramenant ce qui n’est plus pour que 
ce qui n’est pas encore ne devienne pas ; en ramenant ce qui n’est plus pour économiser 
(donc préserver du néant) ce qui n’est pas encore et doit devenir.» 
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impliquant donc un usage […], parfaitement réglé-régulateur, de la 
négation. (Lyotard 1974, 75)  
 
 
2. A Normative Third 
 
Il ne faut pas commencer par la transgression, il faut 
aller tout de suite jusqu’au bout de la cruauté, faire 
l’anatomie de la perversion polymorphe, déployer 
l’immense membrane du «corps» libidinal, toute à 
l’inverse d’une membrure. 
Lyotard 1974, 10-11  
 
Je défends que mon corps soit ouvert, sous quelque 
prétexte que ce puisse être… Ma fosse sera pratiquée 
dans ce taillis par le fermier de la Malmaison, sous 
l'inspection de M. Lenormand, qui ne quittera mon 
corps qu'après l'avoir placé dans ladite fosse… La fosse 
une fois recouverte, il sera semé dessus des glands, afin 
que, par la suite le terrain de ladite fosse se trouvant 
regarni et le taillis se trouvant fourré comme il était 
auparavant, les traces de ma tombe disparaissent de 
dessus la surface de la terre, comme je me flatte que ma 
mémoire s’effacera de l’esprit des hommes. 
Testament du Marquis de Sade 
in Klossowski 2001 [1936], 93 
 
Les deux sérails sont environnés de hauts murs. Toutes 
les fenêtres en sont grillées et jamais les sujets ne 
sortent. Entre le bâtiment et le haut mur environnant est 
un intervalle de dix pieds formant une allée plantée de 
cyprès, où les membres de la Société font quelquefois 
descendre des sujets, pour se livrer avec eux, dans cette 
promenade solitaire, à des plaisir plus sombre et 
souvent plus affreux. Au pied de quelques-uns de ces 
arbres sont ménagés des trous, où la victime peut à 
l’instant disparaître. On soupe quelquefois sous ces 
arbres, quelquefois dans ces tous mêmes. Il y en a 
d’extrêmement profond, où l’on ne peut descendre que 
par des escalier secrets et dans lesquels on peut se livrer 
à toutes les infamies possible avec le même calme, le 
même silence que si l’on était dans l’entrailles de la 
terre. 
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Article 44 des Statuts de la Société des Amis du Crime, 
Sade 1966 [1797], 409    
 
 
Zero is a figure where several libidinal devices are affirmed as a whole (Lyotard 
1974).  
The passage through Zero is also the special libidinal path of a religious 
(thus libidinal) fantasy. 
Sade moulds an affirmative idea of Zero: The pagan theatre of the Cent 
vingt Journées de Sodome (1975 [1785]), where we deal with the accumulation 
of the vastest lot of reverses, ruptures, splits of chimerical relations.    
 
Elle est empreinte d’une dépense de quantités importantes d’énergie, 
employées à rendre supportable quelque chose qui n’est l’est pas, qui est 
peut-être cette accumulation même de puissances. (Lyotard 1974, 19) 
 
The figure of life and death gather together. They are the energy of an 
instant or eternity which devours it, as demonstrated by the awful set of 
postures and manoeuvres required, of beats inferred, of victims involved.   
 
C’est la quantité, le nombre imposé qui par lui-même est déjà motif 
d’intensité. (Ivi, 140) 
 
Sade gives shape to a sort of intensity, which determines the body itself. 
Libidinal skin is a sort of tapestry, a patchwork of organic and social bodies. 
Coitus, in Sade, is always a group activity, whose characters are children, old 
men, maids, whores, priests and nuns, gay people, nobles, outlaws… erogenous 
parts are all equivalent: one can fill the anus with milk, defecate into a vagina or 
a mouth, force a woman to an anal procreation…    
Anyway, we deal with a sort of progression against the subject, who is 
mutilated and, finally, destroyed at the accomplishment of the tale. Suspense 
bears narration. The author often prompts out and says that he can reveal just a 
little of facts at the time, being forced by the order of matters. As a result, 
confusion between libidinal skin and inscription register will always be 
legitimated. 
We learnt, after Deleuze and Guattari, and Lyotard, that the inscriptional 
surface is, without chance of discerning, either la peu libidinale engendrée par 
la barre folle  or la sage aplat du livre de compte. 
 
2.1 A Brief Excursus on Freud.  
The focus of the children game Fort da is the edition and the narration 
time. 
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The repetition of this childish game confirms that we are in the negative, 
inside the capitalistic logic of the lack, and thus under the realm of the principle 
of pleasure. We are not allowed the chance of an absence, being supposed that 
the mother was there, as a space of totalization of several singularities, several 
libidinal intensities. Lack is, thus, an attack. 
Here the stress is on the word fort that is on the first step of the playing, 
the fable time of disparition, which is a most amusing time for the baby, like 
Freud himself took down.  
It arrives that suffering is a cut, a scar, dismemberment, but it only hurts a 
totality.    
 
Cet enfant, / il n’est pas là, / il n’est qu’un angle, /un angle à venir, et il 
n’ay pas d’angle…/ or ce monde du père-mère /est justement ce qui / doit 
s’en aller, /c’est ce monde dédoublé-double, /en état de désunion 
constante, / en volonté d’unification constante, aussi…/autour duquel 
tourne tout le système de ce monde / malignement soutenu par la plus 
sombre organisation. (Artaud 1967, 12)11 
 
Oedipus, we know it, is an angle. If he is an angle, then he is a son; if he 
is a son, then he is death intense. If he is death intense, then he is an orphan: 
Anti-Œdipe. That dualism is from neither a dialogue/monologue (like those that 
we can find in Kantian order of discourse if... then), nor does it start any 
dialectics. It is l'indiscernabilité des incompossibles at any time.   
 
Moi, Antonin Artaud, je suis mon fils, mon / père, ma mère, / et moi. 
(Artaud 2003 [1947], 128) 
 
According to Lyotard (1974), in 1920 text (trace, cold, lack of intensity...) 
Freud introduces the instance of death drives, properly in order to keep that sign 
and the whole libidinal economy away from the concept of binarial 
discrimination.   
The dichotomial couple pain/pleasure belongs to the order of the unified 
body, which fulfils the principle of pleasure as transformed into principle of 
reality, but here we discover the reverse;  
 
Il  s’agit... de rendre insoluble la question de savoir si telle Gestaltung  est 
un effet de mort plutôt que de vie, si telle inondation, déliaison 
pulsionnelle, est suicidaire plutôt que thérapeutique… si au contraire telle 
                                                 
11
 See, obviously, Deleuze-Guattari 1972. 
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stase, tel blocage, telle cristallisation… relève plutôt de l’orthopédie 
salvatrice ou de l’entropie mortifère. (Lyotard 1974, 38)12 
  
We should have the chance of not assigning an effect, a sign, to a 
pulsional principle. Thought itself is from libido. What matters is its strength, 
the force, which lets the words pass.13 Syntax is a sort of a libidinal skin, that is 
to say a tensorial sign (Ivi, 57).  
 
Le séducteur dont a parlé Duclos assemble deux femmes. Il exhorte l’une, 
pour sauver sa vie à renier Dieu et la religion, mais elle a été soufflée et 
on lui a dit d’en rien faire, parce que si elle le faisait elle serait tuée, et 
qu’en ne le faisant pas elle n’avais rien à craindre. Elle résiste, il lui brûle 
la cervelle: «En voilà une à Dieu!». Il fait venir la seconde qui, frappée de 
cet exemple et de ce qu’on lui a dit en dessous qu’elle n’avait d’autre 
façon de sauver ses jours que de renier, fait tout ce qu’on lui propose. Il 
lui brûle la cervelle: «En voilà une autre au diable!». Le scélérat 
recommence ce petit jeu-là toutes les semaines. (Sade 1975 [1785], 432) 
 
In this accomplishment of Lacanian vel: ni l’un, ni l’autre (ni l’un, ni 
l’autre choix, ni l’une, ni l’autre femme), even death itself —which obviously 
modifies the structure and recalls Kantian freedom (to choose death is to have 
freedom of choice) (Lacan 1973 [1963])— is tragically masked in the seducer’s 
speech, who makes the contrainte the definite element of performation (if… 
then…) (Martyn 2003, 51-52).  
The speech (dis)covers a region into the libidinal space where « ça ou 
mourir » turns into « ça et mourir » (Lyotard 1974, 117), and « être et ne pas 
être, là où elle est », wherever it is, is a property of the sole virtual object, 
which Lacan subdues to Poe’s lettre volée (Lacan 1955; Deleuze 2003 [1966]).   
 The meaning of this author’s infinitely profound works is in the desire he had 
to disappear (Bataille 1979).  
Les Cent vingt Journées is even its very purloined letter. “Violence et 
solitude” emerging from the seducer’s rational order of the discourse (Bataille 
1957). 
Be the structure what covers the secret and its dissimulation, here comes 
the tensor. Thus Sade refouls the relationship between who speaks and who he 
speaks to (Ibid.). He denies the ternarian structure of language as 
communication, as well as oedipal Self’s triangle, in order to let us infringe the 
                                                 
12
 And: «Il ne s’agit pas de concepts, puisque même si nous pouvons penser les 
instances de vie et de mort […], nous ne pouvons pas saisir, prévoir, contrôler, les 
effets, les affects, à l’aide de cette pensée des instances…» (Lyotard 1974, 41-42) 
13
 Sade uses the «pieds» of the table or of the trees, the «bras» of the sofa, the «boyaux» 
of the corridor, the «entrailles» of the earth. And Cœur-de-Feu to Justine, describes the 
anus as le temple le plus secret, où l’on est logé qu’avec peine. 
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screen of the mimetical play of psychic identities and discover the lull where 
both void and narcistic turn into the grade zero of imagination (Green 1983).14 
Letter is a trace of the archaic inscription of what Freud names “the father 
of any individual’s prehistory”: the instance of idealization, bringing sexual 
attributes of both parents.  
This bêtise libidinale 15 of libidinal body —the One, described by Freud 
as Father, whom we fulfil the identification with (for love, to become like him, 
One, a subject of enunciation)— has to be granted not as a seducer but as a law: 
an abstract instance of One, selecting our capacity of identification and 
idealization.  
The archaic mode of fatherly function —which is previous to the Name, 
to the symbolic— calls for the Third as a condition of psychic life as a love 
(erotic) life. The mother-desired Phallus: Anyway, Not I, Pas moi. 
The seducer’s purloined letter, his private diary, they are from the order 
of the Einfühlung, that of the identification in love, of the assimilation of 
sentiments, of other people’s words (to Sade, confession and prostitution differ 
from a grade only).  
This Identifizierung is not from the order of «to have». It is from the 
order of «to be like». To Freud’s caustic rationality, it was madness.  
This archaic identification is not “objectale” identification. Kristeva 
explained in her Histoires d’amour (1983, 31): 
 
Je m’identifie non pas avec un objet, mais à ce qui se propose à moi 
comme modèle.16 
 
Sade’s letter is all but a grand plan. You can see the regulation of 
libertines and the classification of four classes of passions, whose narration by 
women storytellers has to be made true by the castles inhabitants, as Republic is 
                                                 
14
 See too Kristeva (1983, 29): «Le narcissisme serait cette corrélation (au père 
imaginaire et à la mère ‘abjet’) qui se joue autour du vide central du dit transfert. Ce 
vide qui apparaît comme l’amorce de la fonction symbolique est précisément cerné en 
linguistique par la barre signifiant/signifié et par l’‘arbitraire’ du signe, ou, en 
psychanalyse, par la ‘béance’ du miroir». 
15
 «D’abord: observons cette immensité de la bêtise, qui s’étend bien au-delà de la 
bestialité de Bataille, laquelle continue à savoir ce qu’elle fait, même si la conscience ne 
le sait plus, et c’est là tout le secret acéphale du petit érotisme, tandis qu’avec Schreber 
il faut patauger dans le marais d’une incertitude qui travaille les instincts eux-mêmes, 
les montages de la bête, qu’on est en deçà de ce que sait l’acéphalie animale, que le 
‘corps’ ne sait plus chier alors qu’il en a “besoin”, que la merde ne connaît plus son 
chemin vers la sortie.» (Lyotard 1974, 74) 
16
 And: «C’est à la logique interne du discours, récursive, redondante, accessible dans le 
‘dire-après’, que pourra être rapportée cette énigmatique identification non objectale, 
qui installe au cœur du psychisme l’amour, le signe et la répétition». (Ibid.) 
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libidinal, and law is libidinal. And her, the letter, is its very desire to 
herself/itself. 
In Horckheimer and Adorno’s words (2000 [1944], 98): 
  
L’utopie, dont la Révolution française avait tiré l’espoir [...]. Elle est 
devenue une finalité sans fin qui, de ce fait, peut s’attacher à toutes les 
fins. En ce sens elle est le plan considéré pour lui-même. [...] 
[This way] Après le bref intermède du libéralisme, où les bourgeois se 
sont tenus mutuellement en échec, la domination se révèle comme terreur 
archaïque sous la forme rationalisée du fascisme.17  
 
Le phantasme sadique figures and refers itself to a sort of unity. 
Somewhere, it looks for a body to be transgressed, whose energy is purloined 
from its natural destinations. It is the very body of law(s), where the unequal 
exchange between intelligent sign and intense sign is definitely dealt.18 
 The legal code, or the regulation code, of the Cent vingt journées is the 
variation of an agreement.  
Sadic contract is nothing else than the submission of the object to its 
intestinal functions, «à la seule lois qui régit le processus se déroulant à 
l’intérieur du tractus digestif» (Chasseguet-Smirgel 1984, 196), which is a sort 
of  
 
fractionnement des aliments ingérés et en leur dégradation successive en 
unité de moins en moins différenciées, perdant progressivement leurs 
particularités originelles et formant finalement une masse homogène, le 
bol fécal. (Grunberger 1960, 188)     
 
Sadean scene has often been observed as it flew within closed spaces: 
churches, unbreakable castles, dark forests…, lieu of the fulfilment of the 
contract —Sade himself (1975 [1785], 110) defines the Cent vingt journées as a 
“journey”: «afin de faire durer l’amusement jusqu’au bout du voyage»— that 
                                                 
17
 See too (Ivi, 99): «La structure architectonique particulière du système kantien, 
comme les pyramides gymniques des orgies de Sade, et la hiérarchie des principes des 
premières loges bourgeoises –dont le pendant cynique est le règlement sévère de la 
société libertine des 120 Journées– annonce une organisation de la vie entière privée de 
toute fin ayant un contenu.» 
18
 «On aperçoit cette monstruosité: cette barre qui disjoint, qui délimite donc des 
propriétés (corps, biens, Soi), et règle les transferts de l’une et de l’autre, qui est donc le 
support de la loi même des échanges, qu’on appelle loi de la valeur ou prix de production 
– si elle est elle-même ‘investie’, si c’est elle-même qui fait l’objet de l’attrait des 
pulsions, il faut qu’en même temps qu’elle sépare et distingue, et pour cela même, elle 
brûle et mêle dans sa rotation insensée les quant-à-soi qu’elle régit, il faut que sa froideur 
‘syntaxique’ soit son incandescence». (Lyotard 1974, 98) 
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outlines the proper path which paves the way to understand the fundamental 
aim: fécaliser la Loi.   
Understanding this mechanism, sending the letter where the intensities 
simulated behind the republican equality are a different zero themselves (the 
circumference zero as a regulatory devices of the conquest)19... it is what makes 
the strength of a philosophe scélérat. The use of law (like that of money) 
forecasting the results to come, the metempsychosis of the destruction, whose 
unbalanced time —the reproduction time— is achronic like the time of 
structures.20  
 
Ces vérités une fois admises, je demande si l’on pourra jamais avancer 
que la destruction soit un crime… La seule chose que nous faisons en 
nous livrant à la destruction, n’est que d’opérer une variation dans les 
formes. (Sade 2002 [1795], 179)    
 
Pasolini’s genius: in Salò o le 120 giornate di Sodoma, away with 
Golem’s or Frankenstein’s Zero, he was able to picture the only comparable 
death, that of a wordless body with a risen fist: Nameless body, stone statue 
rigid, which splits, under the fire of fascist guns, its libidinal fragments at 
thousands.  
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NARRATION AS A NORMATIVE PROCESS 
by 
M. Paola Mittica 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Premise 
 
The Law and Literature approach has become one of the most promising 
ways to go about observing the legal phenomenon. I will not trace out the way 
this approach has developed, for which purpose there is an abundance of critical 
essays the reader can refer to, but I will point out that Law and Literature has a 
long history even in Europe (Sansone 2001) and is very much thriving here 
(Aristodemou 2000; Buescu-Trabuco-Ribeiro 2010; Gaakeer 2007; Gaakeer and 
Ost 2008; Garapon and Salas 2008; González 2008; Mittica 2009; Ost et al. 
2001; Ost 2004; Pozzo 2010; Ward 1995, 2004; Williams 2005), as it is in other 
countries outside the United States (Melkevik 2010), most notably in Australia 
(Dolin 2007) and less notably in Latin America (Coaguila Valdivia 2009; 
Karam Trindade, Gubert, and Neto 2008a, 2008b; Lopes 2006; Schwartz and 
Trindade 2008). 
Also testifying to the growing interest in this interdisciplinary approach is 
the large following attracted by the Italian Society for Law and Literature 
(ISLL), established in June 2008 at the University of Bologna with the aim of 
promoting Law and Literature and, more broadly still, Law and the Humanities: 
an international network has been set up linking some of the most prominent 
organizations devoted to this approach; an online multilingual journal called 
ISLL Papers has since been founded, and also a library that extends its scope so 
as to also keep a close eye on the research being conducted in this field in 
different parts of the world and from different disciplinary perspectives. 1 
It is too early to have a proper assessment of this experience, to be sure, 
but at least one observation can be made from the outset as far as the society’s 
                                                 
1
 A fuller statement of ISLL’s aims and activity can be found online at 
www.lawandliterature.org .  
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membership is concerned. There has gathered around ISLL a community of 
scholars coming from a variety of disciplines, bringing a perspective both 
internal to law and external to it. From an internal viewpoint we have the legal 
sciences and the different branches of positive law, and we concomitantly have 
a number of disciplines traditionally engaged in observing law from an external 
viewpoint, such as philosophy, history (ancient, medieval, and modern), and the 
sociology and anthropology of law. The area that ISLL has come to stretch over 
is, in this sense, spontaneously interdisciplinary. 
Interdisciplinarity, as is known, offers great opportunities for any 
scholarly enterprise, but at the same time it also increases more than anything 
else the risk of lapsing into improvisation and dilettantism. Our aim is to work 
out investigative models that can be shared among different disciplinary 
perspectives, in such a way as to find a common language and to proceed 
bringing to bear the expertise distinctive to each participant. This need is the 
order of the day on the agenda for this field of study, and the process, especially 
as Europe is concerned, has gotten off to a good start through the effort François 
Ost.2 
While I do agree with Posner (2009) in criticizing interdisciplinarity as an 
idle pursuit when undertaken in a superficial way, I argue, contrary to Posner’s 
view, that through a process involving a theoretical exchange with 
methodological controls on the data to be analyzed, Law and the Humanities 
makes it possible to observe the law in a useful and rigorous way, and not just 
to recover law’s aesthetic dimension, with a view to providing an ethical 
vantage point on the law for those who will be dealing with legal questions. 
There are three objectives in particular I will be focusing on: (a) to 
present a model I have called normative narration (Mittica 2006), a model 
understood as the main engine driving the processes of normative construction, 
and developed by drawing on concepts and insights pertaining to different 
disciplines; (b) to frame a new way of looking at the distinction between law 
and literature; and (c) to come at a definition of law as narrative, as well as to 
see how other types of narrative produced within a culture can be considered 
normative. 
 
 
2. Law as a Kind of Cultural Artefact 
 
                                                 
2
 In addition to getting jurists and literary scholars to come together in Ost, Van Eynde, 
Gérard, Kerchove 2001, Ost directed with J. Gaakeer the last edition of the special 
workshop on Law and Literature organized under the 23th IVR World Congress held in 
Cracow in 2007, a workshop in large part devoted to the epistemological problems 
posed by this new way of approaching Law and Literature (Gaakeer and Ost 2008; 
Nitrato Izzo 2009). 
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In an important book published in 2000, Guyora Binder and Robert 
Weisberg summarize all genres of literary criticism of law. Depending on the 
approach in question, law is understood as an “interpretive practice” 
(hermeneutic criticism of law); as a “narrative practice,” or a construction of 
stories (narrative criticism of law); as an “activity aimed at persuading, 
deciding, conversing” (rhetorical criticism of law); as “language” 
(deconstructive criticism of law); or as a tool for action in disputes and 
transactions, operating on the level where a relational context is represented 
(cultural criticism of law). 
For Guyora and Binder (2000, 26), each of these genres offers its own 
point of view on a broader cultural perspective that sees the law mainly as a 
practice which consists in composing a kind of literary artefact, a practice aimed 
at constructing a representation of reality —the outcome of interpreting, 
enacting, or constructing a story, a performance, or a linguistic sign. 
This broader cultural perspective depicts law as an arena where the 
structural aspects have an equal role with the voluntaristic aspects proper (the 
social actors’ choices and actions) in the symbolic universe that imparts an 
order to life in common (community), and both aspects are expressed according 
to the modes and forms of literature. 
We have here a theoretical advance of no small account in Law and 
Literature. The idea of law as a compositional practice unfolding on the level of 
culture makes it possible to embrace a vision, broadly anthropological, in which 
law presents itself as one of several narrative resources used by culture in the 
process of enabling the mediations necessary for life in common. There is 
something truly anticipatory in this sense in the concept of nomos worked out 
by Cover (1983) on the premise that human communities are in the first place 
“narrative” communities.3  
In other words, underlying the observation of law as a cultural 
phenomenon is an idea of law as a compositional practice that resolves itself 
into a narrative practice, where narration is understood as a process inherent in 
culture and serves a function closely bound up with the normative dimension of 
human coexistence. 
There are a few ideas of theory and method which can be advanced if we 
take that to be the premise of our reasoning. 
 
 
3. Toward a Theory of Normative Narration 
 
Let us proceed by first putting forward a concept of normative practice. 
Where we are concerned, this is generally understood to be the practice of 
                                                 
3
 Even Ost (2004) bases on the same premise his study on the foundational stories of 
law, the premise being that all human communities should be understood as “narrative.” 
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composing a “text,” and a text is in turn understood —in accord with the 
meaning ascribed to this term in certain quarters of anthropology— as an 
“element proper to culture” having the primary function of outlining meanings, 
making it possible for makers of narration to symbolically order their condition, 
not only for themselves but also with respect to their environment and to the 
relational context in which their daily world gets concretized.4 
In virtue of these characteristics, normative practice takes on the guise of 
an ars combinatoria. This is not to be confused with the programme developed 
under the same name in the 1600s in the philosophy of logic, for it properly 
applies to social subjects, who in the course of their interpretive and relational 
processes, and on the basis of their own choices of behaviour, mediate the 
continuous construction of a reality which can be shared, incessantly combining 
and recombining symbolic structures and the possibilities preselected by the 
environment they partake in. 
Social subjects each ground their own existence narratively, recounting 
themselves, the world around them, and their own way of relating to this world. 
Driven by a need to have a way of making sense of life, which never ceases to 
unfold, social subjects recombine —several times over in several arenas— the 
narrative elements available to them, constructing new narratives that may 
provide them with a sense of balance (Brooks 1984). 
There is nothing particularly creative about all this, if not for the 
possibility of certain combinations being more original than others: 
 
For one thing, narrative gives us a ready and supple means for dealing 
with the uncertain outcomes of our plans and anticipations. [...]  
Narrative is a recounting of human plans gone off the track, expectations 
gone awry. It is a way to domesticate human error and surprise. It 
conventionalizes the common forms of human mishap into genres —
comedy, tragedy, romance, irony, or whatever format may lessen the 
sting of our fortuity. Stories reassert a kind of conventional wisdom about 
what can be expected, even (or especially) what can be expected to go 
wrong and what might be done to restore or cope with the situation. 
Narrative achieves these prodigies not only because of its structure per se 
but because of its flexibility or malleability. Not only are stories products 
of language, so remarkable for its sheer generativeness, permitting so 
                                                 
4
 The idea of culture as a text or complex of texts is developed as well by Geertz (1973), 
who does so drawing on the concepts of text and textuality worked out in post-
structuralist semiotics. Unlike the structuralists, however, Geertz observes culture as “an 
acted document” coinciding with what gets “said” by way of social actions; he thus 
observes culture in such a way that cultural and symbolic forms—that is, the structure 
of meaning—are not separated from the flux of behaviour, in a context of reality that 
acts to continuously represent and interpret such behaviour. See also Geertz 1983. 
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many different versions to be told, but telling stories soon becomes 
crucial to our social interactions. (Bruner 2003, 28–31)  
 
Bruner reiterates the importance of telling stories as an activity of 
symbolic mediation, on the level of subjects with respect to themselves and 
their environment, as well as on the level of human coexistence, suggesting that 
our survival as subjects participating in a community depends on an ongoing 
dialectical process through which meaning (or new portions of meaning) is 
destructured and restructured, a process carried on in the course of social 
interactions and through the creation of conventional forms as to what can 
legitimately be expected. 
Although Bruner was specifically referring a moment ago to literary 
narrative practice, he otherwise invites us more broadly, on the model of the ars 
combinatoria I am here developing, to maintain a distinction between the two 
levels or dimensions in question: On the one hand, we are in the wider ambit of 
the processes of symbolic mediation, aimed at imparting sense and semantic 
order to the world in which we are situated, and this is the cultural dimension 
broadly understood; on the other hand, we find ourselves in the ambit of culture 
more specifically understood as legal, where the ars combinatoria proceeds 
from our representing such rules and guidelines of behaviour as are necessary 
for enabling human relations. 
Once the question is so framed, we can see how a theory of legal 
narrations can be developed having at its core a universe of narrative practices 
and means, such as are necessary to make sense of and mediate the conflicts 
proper to coexistence, and such as emerge out of our life in common, through 
its culture, for the purpose of survival. 
So this is the universe of life in common, a universe that survives and 
changes through these cultural resources, and these resources are entrusted with 
holding together the equilibriums of coexistence. This, in other words, is the 
legal dimension of culture, where the narrations resorted to can be described as 
legal in the sense that they bring to us the combinations worked out in the 
sphere of community, as well as in the sense that they depend on our capacity to 
structure codes of both signification and behaviour. 
And, finally, there is the question of the forms in which these 
compositional activities are configured, and it is clear in this regard that 
narration assumes the full gamut of forms our cultural environment enables as 
either a possibility or an expectation. 
There are three important consequences that so far in this discussion can 
be drawn in regard to narrative practices: 
 
(1) Narrative practices are productive of reality, such that the distinction 
between reality and fiction cannot be made to rest on the imaginary or factual 
origin of a given event, because reality must be observed starting from the 
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effects that narration yields in the concrete in the representations of the social 
subjects involved. 
(2) Narrative practices are in large measure “legal” insofar as they mediate not 
only codes of meaning but also norms pertaining to such acts and relations as 
are socially relevant or oriented. 
(3) Narrative practices potentially avail themselves of all the resources 
expressive of culture. 
 
The only idea of reality put forward on this analytic approach is thus that 
of a boundless web of narrative combinations. This is reality such as we observe 
it from a sociological and anthropological point of view: Reality understood as 
the relational universe underlying our life in common and grounded in 
representation (White 1980). 
Inherent in this world are certain equilibriums that need to be maintained 
even as our orderings undergo change. We can appreciate from this perspective 
that it is no longer useful to distinguish what is true from what is false: We 
instead need to consider whether and how narrative resources serve the function 
of maintaining the equilibriums they are called on to maintain; so too, we need 
to consider what contents and limits such resources operate with, as well as 
whether and how these resources exert influence on one another and, finally, 
which of them are more effective in offering suggestions and in enabling and 
accompanying change. 
Normative narration can be described as any cultural form forged by way 
of this ars combinatoria, and so as including within its scope any legal text, 
literary novel, or poem; or the scripting and staging of a trial, play, or movie; or 
again a visual work, such as a painting, sculpture, or photograph. 
There is nothing new about having detected in much of one’s own 
creative work (in the genres pertaining to “fantasy,” inclusive of literature and 
art in a broad sense) social norms, rules, and institutions, or rites aimed at 
channelling conflict or perpetuating a modus vivendi or power and violence —
all of them codes structuring our living in common. It is legitimate to at least 
suspect that this work, more than a “mirror of reality,” is actually part of reality: 
It does not so much represent reality as it itself consists in portions of reality,5 or 
at least it consists in that portion of reality which is the symbolic universe of 
human relations, with respect to which it serves the function of codifying and 
communicating rules. 
By the same token, law is not the only system called on to play out 
processes of social signification and modelling, and it may not even be the most 
                                                 
5
 We are thus working here from a different perspective than that established among 
scholars of Droit et Littérature, who instead take an aesthetic-legal approach on which 
art is understood as a “mirror of reality” and, consequently, as a mirror of law (Andrini 
1997). 
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effective of such processes, notwithstanding the strong performative component 
it carries. Then too, law’s similarity to literature is so well documented as to at 
least suggest the wisdom of observing it as a complex of narrative practices 
embracing, in a more general way, any sort of narration brought into being by 
the need to order coexistence in the dimension of juridicité (juridicalness), a 
dimension proper to culture at large.6 
In this sense, we should not exclude from our field of inquiry any of the 
forms that may be taken up as narrative resources: Every compositional genre 
comes under the scope of inquiry, which thus extends to include law as 
literature and as cinema, painting, photography, music, and so on. 
There has not been enough reflection so far on reality and representation, 
on the performativeness of symbolic structures, on the narrativity of law itself; 
and so we are seeing more and more often, in consequence, “texts” in various 
cultural genres being taken into account from a limited perspective that has us 
observe positive law through the representation afforded by a work of art, or it 
has us analogize positive law to other formal systems, or again it asks us to look 
for normative expectations which the law suppresses or ignores but which do 
find expression in fiction. A theory of normative narration could at least in part 
make up for these shortcomings by providing a wider frame within which to set 
the various approaches based on the ars combinatoria model here advanced. 
The point is not to merge Law and Literature into the wider field of Law 
and the Humanities. The point is instead that Law and the Humanities itself 
takes a different subject matter, for it no longer focuses narrowly on positive 
law in relation to the arts but rather turns to juridicité conceived as the nomos 
expressed in cultural products that channel narrations having a useful role in 
imparting order to common sense. 
Given this frame, Law and Literature can be understood as specifically 
concerned with all forms of literature a story can take, so long as the story in 
question bears relevance to the order of social relations. 
This makes law a literary genre —or rather, a species of genre we call 
literature— and it is from this point of view that law must be observed in 
relation to the products of the other arts pertaining to juridicité. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 No one, among the classic writers on the sociology of law, has been more eloquent in 
this regard than Carbonnier (1969), taking a close critical look not only at pure theories 
of law but also at the purity of law itself. Together with law, nonlaw forms part of that 
broader legal realm inclusive of social life referred to as juridicité (juridicalness). 
Indeed, the idea of juridicité put forward by Carbonnier moves beyond the disparity 
among existing sources of law and beyond the hierarchy that comes to hold among 
them, for it encompasses a much broader view of the legal phenomenon as having its 
essential locus in the cultural dimension of coexistence. 
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4. Structures of Order and Structures of Possibility 
 
What makes the literary criticism of law the approach closest to my own 
analysis has mainly to do with the fact that literary texts and legal texts alike are 
expressed in verbal language, most of it set down in writing: this not only 
makes them easier to use and access but also endows them with a specific 
performative capacity. Indeed, unlike other forms of narrative resource, literary 
texts draw on largely shared codes and on a highly formalized language, as is 
the case with the language of verbal communication, and this gives them a 
greater capacity to structure wide tracts of juridicité.  
The first thing to flow from usability so understood is the possibility of 
receiving codes and sharing meanings, at which point we have already entered 
the universe of relations and so of juridicité. And if we look at the performative 
aspect, we will realize not only that words are in themselves performative as a 
code —they form a fragment of our reality— but also that the very structuring 
of a literary work is effected in ways which can in certain respects be described 
as performative. 
This characteristic of the process of normative structuring I will come 
back to shortly, when I discuss the connection between performance and 
narration; but before we get there, we need to understand what types of 
narrative develop in the literary cultural dimension of juridicité. 
If we keep within the ars combinatoria model I am here proceeding from, 
we will see that social actors evolve essentially two types of narrative, both of 
which we can refer to as “stories,” ignoring for the time being the literary form 
they can find themselves translated into: On the one hand, we have stories 
practiced by subjects who orient themselves to already established codes of 
behaviour, and so these people will come up with narratives having solutions 
that look to the past, tending to conserve settled and certain meanings; on the 
other hand, we have stories whose plotlines are worked out by subjects who, by 
contrast, call into question the solutions the given order can produce, and so 
these are people who look to new possibilities. And so it can be observed, 
depending on the plotline in question, that people will use symbolic structures 
(or narrative elements) tending to either conserve a settled order or set out a 
possible new order. 
To be sure, the combination making up a story is clearly such that both 
types of narrative elements —the conservative and the innovative alike— can 
find their way in there. But let us stipulate, for the sake of expository 
expediency, that a distinction can be drawn between, on the one hand, stories 
aimed at consolidating a preexisting order and, on the other, stories that instead 
outline the way this order changes and the new content it takes or can take. To 
this end we can consider —as our term of distinction— the ending of each 
story, its denouement. We can accordingly class as belonging to the first type 
those stories whose ending is predictable (you already know how things will 
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turn out), and as belonging to the second type those stories which do not offer a 
solution to the problem framing the story or which offer an unexpected solution. 
While it’s conceivable that stories concerned to consolidate a given order 
will draw on the semantics proper to that symbolic-normative order —made up 
of rules, norms, and values intended to guide social action— it may not be as 
easy to recognize a story as one that sets out or introduces a possibility, a story 
having performative characteristics on a par with other stories, but geared 
toward unsettling and changing the preexisting order. 
On the other hand, the existence of a world of possibility extending 
beyond culture is something that can take shape only as a story, a story like any 
other story, for it falls outside our field of observation and so does not cross our 
path. 
All that can be observed from a sociological and anthropological 
perspective is the social fact of the existence of stories acting as the main engine 
of change and innovation. 
We are dealing here especially with the narration of crises, whose 
plotlines share a perturbative kind of force, which they can bring to bear by 
textualizing the human environment, and doing so in such a way as to question 
rules and meanings hitherto considered certain and univocal. Even as these 
stories, so combined, carry uncertainty, confusion, equivocalness, and 
indeterminacy, they nonetheless make it possible for other authors and for users 
(the ones and the others reinterpreting such stories) to conceive of new solutions 
for mediation and coexistence, solutions we would not be able to alight on 
through stories of the second kind, those fashioned using only such elements as 
stabilize the normative-symbolic order. 
It is this unquiet, albeit imaginative, dimension that creeps into our 
culture. In fact, its presence in our world of meanings is evidenced by 
something that eludes the codes, exceeding all that can be named. Out of this 
dimension, which does not lend itself to description, come tensions we cannot 
name: They are “nameless” and, in this sense, “lawless”; they cannot be 
governed or mediated. 
Having made this point, we can now proceed to a more precise definition 
of the two types of narrative. 
We can reckon among stories of the literary-conservative type —the ones 
typifying the existing normative symbolic order— those that use the symbolic 
structures found in much of law, of a social group’s dominant morality, and of 
religion, and generally of shared social codes handed down by tradition or by 
way of established practices. We have here a portion of juridicité that offers 
resources aimed at cementing and defending rules of coexistence, answering a 
need for certainty, security, and predictability in the game of social 
expectations. 
This part of juridicité, only apparently tranquillizing, winds up actually 
generating greater possibilities for conflict than for peaceful coexistence, 
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particularly when it resolves itself into the combining of stories tending to 
universalize and impose their own narratives as unique, and that in an 
environment like ours, characterized by manifoldness and alterity. 
The common thread linking the persons involved in this type of story is 
their need for certainty. We have a tendency to confirm and cement a semantics 
we recognize as our own, so as to remove risk and bewilderment from the 
universe of our social relations. By a paradox, however, these narrations 
amplify the fragmentation, indeterminacy, and confusion which we take up 
from the complexity of the environment, and which we would instead like to 
resolve and dispel: Out of the certainty and coherence of the visions we 
perceive as unique and as offering solutions, we instead get conflicts, with the 
consequence that the irenic ends these visions promote are not achieved if not 
by revealing their inadequacy to serve their stated function. Not to mention, 
finally, that the greater their force, the greater will be their capacity to become 
perfect tools in the hands of minority groups who use them to further their own 
interests. 
In contrast to the ease with which the symbolic-normative order can be 
defined, stories that are capable of innovation, and so are bearers of change, can 
be identified only by way of their outstripping the conservative type or by way 
of their putting up resistance to it. We could use to this end the same 
considerations through which Carbonnier (1969) singles out different forms of 
non-droit (as against law understood in its widest acceptation), which is to say 
that nonlaw is for him that portion of juridicité which manifests itself as an 
absence of law.  
So we have droit (law), corresponding to that part of juridicité which is 
made of established codes, and then we have non-droit (nonlaw), corresponding 
to that part of juridicité where alternative possibilities come into being. 
One approach in singling out nonlaw can be described as objective and 
consists in seeking out stories so combined that they are keyed to a possible 
order in that portion of juridicité left vacant by law or by other stories belonging 
with the “order of certainty.” It may indeed happen that stories minded to 
confirm a preexisting order will invoke structures of meaning inadequate to 
understand particular questions which overstep boundaries, meaning the 
boundaries of the stories’ own authority or those of their own reasoning; so we 
are confronted here with questions that these stories fail to understand or 
conceive, and ultimately to regulate. Consequently, these stories retreat: They 
limit or neutralize themselves, thereby making space for stories having 
unexpected solutions or even stories lacking any conclusion at all. These other 
stories present themselves as possibilities for action, in such a way that the 
outcome of their combining becomes a recognizable and formalizable portion of 
legal culture. 
A second approach in singling out nonlaw can instead be described as 
subjective, and is such that we each freely choose whether or not to subscribe to 
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an established code. These choices are widespread, and, for Carbonnier, a 
determinant role in this sphere is played by individual will: When we find 
ourselves involved in a normative situation, we can individually decide —for 
each of the episodes making up this situation’s plotline— whether we will live 
the experience normatively or not; which is to say that we always have an 
option we can exercise; in fact, it is precisely as individuals that, by an effort of 
will, we move away from the establishment codes and turn to other possible 
stories instead. The actions that can more readily be brought within this scope, 
the scope of individual choice, are proper to decisions concerning areas of life 
in common that impact heavily on the single individuals’ affective intimacy. 
One need only think, in this regard, how we retreat from the codes of law, or 
from other sources of “established” social regulation, whenever an emotive 
component is present, as in a love or family relationship or in one of friendship, 
where, in Carbonnier’s (1969) evocative words, we carry on within the tranquil 
night of nonlaw, since these relationships are ones we have taken up without 
wanting to bring them under the full light of the law. 
Of course, stories keyed to a possible world are narrations produced by 
people practicing their ars combinatoria in a setting where life is a life in 
common, but what ultimately enables us to identify them as stories of this type 
(stories that invoke a possible world) is that they will prompt a retreat among 
stories of the conservative type, or they will emerge in consequence of such a 
retreat. And, even more importantly, these stories, precisely by way of their 
invoking a possible world, can all be linked to crises in the symbolic order 
affecting their authors’ environment, and hence affecting their authors 
themselves and their relational context. Because these narrations emerge with 
an established structure’s retreat, they hold themselves out not only as “new” 
possibilities of normative construction, but also as possibilities asserting 
themselves more softly than others: They are more uncertain, but precisely for 
this reason they are more open-ended, and in theory more disposed toward 
irenic solutions. 
 
 
5. Normative Narrative Construction 
 
When the ars combinatoria proceeds to construct portions of juridicité, it 
sets into motion a process that can be termed normative narrative construction. 
For an understanding of the dynamics involved in this process, we can start 
from the concept of performance. In performance, the action involved in the ars 
combinatoria is coupled with the reservoir of given symbolic structures which 
the social actors draw on to enact their narrative practices: the level of action 
literally meets that of symbolic structure. 
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The most significant work on performance is that done in anthropology.7 
Authors like Turner and Moore view the structuring of social reality as an 
ongoing process of situational regularization driven by the need to manage the 
indeterminacy present in the social and cultural order: 
 
The cultural, contractual, and technical imperatives always leave gaps, 
require adjustments and interpretations to be applicable to particular 
situations, and are themselves full of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and 
often contradictions [...]. [C]ommon symbols, customary behaviors, role 
expectations, rules, categories, ideas and ideologies, rituals and 
formalities shared by actors do exist and frame mutual communication 
and action. But [...] the fixing and framing of social reality is itself a 
process or a set of processes. (Turner 1986, 78) 
 
Because performance serves precisely this adjustment function, it must be 
understood as a process by which meaning or portions of meaning are 
structured, and this process unfolds through procedures that may transform or 
simply stabilize meanings and codes. 
So far, we have not yet looked at any specific process by which juridical 
codes are structured. But Turner points out that there is an essential element of 
drama to performances: These are enacted in response to the outbreak of a 
social drama, which happens when someone stirs up tension among those 
engaged in life in common, and does so in such a way as to cause that order to 
shift into crisis, thus taking up what is substantially a normative perspective. 
Social drama presents itself as an eruption out of the horizontal process of 
daily life in its unfolding, with its interactions, transactions, and reciprocities, 
and with its customs in producing regular and ordered sequences of behaviour. 
This perturbative force is always latent in the context of human coexistence, 
ever ready to turn into a source of uneasiness or into a conflict. 
Turner explains it by noting that social life, even when apparently quiet, 
is in reality pregnant with social drama. It’s as if each of us had two faces, a 
peaceful one and a bellicose one, as if we were programmed for cooperation but 
were ready to engage in conflict. This perennial and primordial fighting mode is 
                                                 
7
 It is to Turner (1986) that we owe the reconstruction of an anthropology of 
performance. His main objective is to study the interrelations between sociocultural 
structures and the individual by laying emphasis on the creative action of individuals 
themselves, and this is an objective the other anthropologists he refers to partly share. 
Even as Turner moves in this direction, he works out a theory of the “process” by which 
meanings are structured: This is a process necessary to life in common and to its 
change, and it can also be applied from a perspective like ours, where the creative 
activity of social subjects is understood as limited to the practice of combining 
meanings and possibilities preselected by the environment the subjects themselves 
participate in. 
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the social drama itself. But just as our species has evolved over time and has 
become more skilled at using and manipulating symbols, just as our 
technological domination of nature and our capacity for self-destruction have 
grown exponentially over the last several thousand years, so in a comparable 
measure have we somehow advanced in our ability to conjure up new cultural 
modes by which to grapple with, understand, and make sense of a crisis, and 
sometimes even to solve it: This is the second phase in the ineradicable social 
drama that threatens us at every time and place, and at every level of 
sociocultural organization (Turner 1982). 
By and large, what makes the state of drama recognizable is its being 
acted out on the level of life in common, the level most closely bound up with 
the dimension of juridicité. Performance, after all, gets engaged precisely from 
the moment that a crisis is publicly acknowledged, and the crisis is pushed 
forward until a point is reached where a new equilibrium can be shared. 
 
Typically, [social dramas] have four main phases of public action. These 
are: (1) Breach of regular norm-governed social relations; (2) Crisis, 
during which there is a tendency for the breach to widen. Each public 
crisis has what I now call liminal characteristics, since it is a threshold 
(limen) between more or less stable phases of the social process [...]. [I]t 
takes up its menacing stance in the forum itself, and, as it were, dares the 
representatives of order to grapple with it; (3) Redressive action ranging 
from personal advice and informal mediation or arbitration to formal 
juridical and legal machinery, and, to resolve certain kinds of crisis or 
legitimate other modes of resolution, to the performance of public ritual. 
Redress, too, has its liminal features, for its “betwixt and between,” and, 
as such, furnishes a distanced replication of the events leading up to and 
composing the “crisis.” This replication may be in the rational idiom of 
the judicial process, or in the metaphorical and symbolic idiom of ritual 
process; (4) The final phase consists either of the reintegration of the 
disturbed social group, or of the social recognition and legitimation of 
irreparable schism between the contesting parties. (Turner 1986, 74–75) 
 
Social drama, then, sums up the complex of conditions we would find 
ourselves in once, having been confronted with an exceptional event that has 
unsettled our everyday order, we fall into crisis and find it necessary to display 
our uneasiness to others, projecting such uneasiness onto a communitarian 
(public) frame, or indeed any shared frame, from which to start in 
reconstructing a form of equilibrium, even if such an equilibrium simply 
resolves itself into redefining the problem. 
The area in this sequence where disorder arises is that of the limen, 
present in the crisis phase as well as in the redressive phase, and this 
disturbance can be described as a highly destabilizing and destructuralizing 
“energy in motion” that performance must come to grips with. Turner (1982) 
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even posits a direct correlation between communitas and liminality, for on the 
one hand we have a process by which the subject’s publicly staged crisis calls 
into question the semantic order of the environment (or portion thereof) that 
comes under criticism or revision, but this plot runs parallel to and coincides 
with the process through which the crisis could be composed by mediation 
(limen). And then, the moment the breach is so mended, the environment that 
the initiator of the crisis and the other members of the community participate in 
will have been renewed or will have been consolidated into an order. 
While the drama describes a sequence of situations, performance takes 
shape as a complex of actions the social actor carries out within the frame of the 
same sequence. 
Structure and process meld into each other through dynamics of a ritual 
kind, and in addition to marking the unfolding of the drama, in such a way as to 
also reenact or dramatize the drama itself, these dynamics make distinctly 
performative the performance’s actions. 
To understand these dynamics, we have to imagine what happens when 
someone begins to move about within the space of the social order: This 
moving about takes place in a ritual and performative way, and yet —despite 
the ritual component— a crisis arises because any change in condition entails a 
readjustment in the overall scheme. And the crisis is answered with an order 
(even a new one) that restores itself ritually, that is, through a ceremony (Turner 
1986). 
Performance is a complex sequence of symbolic acts: It has 
transformative power, but it can only exercise this power through formal 
procedures. 
Turner stresses how inadequate this ritual processuality is, especially in 
the liminal passage from crisis to redressive action to reintegration. In this 
transitioning, the ritual process of performance serves the function of symbolic 
mediator, having an ability to grasp or devise new meanings for possible 
redressive action or, more simply, an ability to process the terms of the crisis. 
The performative function proper, then, is served by performance itself, in the 
final phase of the social drama, that of reintegration, where the aim is to restore 
order by reintegrating such symbolic and legal codes as were already shared or 
by formalizing new ones. 
It is my opinion that the social-drama model can explain the process of 
normative construction. Not incidentally, Turner connects social drama to the 
main genres of literary narration (considering in particular how performance can 
translate into theatre). And even though he does not concern himself with law, 
the possibility that social drama may represent the main genres of literary 
narration encourages me to use this model in an effort to understand the process 
described by the ars combinatoria as applied to the structuring of juridicité. 
We can analogize the two models and say that performance relates to 
social drama the way narrative practice (understood as an ars combinatoria) 
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relates to narrative itself, where social drama is the context of performance just 
as narrative, or indeed any other literary form, is the context for the practice of 
narration, that is, for the ars combinatoria. 
Narrative practice and performance can both be configured as processes 
aimed at limiting or keeping within manageable bounds the share of 
indeterminacy present in a cultural and social plotline, a plotline that gets 
filtered through individual experience. 
Furthermore, just as performance finds its occasion when a social drama 
arises, so the process of narration is deliberately set in motion when a given 
order that is taken for granted gets breached, and it is this breach that provides 
the occasion for the story. Indeed, stories start out by assuming the normality of 
some state of affairs in the world, a state of affairs whose order will soon be 
breached: It is from this infringement of the predictable order of things that a 
story takes its cue. In what ensues, the character or characters affected by the 
breaching event shift into a phase of crisis and make their way through it by 
calling into question what had hitherto seemed obvious. And so, a process gets 
underway whereby the indicators of daily life get worked together, intervening 
in the dialectic between retaining the established order and embracing the 
possibility of new orders, a dialectic that works itself out narratively, by making 
attempts at moving beyond the unsettled order or striking a compromise with 
the old order so as to reconstitute it. The plotline will finally offer a solution to 
the entire affair by making a selection from among the culturally available 
options or by narratively suggesting and firming up new possibilities. 
As to the characters in the story, they will reflect that share of autonomy 
that Turner ascribes to social actors: even as they find themselves situated in an 
established social order, they present themselves as persons capable of choosing 
and acting in unexpected ways if it comes to that. 
Narration thus drives a plot having a structure very much like that of a 
social drama (breach, crisis, redressive action, and reintegration). And so, just 
like performance, narration can act as an agent of change, not only by 
recombining given narrative elements but also by playing out that ritual 
processuality which at the same time involves a processing and codification of 
forms. 
The ars combinatoria, in other words, describes a process of normative 
narrative construction that social actors engage in by drawing on literary 
structures (those available in the existing order or otherwise extracted from the 
making of possibilities), as well as by drawing on models with which to 
narratively structure the forms proper to the different literary genres, in such a 
way that these forms can become the point on which to focus the options open 
to the stories’ authors and characters. 
The analogy between stories and social dramas is strong even as concerns 
the idea of a limen, describing areas of liminality where indeterminacy 
develops, and which we can get a handle on only by way of the ritual 
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formalization provided by a plot or storyline. One need only consider, in this 
regard, the moment after a breach, when the established order is called into 
doubt, and just as the possibilities begin to expand, so do the gray areas; or one 
can consider the subsequent moment, when attempts are made at finding 
solutions useful in rebuilding an equilibrium, whether it be backward-looking or 
forward-looking. At these critical passes, narrating serves the function of 
bringing back a certain stability amid the disarray, amid the semantic 
components that have all been mixed up and scrambled in the flow of events. 
In making our way through a crisis, we are like seafarers who have gone 
off course and, in figuring out new coordinates, have only their logbook to rely 
on, or some kind of diary, or simply someone to talk to and relate what 
happened. Here we find ourselves in a vacuum where order no longer exists: All 
we have left are fragmentary and unstable structures that we cannot mend, for 
we do not know how to mediate between them. And so our survival instincts 
kick in and we invoke our powers of imagination or, more often, those of 
recollection. We thus manage to find or salvage narrative elements with which 
to compose new possibilities or to reconstruct old, reassuring stories, until the 
disorder has gone away or a new order has been set up. 
Finally, like a social drama, so a normative-literary text also brings into 
play the relation among publicness, liminality, and communitas. Indeed, a 
literary work implies readers and spectators, and therefore unfolds publicly, in 
such a way that those who use the narration are made participants in one’s own 
quotidian world, in a process calling into question shared codes and values that 
subsequently end up being reintegrated on the level of cultural and normative 
codes, or they end up replacing such codes. 
By way of a summary, I will note that literary narrations can be likened to 
the process of narrative construction of normativity by way of their function and 
by way of their structural and procedural characteristics. Literary narrations, in 
other words, can be described as normative in that (1) they prove useful in 
restoring conditions of equilibrium when crises arise that unsettle life in 
common; (2) they rely on symbolic structures that are mainly linguistic; and (3) 
they are “told,” narrated, or acted out in public in accord with narrative 
procedures that follow fixed-sequence ritual stages, and the whole process is 
performatively effective. 
 
 
6. An Old Territory within which to Forge a New Distinction between Law and 
Literature 
 
It is not easy to take it as a given that the reality at our disposal is 
ultimately just a complex of narrative combinations, where even the knowledge 
we refer to and keep building is at once all real and all imaginary. Nor is it 
flattering to think of ourselves as social subjects constantly moved by a sense of 
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disquietude and forced by the demands of coexistence to concoct a story for 
ourselves and stick to it (until some other disruption comes along), and that 
without having to be particularly creative at it. 
Still, this seems to be the only basis we can proceed from in working 
toward a new approach to law and literature. Which is to say that we have to 
work on the level of representation, without giving way to the latent need to 
penetrate a “true” reality, or at least a “verisimilar” one, in a territory that is 
cultural and real because symbolic. 
The distinction between law and literature is constructed on the basis of a 
contrast between an actual reality of law and the nonreality or fictional reality of 
literature: a contraposition on which the distinction tends to be overlaid between 
stories concerned to preserve an established and certain order (law) and stories 
where everything is possible (normative fiction). But this way of framing the 
distinction at hand diminishes the potential offered by the narrative approach, 
for it forces us to look through lenses that are not always clear. 
One need only consider in this regard the paradox the distinction so 
framed leads to when it locates the disquiet, restive face of law in its literary 
representation, as if the only way we could detect this face were to break the 
mirror we are reflecting ourselves into: This casts literature as the true locus of 
life, the place where life is “more authentic,” precisely on the notion that fiction 
is much more telling of the law than is “a real-life story.” (But then, where does 
the truth lie?) 
Then, too, unlike what is entailed by the distinction between the 
conservative stories proper to law and the possible-world stories proper to 
literature —a distinction loosely based on the true-false dichotomy— it is by no 
means a foregone conclusion that law cannot be a source of stories looking to 
the possible (just think of the legal framework for mediation, or of the 
unexpected rulings and pronouncements a case can resolve itself into), nor is it 
so clear that the more complex aspects of law can only be observed through 
their literary representation, nor can it be taken for granted that this 
representation will always offer the deepest insights into the law. Conversely, 
and to the same effect, we should not neglect to bear in mind that even 
literature, for its part, produces stories offering recurrent themes and solid, 
certain solutions drawing on a shared fund of ideas in a settled order of 
meaning. 
If we inhabit a universe of stories, then what is the point of distinguishing 
between “real” stories and “fictional” ones? Why proceed on such a 
classificatory distinction between fields of inquiry, giving heed to which we run 
the risk of being stuck on the surface of these narrative resources, affording a 
limited understanding of their real function and effectiveness when it comes to 
human coexistence? 
And what about the person as social actor? In this useless toing and froing 
between reality and fiction we lose sight of the problem of the relation between 
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social actors and their cultural structures. Where law and literature alike are 
concerned, the social actor is so unspecified it is hard to understand how these 
persons ought to be understood, were it not that on the one hand, under the 
rubric of law, we envision for them a quite restricted and conservative range of 
social action, and on the other hand, under the rubric of literature, wide latitude 
is given for actors to express their potential, so much so that they regain their 
autonomy with a full range of capacities: imagination, creativity, a critical 
mind. 
Law and Literature has so far devoted too little attention to the question of 
the social actor, failing to analyze the characteristics that distinguish an actor, 
understood here as the maker of a narrative having relational import.8 Which is 
to say that on my approach —where the distinction between law and literature is 
refashioned proceeding from the idea of culture as something we look to in part 
for its ability to serve an equilibratory function by drawing on narrative 
resources that translate into stories— social actors are persons who undertake 
processes of normative juridification. A performing social actor is thus an artist 
of life, more or less creative and cognizant, but the point is that one becomes 
such an artist just in virtue of one’s practicing the ars combinatoria. Social 
actors engage in narrative practice, and in so doing construct themselves and 
their own relational reality, manifesting their existence as social actors by 
putting forth constructs, whether in discursive or narrative form, which they 
work out for themselves and submit to people other than themselves in a 
process of exchange that results in the production of reality (Calame 1986). This 
practice and process intensifies when a crisis arises, for in these circumstances 
the social actor experiences cognitive dissonance, and that makes it impelling to 
achieve a stable assembly of packages of meaning (Schütz 1981). 
Literature is one of the cultural forms through which this can be done: it 
is a “field of assembly” that, as a genre, also includes among its species the 
cultural “texts” produced in the circles where the semantics of the juridical 
system are constructed. 
For this reason, it would be more coherent, on this approach, for Law and 
Literature to go by the name of “Juridicité and Literature”, which is admittedly 
a mouthful, but it would nonetheless more effectively convey the idea of a field 
of inquiry inclusive of any literary text concerned with the normative 
component of culture. 
These texts can be grouped under two broad areas of narrative. The first 
of these is that of law, comprising all juridical literary “texts” having a formal 
place within the ambit of the legal system, or otherwise making reference to that 
system; and the second area is that of stories having other literary forms outside 
the “official canon.” 
                                                 
8
 The work devoted in Law and Literature to the social actor has focused mostly on the 
narrative construction of identity (Binder and Weisberg 2000). 
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The distinction between law and literature thus resurfaces, but only once 
these two sides of the distinction (law and literature) have found their common 
element in that territory where narrative production assumes literary forms. The 
outcome is that we come to observe law in the first instance as a social device 
among others, a resource available to those who are bound by a relational 
universe: Like all other social devices, this resource can be used in a bad way or 
a good way, and it also importantly shares with them the feature of purporting 
to guide behaviour through a set of guidelines, if even these guidelines form 
part of the state’s framework. 
Stories in law and literature are always to be considered as literary works 
we can turn to in the effort to grasp the process through which juridicalness is 
narrated: This is something we can equally observe in the law’s “official” texts 
as in the representation they have in other literary sources, and indeed in any 
other “unofficial” story, so long as it comes to bear on an order of coexistence.9 
Given this background, the theory of normative narrations finds its own 
ground next to the more traditional critical analysis of law, having the objective 
of debunking the sacredness which the law is regarded as having in the 
collective consciousness, where it is represented as the issue of a sovereign state 
empowered to maintain the rule of law, dispense justice, ensure peace and 
certainty, and even pronounce on reality itself. Here law —unlike the way it is 
represented in classic legal dogmatics, that is, as an abstract and coherent 
system— shows itself to be only a factory where stories are manufactured 
having a more persuasive thrust than those coming from other sources of 
normative regulation. 
What marks out the stories of law is simply that their guidance consists in 
setting out a complex of rules of conduct and having them enforced through a 
coercive apparatus, whose legitimate use of force derives from another narrative 
tradition, one among many others: Another old story. 
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 J. Boyd White himself, in locating literary discourse both inside and outside official 
law, reduces the law to a system of meaning among others, a form of “culture 
sometimes literary and sometimes political.” Then, too, he also makes a point of 
underscoring that if we are to have any deep understanding of the reality of human 
coexistence, we must look at the universe of the speech acts of daily life, since these are 
more faithful to reality and to change: “Poets have always known that life cannot be 
reduced to systems and schemes. [...] Toleration of ambivalence has long been thought 
to be an essential ingredient of intellectual, emotional, and political maturity. [...] The 
comprising of contrary tendencies, the facing of unresolved tensions, is an essential part 
of the art of life, as our artists repeatedly teach us.” (White 1960, 15) 
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AGUDEZA AND THE LAW 
by 
Marzio Pieri 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Law & Letters; it’s certainly a duty of the jurists and law scholars to fix 
the boundaries & the contents of the area within their natural province. But 
undoubtebly a decision about the jurisdiction of the literature in this binomial or 
“working torque” is urgently needed, the preliminary and sine qua non 
requirement for moving off together towards a common and real object. On this 
way, it’s highly probable to come to a dead-end. A combinatorial or 
interpolating process that enucleates and puts together some important facts is 
in my mind very probably misleading. By ‘important facts’ I mean a great 
novelist (e.g. Zola, Dostoevskij, Pirandello, Balzac, and on purpose I don’t 
include among them the ‘comic’ Franz Kafka, who stands rather by the side of 
our Woody Allen) who puts us in front of some “realist” legal occurrences ―as 
e.g. trials, convictions, crimes & punishments, or one’s bearing the blame of a 
fault as a matter of coscience and not for a justice sentence― or an illustrious 
lawyer whose noble pastime is to invest his legal and worldly experience in 
historical or fictional or theatrical writings. That is not the case of the physician-
writer (medico scrittore) which stands almost always by the side of a pure 
amateurish hobby. We must at the opposite take as our model a great jurist and 
writer as Piero Calamandrei, one of the fathers of Italian constitution, who 
strongly and closely joined together his style (vis rhetorica) and character with 
his legal, and political, and journalistic, and epistolary workings. His hobbies, if 
that is the case, are his liberal essays on the Tuscan and Rinascimental artist and 
writer Benvenuto Cellini or, always on the side of an ideal ‘Tuscan order’, those 
nourished ones on georgical matter (Inventario della casa di campagna 
[Inventory of a country-house]). Calamandrei, we must remember, was also a 
folk-tale writer. But then we must be careful not to consider him, or people like 
him, as a sort of hero. Their wonderful examples must be for us a spur to 
descend underground in search of the (Goethian) mothers (i.e. matrices) of the 
laws and to disclose the secrets of a logos which isn’t merely rational or 
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abstractly spiritual or empirically “glossological”. It means that the rhetoric is 
an available and transmittable art where the bravest most shines, but the real 
play is antecedent and primary, and its nature has two distinctive features: The 
demoniacal and the paradox. Fabula movet, non docet: It doesn’t teach 
anything; indeed we stand on the ground of the fabulous. But this fable does not 
speak to us of human or animal beings, nor of mythological satyrs, nymphs, 
trees or fountains (Leopardi: “vissero i boschi un dì...”, i.e. Once upon a time 
there were the Woods living...), but of the metamorphosis of a pure emotional 
energy in vital ganglia of potential languages; metaphorically we could speak of 
a “kitchen language”. Within the uterus of the Earth (that is the Hell) the word 
stays shapeless, the foetus still tore in pieces as the body of Orpheus. The 
personae and their histories are only disiecta membra, as trunkes of trees or 
bodies or empty sleeves. Every ascent or descent towards the text is a sort of 
nekuia, a meeting with the Dead, as in Aeneid VI, where Vergil clearly connects 
the gushing of the word (the speech of the Cumaean Sibyl or Rhetoric in the 
very act) and the haunting dread of Amputation. The French philosopher and 
writer Pierre Klossowski (1905-2001), who studied Nietzsche and Sade as well 
as Correggio or Vergil, in his glorious translation of the Aeneid where he 
excogitates an unhinging and asyntactical poetical language reflects this way 
the verses of the Augustan poet: “Dieux, auquels appartient l’empire des âmees, 
et vous, ombre silencieuses, | et vous, Chaos et Phlégéton, lieux dans la nuit, 
sans fin taciturnes, | qu’il me soit faste de dire les choses ouïes: m’assiste votre 
divinité | à révéler celles dans l’altitude ténébreuse de la terre ensevelies”. But 
pay attention! The unity broken by Nietzsche isn’t even reformed. Heidegger 
listened to that recall but then he stopped within the borders of the etymology 
(i.e. the roots of the Tongue). The German philosopher Hans Blumenberg 
(1920-1966) devoted his last essay to this topic (Höhlenausgänge [Exits from 
the Caves]). Glenn Gould, the famous Canadian pianist and philosopher of 
Music (1932-1982), was very likely influenced by the savage and hellish jazz 
when he back-dated Bach to the Origins and to the Baroque: A “noche oscura” 
(San Juan de la Cruz) which imitates the spirit of the Holy Bible, where all 
moves forward from an offended God (but in consequence of a due and 
therefore just and necessary fault) and by a God making laws on the ground of 
His power (I’m your God and Lord: “quoniam nominor leo”, because my name 
is the lion). But then is the disparity between the pure shapeless shapes (again, 
the “mothers” from Goethe, whence Paul Klee comes with his theory of 
Formativity against Form, an open and expansive space of active, musical and 
playful creation) and the schemata or rhytmical, prosodical, rhetorical 
predetermined “figures”; or between the voice and the writings, the gesture and 
the text(ure), the aion (that is a geological time) and the chronological time? 
That is the question, if there exist or not some laws, unnecessary measures and 
periods. And if we can legitimately declare in limine: No admittance for whom 
hasn’t an historical language and a determined law. The law itself supports the 
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text of the writing, producing the textual philology and the copyright, easily 
destroyable by a crueller thinking. The author is a greedy and abusive owner, 
walking over the great prairies of the Being where all the passers-by leave only 
a pale track. The mental operations of a child (of every child) learning talking 
are immensurable in front to the calculable movements of a philologist formally 
fixing a given text. Nonum prematur in annum? The preliminary (“hygienical”) 
assumption of a given history and literal meaning is just the same as a principle 
of auto-blinding [cf. a contrario a monstrous work as Finnegans Wake by J. 
Joyce but also e. g. the multicoloured and ‘baroque’ prose-poem Praga Magica 
―indeed, a « città morta », a ghost-town― of the great Italian Slavophile and 
poet A. M. Ripellino (1923-1978)]. The letter is not enough even to itself. For 
the jurisprudence, right and wrong, salvation and falling, punishment or 
reconciliation are less pertinent to the reason or the instinct ―vox Dei― than to 
the written history; besides lex and law according to certain authors are 
etimologically akin to letto (the bed) and to legato (legacy), that is the lying-
down and the transmission, and likewise to the greek léghein, lat. legere, i.e. to 
read and to get together (cf. religio), which is the very function and meaning of 
logos. This way isn’t really and geometrical or logical but anfractuous, uneven, 
pronged, interrupted, erratic, insane. Some cultures wholly and abruptly break 
off, vanish. The Lex Mosaica annihilates and replaces the sacred right and 
power of ancient Egypt, the Justinian Code only apparently retains by the way 
of an illuminated selection and reorganization the actual and, so to say, floating 
dramaturgy of a Greek-Roman heritage, really reduced to a jungle of natural 
values and behaviours. Shakespeare vs Cartesius, Plautus vs Vergilius! So, the 
act of baptizing Medio Evo (Middle Ages) a concrete history of one thousand 
years about was an extraordinary and obscurantist violence, nicknamed 
Instauratio nova or magna. Some parts of the respective lives of, e.g., 
Giambattista Vico and J. S. Bach were placed one upon the other, and even the 
years of their respective maturity overlap. Vico, as well as a visionary thinker 
and a baroque writer, was steadily placed over a perfect juridical knowledge (cf 
Christian Molbech, a Danish historian of science and literature [first part of 
XIXth century] who writes in his famous Copenaghen lessons (1831): Vico was 
a “giurista eruditissimo”, the first one who made an attempt to philosophically 
enlighten the various and contrasting courses of the human history); in the same 
period Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, who descended from the great German-
Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, nicknamed ‘the Jewish Plato’, 
discovered again the Passiones of J.S. Bach. His long time forgotten Matheus 
Passion was at last (1829) newly performed by Mendelssohn, who was a 
baptised Jewish, and by his fellow the actor and singer Eduard Devrient, who 
executed the extremely difficult part of Jesus Christ. An historic paradox! But 
paradox is pars magna of the truth. So an illustrious expert and translator of 
Vico’s works, Sania Rojc’, justifies his translation (Vico in una lingua 
scomparsa,”Translating Vico in a dead language”): “[the Croatian language] 
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isn’t the first language who disappears and in history it often happens that 
somebody is deprived of the Idea of a Motherland. Let’s hope that the librairies 
don’t end all in fire...”. Another Vico’s scholar and translator (particularly of 
the Neapolitan philosopher’s juridical works and grounds), Alain Pons, moves 
in some ways from the ideologically maudit French philosopher Pierre Boutang 
(1916-1998), a Catholic and monarchical follower of Charles Maurras, and a 
long time a friend of G. Steiner and E. Lévinas though suspected of 
antisemitism. Here are the fractures and the blindnesses and the secret counter-
trends I was talking about. We must establish our new thinking on Nietzsche, 
whose metaphoric Zarathustra is nevertheless too much European, the treatise 
Dhvanyāloya of the great Ānandavardhana (a Kaśmir thinker, IXth century), 
who insists on the concept of the “poetical Unexpressed” or ‘semantic 
resonance’ (dhvani), and the essay of Sigmund Freud about the Wit. But dhvani 
is substantially the analogous of Aristotele’s thaumaston and Cavalier Marino’s 
“meraviglia” (poetic marvelous). An indispensable compendium could be the 
basic and propagated Institutio Oratoria by Spanish master of rhetoric 
Quintiliano, who originally combines the Greek-Latin or Attic style-line with 
the Asian one. That’s the main-road to end the too long and abstract question of 
the Baroque in the name of a joyful clownery. Incipit Comedia Nova... 
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CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD: A RETROSPECTION 
by 
István H. Szilágyi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He was newly graduated and still wore his 
black linen school suit and the gold ring with 
the emblem of his degree, and he had the airs 
and the lyricism of a happy new parent.1 
 
 
A turn 
 
Following Paul Ricoeur’s instructions we can wander the way to the right 
interpretation passing through three phases: contextualisation−de-contextu-
alisation−re-contextualisation.2 Contextualisation means those efforts with 
which we try to explore the meaning of the work considering the conditions of 
its birth. This comprises the investigation of the author’s relation to the literary 
tradition and to the contemporary social problems as well as the determination 
of the place of the work within the whole oeuvre of the author, and the 
identification of those literary themes and aesthetic problems which has aroused 
                                                 
1
 G. G. Márquez, Chronicle of a Death Foretold, trans. J. Cape, London: Penguin 
Books, 199613 [Chronicle], 99. 
2
 I have borrowed the concepts of “decontextualisation” and “recontextualisation” from 
Ricoeur’s writings although I shall use them with a slightly different meaning in the 
following sketch. As he wrote (1981, 139): “An essential characteristic of a literary 
work, and of a work of art in general, is that it transcends its own psycho-sociological 
conditions of production and thereby opens itself to an unlimited series of readings, 
themselves situated in different socio-cultural conditions. In short, the text must be able, 
from the sociological as well as the psychological point of view, to ‘decontextualise’ 
itself in such a way that it can be ‘recontextualised’ in a new situation —as 
accomplished, precisely, by the act of reading.” See also Ricoeur 1986, 366-370. 
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her attention. In short, contextualisation aims to outline the authorial intention, 
or at least to draw the horizon of plausible authorial intentions that encompasses 
a multitude of the possibly right interpretations, of course, since the authorial 
intention could never be determined exactly. 
 The reader (interpreter) tries to tear the text out of the social, 
psychological and other contextual conditions of its birth, taking account of the 
possible meanings of the text itself in the phase of de-contextualisation.  For 
example, the unstitching of the plot’s threads, the analysis of the characters’ 
motivations and their importance in the plot and of the dramaturgical structure 
of the work traditionally belong to this phase in case of a novel. Here, the 
proper aim of our investigations is to bring to the surface the meanings which 
are hidden in the text independently from the original authorial intention. 
Finally the re-contextualisation requires us to determine the text’s actual 
meaning for ourselves seizing one meaning out from the multiple possible ones, 
at the same time, determining our position in the interpretational community, 
and founding our aesthetical value-judgement. 
This sketch of interpretive process can not afford a complete image of its 
complicated inner relationships; nevertheless, it is suitable for pointing out its 
two features having greater importance in achieving our purposes: The 
openness and the dynamics of interpretive process. 
Openness means in relation with interpretation that we could not reach a 
solely correct meaning of a literary work, even if we follow the instructions for 
the “proper interpretation”, but only a multitude of authentic readings.3 
However, this does not make our efforts to acquire a right interpretation 
senseless. They are not senseless for just two reasons. Partly, since we can still 
disclose a multitude of false interpretations in this way. On the other hand, and 
maybe this is an even more important reason than the previous, the openness 
just turns the act of interpretation into a two-way act. For grabbing out the 
meaning for ourselves induces us to determine our position toward the author 
and the other members of the interpretive community at the same time. That is 
why every literary work offers an opportunity for improving our self-
knowledge, and contains an implicit call for self-determination addressed to the 
reader. This effect is one of the most important propelling forces of the 
dynamics of interpretation. 
                                                 
3
 In relation with this problem James Boyd White (1985, 77-84) has pointed out that 
neither the act of writing itself, nor the meaning of the text can be fully described in 
purely descriptive or analytical terms. Even the most “simplest” text, with the less 
literary value, has a more complex structure than the experience of its reading could be 
summing up in a couple of sentences. Here lies the sense of the literary scientific 
platitude: the meaning of a literary work is not its “message”, but the experience of its 
reading. 
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The structure of contextualisation−de-contextualisation−re-contextualisa-
tion already implies the concept of a progressing move in time. In the first sight, 
it seems to be a rectangular movement which, passing through the phases of 
“right interpretation”, brings us to seizing the meaning for ourselves. 
Nevertheless, what we can find here is nothing but a meandering, a cycle of 
joining circles returning to the provisionally already answered or decided 
questions. For those points of comparison, necessary for grabbing the meaning 
for ourselves are in a constant move: The formation of literary tradition, the 
social conditions surrounding the reader, and her position in the interpretive 
community are constantly moving. 
Just from this dynamic character of the hermeneutic circle results, too, 
that we do not have to keep ourselves to the sequence of contextualisation−de-
contextualisation−re-contextualisation. And in fact, often happens, for example, 
that we take a book in our hands without previously investigating thoroughly 
the author’s identity, and we try the contextualisation only later, if the book has 
aroused our attention. 
Well, just this insight is the base of the concept of the present study, since 
I shall not keep myself to the above suggested sequence in the following 
analysis of Márquez’ novel, of which title has been borrowed for this essay, 
instead I shall catch up the thread of interpretation in the phase of de-
contextualisation. A didactic consideration stands in the background of this 
decision, since the discussion of this novel is the central theme of a Law and 
Literature course for law students, and the proper aim of this paper is taking 
account the experience drawn from a more than a decade teaching of this course 
by its teacher. 
 
 
De-contextualisation 
 
Right away, one of the most exciting tasks for the students is the 
reconstruction of the plot, the chain of the events presented in the novel. The 
contemporary Hungarian system of legal education generally concentrates on 
the acquisition of the legal rules and on their dogmatic analysis, so students 
very rarely meet the task of fact finding. Even on those courses where the 
students are analysing court decisions, they usually deal with previously 
established facts in which the legally relevant elements are pointed out already, 
therefore they have not so much experience in the difficulties and pitfalls of fact 
finding. However the fact finding is the base not only for the adjudication, but 
generally for all kinds of practical legal works.4 
                                                 
4
 For example David Simon Sokolow (1991, 969-987) gives an account about his 
similar experiences concerning the difficulties of teaching fact finding, albeit it is a well 
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And the reconstruction of Chronicle’s is not a simple task at all, because, 
in contrast with its title, the novel is not a chronicle in the sense that the story 
would be told in a rectangular time line by a neutral, objective, outsider 
narrator. The narrator is the writer himself who has returned after twenty years 
to that Columbian small town where he spent his youth. The life of the town 
was changed drastically by the tragedy of events (Chronicle, 97) which the 
author, who had taken part in the plot himself, tries to clear up and explain, 
even if just as a “supporting character”. Each five chapters of the novel tells the 
drama from another perspective jumping back and forth in time, nevertheless, 
each ends up by the dramatic culmination of the killing of Santiago Nasar. The 
whole story can be assembled only by synopsising the five chapters which are 
rounded up from the multiple testimonies and statements of the witnesses, so it 
is not easy to undo the often parallel running threads of the various characters’ 
actions. 
An affair of honour stands in the centre of the Chronicle’s plot, which 
happens in the 1930s.5 A young man, Bayardo San Román, of whom turned out, 
passing several months, that he is looking for a bride for himself, arrives in the 
small town. Finally he picks out Angela Vicario,6 the youngest daughter of a 
family of scant resources (Ivi, 30), who accepts her suitor due to her family’s 
pressure. The wedding-feast, which has been arranged after long preparations, 
swells into a carnival in which nearly the whole town takes part, and which 
obscures even the bishop’s next day visit. But at the wedding night Bayardo 
discovers that Angela has already lost her virginity, and he brings her back to 
her parents. Angela’s twin brothers, for restoring their family’s honour, decide 
to kill the person, who has taken her virginity. The intimidated Angela, urged 
by her brothers, names Santiago Nasar as the “perpetrator” (Ivi, 47), a wealthy 
young man who belongs to a group of Arabian immigrants. The twins, who 
have known Santiago since their childhood, do everything for they do not have 
to wash their family’s fame clean by blood. At Sunday morning, they tell all the 
world what they want to do, at the main square of the village, in the bustle of 
crowd hurrying to give the bishop, arriving by ship, a warm welcome. By the 
time the bishop has passed away, nearly everybody, except Santiago Nasar, 
learns of the twin’s plan, but nobody stops them because of hatred, negligence, 
cowardice, indifference or the coincidence of chances. After the tragedy, the 
                                                                                                                       
known fact that the American system of legal education is much more practical centred 
and problem oriented than the Hungarian. 
5
 The affair took place in 1951 in the “real time”. We shall return yet to the problem of 
chronology below in the section of Contextualisation. 
6
 The expression of “picking out” seems to be quite correct here. The way Bayardo San 
Román choose Angela was very characteristic: it showed that he did not feel love for 
Angela, and, at the same time, it mirrored the macho thinking what Bayardo represented 
so well (Chronicle, 27-28). 
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court acquits the twins who have spent three years in pre-trial detention. The 
Vicario family leaves the village already on the following day after the tragedy, 
and passing a couple of days, Bayardo San Román, who has escaped from the 
shame into drunkenness, is also taken away by his relatives. Angela, who had 
been enforced to accept her suitor in fact, suddenly realises that she has fallen in 
love with Bayardo in the course of the tragic events, and she writes hopeless 
love letters for her husband for more than twenty years, when he returns to her 
at last. 
For the students, the reconstruction of the events of the preceding several 
hours before the killing is a really exciting exercise, while the facts have to be 
tidied together from the “testimonies” of the dozen characters and eyewitnesses, 
and we even draw imaginary maps to survey better the moves of the characters. 
However, the most important lesson for the students is that the picture they have 
made with fatiguing work is an uncertain, obscured and ambiguous one: 
Everybody has seen different things and remembers other ways. There is no 
concord in those unimportant details whether it was raining at that fatal Sunday 
morning or the sun was shining. But the greatest uncertainty appears just in the 
most important question: Was it really Santiago Nasar who had taken Angela’s 
virginity?7 In the Chronicle (99-100), Márquez masterfully demonstrates the 
impossibility of grabbing the “objective” reality, and the inherent uncertainty of 
the legal fact finding. 
With this we have arrived to the other group of interesting problems of 
the intra textual interpretation, to the questions of responsibility. This gives us 
an opportunity to examine the characters’ personality and to explore the motives 
of their actions at the same time.8 
How much can be blamed Plácida Linero, Santiago Nasar’s mother, who 
herself had put the bar up on the door of their house in the last moments before 
the killing, closing Santiago’s escape route, because she was in the belief that 
his son is already in the safe of the house? And who blamed herself in the 
remaining part of her life just for she had not been capable to decipher her son’s 
previous night dream (Ivi, 1-2, 4-5, 98-99, 118-119). Victoria Guzmán, the cook 
of the Nasars’, the one time mistress of Santiago’s father who had fears for her 
daughter, Divina Flor, was to share the same destiny, because Santiago had 
                                                 
7
 A lot of references can be found in the novel suggesting the fact that Santiago Nasar 
did not understand the charge against him until the last moment, and he himself behaved 
as someone innocent in the case (Chronicle, 16-17, 20, 41, 45, 67-68, 100-102, 116-
116). Although Angela Vicario, even twenty years after, firmly kept that Santiago Nasar 
had been “her perpetrator” (Ivi, 91). And certainly this question, the question of  
Santiago Nasar’s guiltiness alarmed also the investigating magister the most (Ivi, 100-
101). 
8
 I shall mention below the more important supporting characters in the order of their 
appearance in the novel.  
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already got his eyes on her. That is why Victoria Guzmán hated Santiago, and 
intentionally omitted to warn him, although she had been informed about the 
twins plan among the firsts (Ivi, 7-11). Divina Flor, who did the same because 
of fear for she was only an adolescent girl, and who imagined in the last 
moments before the killing that Santiago entered in the house and went upstairs 
–whereas he was just  running away from his attackers outside on the square 
(Ivi, 11-12, 118). Clotilde Armenta, the milk shop keeper, who had sent the 
message to the Nasars’ house, and tried to make the twins drunk, and persuaded 
them to pass the first chance for executing their plan: she requested them to be 
merciful to Santiago hurrying to greet the bishop (Ivi, 14-15, 53-55). Colonel 
Lázaro Aponte, the mayor of the town, who did not take seriously the twins’ 
threat, was content with seizing their knives instead of detaining them (Ivi, 55-
58). Father Carmen Amador, who was also among the firsts hearing of the 
imminent killing, but he wanted to deal only with the bishop’s visit (Ivi, 70-71). 
Cristo Beyoda, Santiago’s intimate friend, who, hearing that Santiago is in 
danger, slipped into Santiago’s room and took his gun, but the fear prevented 
him from running to help his friend in the last moment (Ivi, 106-112). Just like 
the other friend of Santiago, Indalecio Pardo, about whom the twins had thought 
that he was the most appropriate person for warning Santiago and impeding the 
tragedy (Ivi, 103). Nahir Miguel, the father of Santiago’s fiancée, who invited 
Santiago into his house to save him, but did not hinder him from rushing into 
death (Ivi, 11-116). 
Considering now the main characters of the drama, can we regard Angela 
Vicario as innocent, who concealed the loss of her virginity from her parents 
and from her fiancé, and who had prepared to cheat her future husband at the 
wedding night (Ivi, 37-38)? Is it possible that she named Santiago Nasar as her 
seducer only for hiding her girlhood lover, and because she believed that her 
brothers did not have courage to take revenge on a wealthy person of a higher 
social position, as several characters aimed at this possibility repeatedly in the 
story (Ivi, 53, 55, 91, 102-103)?  
Was Bayardo San Román the “real victim” of the affair, as the villagers 
kept saying later (Ivi, 84)? Did not he have really other solution than bringing 
Angela back to her parents like a damaged good to the seller? Although he 
could have known that he destroys, if not other’s, but at least Angela’s life for 
ever, if he chose this way. 
Can we speak about the victim’s contribution in the case of Santiago 
Nasar? As we have mentioned above, it can not be taken as a granted fact that 
he seduced Angela Vicario. It seems from many details that he never liked her 
very much (Ivi, 31, 90). The narrator himself inclines to accept Santiago’s 
innocence (Ivi, 101-102), and the author emphasises this with certain literary 
means: Santiago always wears white linen suits, and the wounds stabbed by his 
killers look like the stigmas of Christ (Ivi, 76). On the other hand, what we learn 
about Santiago’s personality can explain why the twins did not hesitate to 
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accept his name from their sister without any doubt. Santiago's engagement to 
Flora Miguel was based on common agreement of the two families, and he did 
not attached to her with so much emotion than to María Alejandrina Cervantes 
who run the local bordello, and with whom Santiago had a stormy love affaire 
(See Ivi, 65-66, 77-78). By the way, it was widely known that “he went about 
alone, just like his father, nipping the bud of any wayward virgin that would 
begin showing up in those woods” (Ivi, 90-91). 
Finally, were the killers of Santiago Nasar, Pedro and Pablo Vicario, 
really innocent? The twins did not waste a moment to consider whether 
Santiago had been guilty in seducing their sister or not, and they did not doubt 
that they had to take the law in their own hands, although they did everything 
for not to shed the blood of Santiago (Ivi, 49). In any case, the court in the novel 
upheld that the homicide was in a legitimate defence of honour, so they were 
innocent (Ivi, 48). 
The writer even heightens the unsettling uncertainty about the 
responsibility with using contradictory artistic means. On the one hand, he 
suggests that the drama was inevitable —it happened what it should be 
happened (Ivi, 10-11, 47, 84, 114), in other words nobody is responsible 
personally for the events. On the other hand, Márquez weaves allegories (Ivi, 
78-79) and sporadic allusions9 expressing the collective responsibility of the 
whole community. 
The problem of responsibility generally grabs the students’ attention, and 
at least half of the seminary papers deals with this question. Most of the 
students do not see the acquittal of the twins by the court rightful, nevertheless I 
have read several papers whose authors felt sympathy for the Vicario brothers: 
In their opinion, only the twins behaved honestly when they kept themselves to 
the community’s codex of honour and, at the same time, they did everything for 
not to carry out the bloody reckoning in fact. The students are also agreeing in 
that they see culpable negligence on the side of the community’s leaders, 
colonel Aponte and father Amador. According to the general opinion, they 
should have stopped the tragic developments by their determined intervention. 
Comparing to this, a rather great uncertainty can be seen among the 
students in judging the responsibility of the community as a whole. They are 
fairly wavering in deciding between the alternatives of “nobody is guilty” 
(beyond the leaders of the community) and “everybody is guilty”. Reasoning 
for the former standpoint, they are pointing out that love affairs belong to the 
private sphere, and the tragedy happened due to a line of incident chances in 
fact. Those who take the latter standpoint emphasise the culpable carelessness 
of the villagers with which they let happen the tragedy. However, relatively 
                                                 
9
 “They [the twins] didn’t hear the shouts of the whole town, frightened by its own 
crime.” (Chronicle, 120) 
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many students arrive to the analysis of the community’s value-system after 
considering these two contradictory alternatives. 
But what can we learn about this value system from the novel? At first 
sight it appears that it is homogeneous in the sense that it is shared by the whole 
community, and even the state law recognises it. The small town is not too 
differentiated socially: the differences in the wealth are not so big that the riches 
could separate themselves from the poor,10 and the minority of the Arabian 
immigrants, who have already turned Christians, to whom belongs Santiago 
Nasar too, is also integrated into the community (Ivi, 9-10, 82-83). 
Nevertheless, if we take a closer look then it can be seen that the general 
rules are “not so much” valid in case of the rich people. This is very well 
pointed out in the detail that many thought that Angela Vicario told Santiago’s 
name to her brothers in the hope that they had not courage to attack a rich 
man.11 On the other hand, perhaps the Vicario brothers stuck themselves to the 
unwritten code of honour, just because their family had seen better days one 
time. 
The most evident inherent contradiction of this value system, however, is 
the inequality in the man-woman relationship that comes into light in all aspects 
of the social connections,12 of the partner-choosing,13 and of the family life.14 A 
patriarchal,15 macho,16 hypocritical17 and sanctimonious18 value-system 
                                                 
10
 This is fairly demonstrated by the description of the wedding-feast swelling into a 
carnival, from which comes clear that nearly every villagers took part in the festivities 
(Ivi, 16-17, 41-45, 66-68). 
11
 For example, Polo Carillo’s, the owner of the electric plant, opinion was that Santiago 
Nasar “[t]hought that his money made his untouchable.” (Ivi, 102. See also 53, 55, 91) 
12
 The women nearly never leave the house, except festive occasions, while the spinsters 
have to be escorted (Ivi, 19, 27-28, 37). 
13
 While Bayardo San Román could freely wander the word to find a wife for himself: 
“In any case, not even his family knew much more about him than we did, nor did they 
have a slightest idea of what he had come to do in a mislaid town, with no apparent aim 
than to marry a woman he had never seen.” (Ivi, 88); until Angela Vicario’s family had 
decided in the matter of marriage instead of her: “Angela Vicario never forgot the 
horror of the night on which her parents and her older sisters with their husbands, 
gathered together in the parlor, imposed on her the obligation to marry a man whom she 
had barely seen. […] The parents’ decisive argument was that a family dignified by 
modest means had no right to disdain that prize of destiny. Angela Vicario only dared 
hint at the inconvenience of a lack of love, but her mother demolished it with a single 
phrase: «Love can be learned too.»” (Ivi, 34) 
14
 The mother of the author, who herself appeared too in the novel, summarised her 
opinion about the Vicario sisters this way: “«They’re perfect», she was frequently heard 
to say. «Any man will be happy with them because they‘ve been raised to suffer.»” (Ivi, 
31) 
15
 The figures of the charismatic patriarchs, who have full authority in the family 
matters, are serving as a background of the story: Ibrahim Nasar who shut his son out of 
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determines the behaviour of the characters, so the whole story in fact dramatises 
the inherent contradictions of this value-system. Although the examination of 
this problem is leading us into the next phase of the interpretation, since the 
evaluation of this value-system can not be separated from seizing the text’s 
meaning for ourselves. 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
the bed of his lover with a whip (Ivi, 65), Nahír Miguel who kept his house closed and 
his whole family had to sleep until noon on his order (Ivi, 112), and, of course, Petronio 
San Román, Bayardo’s father, the almost inevitable figure of the “general” of 
Márquez’s novels (Ivi, 38-39). 
16
 Not only Bayardo San Román’s outward appearance was emphatically manly —he 
dressed like a toreador (Ivi, 24-25), but he gained popularity throughout the town 
because “[h]e liked noisy and enduring festivities, but he was a good toper, a mediator 
of fights, and an enemy cardsharps. One Saturday after mass he challenged the most 
skilful swimmers, who were many, and left the best behind by twenty strokes in 
crossing the river and back.” (Ivi, 26). We could learn about Santiago Nasar’s character 
that he inherited his instincts from his mother, and “[f]rom his father he learned at a 
very early age the manipulation of firearms, his love for horses, and the mastery of 
high-flying birds of prey, but from him he also learned the good arts of valor and 
prudence.” (Ivi, 6). And we could add to this: he learned from his father how to handle 
women (Ivi, 65-66, 90-91). Pedro Vicario, the veteran, boasted with his blennorrhagia 
without a break, and shaved himself with a butcher knife at the main square. See too Ivi, 
59-64. 
17
 A nice example for the hypocrisy lacing all the social relationships is the above 
quoted (fn. 39) argument of Angela’s parents about their “family’s dignity”. However, 
the most profound example of the vileness behind the appearance of the honest 
intentions and true emotions was the behaviour of Bayardo San Román who had never 
been interested at all in Angela’s personality —whom he barely knew, because he had 
been arrived in the town just a couple of months earlier, and he courted not her, but her 
family during the short period of their engagement (Ivi, 28-37) — but he simply wanted 
to buy a wife for himself: “Bayardo San Román, for his part, must have got married 
with the illusion of buying happiness with huge weight of his power and fortune […]” 
(Ivi, 38). On the other hand, it could be seen that neither Santiago Nasar was 
embarrassed by the fact of his engagement with Flora Miguel in visiting regularly the 
brothel, or in catching at maidservants (Ivi, 90-91). 
18
 The primary metaphor of this is the bishop’s visit: All the villagers had been eager to 
greet him, who did not take the trouble even to ashore at the end (Ivi, 15-16). And there 
was the behaviour of Father Amador, to whom it was more important to greet the 
bishop than to prevent the imminent murder. Nevertheless, there were very 
characteristic gestures, for example, when Bayardo brought back Angela to her parents’ 
house, and he “[…] didn’t go in, but softly pushed her wife into the house without 
saying a word. Then he kissed Pura Vicario on the cheek and spoke to her in a very 
deep, dejected voice, but with great tenderness. «Thank you for everything, mother», he 
told her. «You’re a saint.»” (Ivi, 46) 
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Re-contextualisation 
 
Taking in account the legally relevant readings of the novel, the feminist 
legal theory’s perspective offers itself firstly for the analysis of the value-system 
outlined from the story. 
The feminist branch of the Critical Legal Studies movement is not so 
much cultivated in Europe —except in Great Britain, and even less done in 
Hungary, comparing to its position in the American legal theory: This fact is 
evidently related to the general conditions of the feminist movement, of course. 
Presently I rely mainly on Ian Ward’s summary of the feminist approach in my 
following analysis (Ward 1995; see also MacKinnon 1983 and Buttler 1998; for 
a feminist reading of the Chronicle see Aristodemou 2007). 
Two insights of the feminist perspective are worth bringing in play in the 
interpretation of the novel. One of them is that all the modern legal systems —
both the common law and the Roman-German systems— describe the women’s 
social positions with such categories which are originated in a previous epoch 
of the legal development preserving its patriarchal attitude, thereby they incline 
to define the woman, and the woman’s integrity with the categories of property. 
For example the contemporary English legal term of “rape” originated from the 
Roman raptus. In early medieval Europe “rape” meant the abduction without 
consent of a marriageable woman, as Ward and others has pointed out, but the 
consent was not that of the woman herself, but of the (male) head of the family, 
what means that “rape” was a crime of theft, not of sexual conduct, and it was 
not even necessarily a violent action. A woman could voluntary eloped with her 
lover, however, the family still had been raped independently of the actual lack 
of violence. The element of violence has been attached to the original sense of 
the legal term only as an evidential qualification at the beginning, and it has just 
much later, with the gradual emancipation of the women, become a substantive 
element of the term. However the original meaning of the “rape” —that it is a 
theft against a man— still has an impact on the public thinking which continues 
to emphasise the male experience of loss instead of the woman’s experience of 
suffered violence in this crime (Ward 1995, 130-131). 
 The other issue calls attention to a problem lying on a wider horizon. 
Namely, since the shaping of language reflects the social relations of power —
thus the language conforms to the “fallogocentric” thinking of men in a man-
dominated society, thus women have no language to express their own proper 
experience. It is eminently true for those social fields, such as that of politics 
and of law, which are especially controlled by men (Ivi, 119-128). 
Well, in the Chronicle, both insights seem to be extensively verified in 
Angela Vicario’s character and fate. That she is in fact a property of her family 
what (whom) Bayardo San Román wants to simply buy for himself comes clear 
from the following details: (1) Angela does not want to marry Bayardo 
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originally, because she has not even known him, and she has considered him 
pompous; (2) Bayardo does not pay court to her, but to her family; (3) the 
family decides on the matter of marriage instead of Angela; (4) when turns out 
that Angela is not a virgin at the wedding night, Bayardo does not require any 
explanation from her, but returns her to her family as someone returns a 
damaged good to the seller; (5) the twins do not care about Angela’s emotions 
or intentions, but only about the stain fallen on the family’s honour; (6) the 
twins decide on the matter of revenge instead of Angela; (7) Bayardo worried 
apparently not because of loosing Angela, since he has not known her at all, but 
of the spectacular and senseless throwing out of an enormous amount of money 
that he invested in buying a wife; (8) according to the public opinion, the real 
victim in the case was not either Angela Vicario or Santiago Nasar, but the 
“poor” Bayardo San Román. 
The story naturally fits into the frame of the traditional societies’ 
folkways about the institution of marriage itself based on the forms of buying 
and selling of woman. The women’s own will in choosing spouse begins to 
succeed only with the gradual alleviation of the female position. In modern 
western cultures this has been slowly obscured by the nineteenth century idea of 
romantic love and of “love match”. As it is well known, this idea could be 
realised just between roughly socially equal parties, that is, between members of 
middle and lower classes within their own class. It is the great social difference 
between Angela and Bayardo that makes Angela’s position so radically 
defenceless that it degrades her personality nearly to an object. On the other 
hand, the patriarchal value-system is still much vivid in such a borderland small 
town like which has been presented in the Chronicle. More exactly, every 
villager already talks about romantic love meanwhile everyone thinks and acts 
according to the traditional patriarchal order —this is just one aspect of the 
insincerity of this value-system. 
Taking now the second point of view, it can be seen that Angela is 
doomed to passivity not only in the matter of declaring her own will and of 
acting freely but she “has no voice” in fact. In the sole occasion when she tries 
to say a word for herself in the family discussion over the matter of marriage, 
she is silenced by her mother. After this, we can only hear from her a name, 
Santiago Nasar’s name, at the fateful daybreak. Even the investigating 
magistrate can not draw more out of her later, recording her testimony 
(Chronicle, 101). The most forceful metaphor of the impossibility of linguistic 
self expression is that when, immediately after the tragedy, Angela awakes on 
her love felt for Bayardo, she can not communicate her feelings to him: She 
hopelessly writes her letters in vain for years, and when her husband returns to 
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her after twenty years, it turns out that he has not read any of the almost two 
thousand love letters she has written to him.19 
Finally, closing the analysis from a feminist perspective, we have to point 
out that the court, by the acquittal of the twins, in fact reinforced the traditional 
patriarchal value-system of which inherent contradictions caused the tragedy. 
Nevertheless, this issue leads us to a more general investigation of the law’s 
role in resolution of social conflicts, to a legal sociological reading of the novel. 
It is a widely accepted statement in the literature of legal sociology that 
the courts actual social role can be localised not so much in their manifest 
function that is in resolving the individual social conflicts, but in their less 
direct, latent function which means the diffusion of the ideas and values 
embodied in law (Shapiro 1981; Cotterrel 1992, 225-232). The story presented 
in the Chronicle demonstrates both parts of the above statement: The 
ineffectiveness of the legal conflict resolution on the one hand, and the working 
of the law’s ideological function on the other hand. 
The following elements of the story enlighten the ineffectiveness of law: 
(1) the negligence of colonel Aponte, the local represent of the executive state 
power, who could have prevented the tragedy; (2) the ordering of an absolutely 
senseless and useless autopsy which is carried out not even by en expert, but by 
father Amador (Ivi, 72-77); (3) the investigating magistrate arrives at the scene 
twelve days after the murder; (4) the investigating magistrate is a “happy new 
parent” who can not clarify what happened; (5) the trial is appointed three years 
after the crime, what time the twins are spending in pre-trial detention, because 
they have not enough money for the bail (Ivi, 49). Moreover, Márquez describes 
these details sometimes with irony but other times in a quite sarcastic tune that 
culminates in the naturalistically detailed description of the autopsy turning into 
a tragicomic burlesque. 
As for the ideological function of law, the last mentioned (5) element of 
our story indicates that the law does not only reinforce the traditional patriarchal 
value-system built on the inequality of the man-woman relation, but it also 
contributes to the social differences based on wealth. After all, regarding the 
acquittal judgement, the twins suffer detriment for the dragging on process only 
because they can not afford the bail. 
Returning to the problem of the law’s ineffectiveness, it can be explained 
partly by the infrastructural weakness of the state organisation: The small town 
presented in the novel lies in a distant corner of the country, far from any 
                                                 
19
 “He [Bayardo San Román] was carrying a suitcase with clothing in order to stay and 
another just like it with almost two thousand letters that she had written him. They were 
arranged by date in bundles tied with colored ribbons and all unopened.” (Chronicle, 
96) 
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provincial or central governmental residence,20 the available means of transport 
and of telecommunications are underdeveloped,21 and as it becomes clear from 
the (2) detail, colonel Aponte has a military experience and has no idea about 
the process of the civil adjudication. 
On the other hand, starting from the point of the relative weakness of 
state we can involve the sociological theory of legal pluralism in our analysis.22 
This theory emphasises the importance of the various behaviour-ruling systems 
competing with state law in determining the individual actions. It is quite clear 
that the rules of the established moral, sanctioning the patriarchal value-system, 
possess primary importance for the characters of the Chronicle. As compared to 
these moral rules, the state law has only secondary importance, what is 
indicated by the fact that the Vicario brothers immediately run to father Amador 
into the church to plead not guilty after the killing, instead of to the mayor (Ivi, 
48-49). 
From the problems of the weak state law and the legal pluralism we 
arrive to the investigation of those means of conflict resolution which are 
competing with the state law that is to the field of legal anthropology. For our 
present purpose, two topics offer themselves from this perspective: the theme of 
revenge and that of ritual. 
The revenge is evidently one of the central motives of the Chronicle: The 
Vicario brothers decide to avenge the injury of family honour by blood revenge 
on the base of a codex of honour that has been defined by the customs. And 
they are, in turn, afraid of the Arab community’s counter revenge just because 
of the same law. Besides bringing the findings of legal anthropology on the 
proto-legal institution of the revenge into mind (Verdier 1981-1984; Grönfors 
1997), it is worth referring here to Richard Posner’s micro-economic analysis of 
this phenomenon. He explains that the revenge is a socially more expensive and 
less certain means for maintaining the social order. The Chronicle mainly 
illustrates the eighth mentioned reason from the nine that Posner worked out in 
his writing: It is a substantial drawback of a revenge based system that, lacking 
differentiated institutions, it can not afford proper principles to make distinction 
                                                 
20
 The city of Riohacha, which is mentioned in the novel, really exists, and it lies in the 
eastern corner of Columbia’s northern, Caribbean coastal region, more than six hundred 
kilometres from the capital, Bogota. 
21
 For example, according to the novel, the most important means of transport, besides 
walk on foot, are the horses and mules. Only two automobiles appear in the novel: one 
is Petronio San Román’s, and the other is the one that the newly married couple got 
from him as a wedding present. In the time of the story the old paddle-wheeler 
steamboats just started to be succeeded by the turbine driven ones in the river shipping. 
Colonel Lázaro Aponte asks order from the governors of the province by the means of 
spark-telegraph. 
22
 About legal pluralism see e.g. Moore 1973; Griffiths 1986; 2003. 
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between the culpable and the morally or legally justifiably injuries (Posner 
1988, 27-33). And in fact, the Vicario brothers have not checked on whether 
Santiago Nasar was really guilty or innocent. The uncertainty arising from this 
doubt is a primary source of the dramatic tension since neither the twins, nor the 
investigating magister, nor the narrator resuming the investigation, and finally 
neither we, readers, ourselves can be sure that we were not witnesses of  a 
senseless death of an innocent man. 
Finally, we can read the story of the Chronicle as, saying with Clifford 
Geertz (1973), a “thick description” of a social drama accompanied by bloody 
rituals.23 We should refer here first to the insight of Max Gluckman (1965) who 
has firstly recognised the rituals’ importance in conflict resolution, studying the 
tribal societies. According to Gluckman, these means start to work when the 
political and legal ways are not suitable in the solution of certain conflicts 
which are usually generated by the inner structural tensions of the tribal 
societies, such as the existence of a tribal aristocracy or the social inequality of 
genders. As, among other authors, Victor Turner (1969) and Clifford Geertz 
(1957) have pointed out that the social drama is usually originated just from this 
kind of conflict, presenting in ritual forms the antagonisms of the social 
structure and these of the value-system legitimising the structure. So the social 
drama is a junction of various ritual processes which bolsters the communal 
sense of belonging and, at the same time, vents off the anger arousing from the 
frustrations caused by social contradictions what the members of the 
community believe insurmountable.24 However, Turner has also called attention 
to that the rituals not only ensure the continuing maintenance of the social order 
but they are important sources —primary by affording the experience of 
communitas, of an original community, in the liminal phase of the ritual 
process— of the social changes and reforms, too. 
Thus, the social drama described in the Chronicle is a junction of two 
rituals, in fact: The ritual of marriage and that of revenge. The ritual of marriage 
stops in its liminal phase, and before it gets into the following phase of 
reintegration the ritual of revenge is inserted in. Angela Vicario and Bayardo 
San Román are the “passengers” in the ritual of marriage, while the Vicario 
brothers in that of revenge. We can better understand the ritual character of 
murdering Santiago, if we point out a certain substantial feature of ritual: It is a 
sequence of formalised actions that has no inherent meaning in itself. Just this 
meaninglessness of ritual, its substantial emptiness, in other words, makes it 
                                                 
23
 We have to keep in mind that the act of defloration on the wedding night can convert 
the marriage itself into a bloody ritual, too. One meaning of the revenge in the 
Chronicle is to replace the blood “missing” from the act of consummation. 
24
 For the analysis of the concept of “social drama” from the perspective of a narrative 
theory see Mittica 2010. 
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possible to join people of different believes, motives, and interests in a common 
action.25 
The ritual character of the marriage in the Chronicle becomes important 
in two ways: Partly since this offers an opportunity for Bayardo to demonstrate 
his wealth and higher social status, partly because Angela has been enforced 
into this marriage against her will. Angela and Bayardo after passing through 
the first ritual phase, through that of separation —which itself can be divided 
into the subsequent phases of courting, of engagement, and of wedding— arrive 
in the liminal phase at the wedding night. Since Bayardo brings Angela back to 
the parental house because of the “missing blood”, both get into an uncertain 
situation, so characteristic of the liminal phase: They are already spouses 
formally, but they immediately part from each other. The liminal phase of 
marriage that is generally limited to the wedding night meaning the 
consummation of marriage, and that is right away followed by the reintegration 
into an already higher social status, becomes a many years long period bringing 
a lot of suffering for them in their case. Although this dragged on initiation 
changes both of them: Angela discovers love and sets herself free from her 
mother’s tyrannical influence; as for the self-satisfied and cold hearted Bayardo, 
he forgives her at the end, and returns to her. 
For the twins, the first phase of the ritual revenge is reduced to those 
several hours which have preceded the murder, when they are informed about 
that Santiago Nasar has taken the virginity of Angela, and they are waiting to 
kill him at the main square. The ritual separation can be observed in two 
directions: On the one hand, the twins do everything to communicate their 
intention, supposing that somebody will prevent them from executing the killing 
—but as if they were in a vacuum bubble, nobody wants to take them seriously. 
On the other hand, Santiago Nasar is in just the same kind of bubble:26 The 
whole town knows already what is imminent, he is the only one who has not 
heard about it. The twins enter in the liminal phase of revenge with the act of 
killing, and this phase lasts until the end of the legal process, up to their 
acquittal after the pre-trial detention. Then comes the phase of reintegration of 
them: since they have proved that they are “real men”, they can step in a higher 
social status.27 
                                                 
25
 On the meaninglessness of the rites see Winn 1991; Schreiner 1996; Szilágyi 2009. 
26
 “It was a thick crowd, but Escolástica Cisneros thought she noticed that the two 
friends [Santiago Nasar and Cristo Beyoda] were walking in the center of it without any 
difficulty, inside an empty circle, because the people knew that Santiago Nasar was 
going to die and they didn’t dare touch him.” (Chronicle, 103-104) 
27
 For Pablo Vicario, standing the trial of revenge was indeed a condition to marry his 
fiancée, Prudencia Cotes, who said to the narrator, that: “«I knew what they were up to, 
[…] and I didn’t only agree, I never would have married him if he hadn’t done what a 
man should do.»” (Ivi, 63) 
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Márquez emphasises the ritual character of the plot with various artistic 
means: we can firstly mention the proper Marquezean style of “magic realism”28 
that lends the sense of inevitability to the chain of events. That mixes epic 
colours in this “otherwise rather ordinary Latin-American drama” as the author 
himself called it (Mendoza-Márquez 1997), and still this feature of the novel 
just lightens the irrationality of the described actions. 
Moreover, the element of “convertibility” of characters is worth special 
attention, since it contributes to the ritual character of plot. The convertibility of 
characters partly refers to the first phase of ritual in which the subjects, waiting 
for initiation, loose their individuality and they become uniformed, thereby 
changeable. At the same time the convertibility emphasises the irrational and 
fatal features of the plot, too. 
The convertibility also appears naturally in a metaphoric way in the 
twins’ case. The two brothers, who are confusingly alike in their outward 
appearance, have different personalities that symbolise two different aspects of 
manhood: Pablo, who has learned his father’s trade and founds a family, and 
Pedro, who has a daring, violent and commanding nature (Chronicle, 59-60), 
they are alternating the initiative role between themselves in the course of the 
killing (Ivi, 60-63), so to say, animating the master-servant relationships’ 
dialectic, well known from Hegelian philosophy. 
The similarity of the two victims, that of Santiago and Bayardo, is not so 
obvious but maybe even more important for the dramaturgy: Both men are 
young, wealthy, grossly materialistic, cold hearted29 and perfectly incarnate the 
macho concept of “real man”. The convertibility of the victim and the “real” 
victim clips together the ritual of marriage and of revenge. The convertibility 
makes possible for Santiago Nasar to transform from the victim of murder into 
the perpetrator of rape meanwhile Bayardo San Román steps in his position as 
the “real” victim of the drama. A symbolic feature of Santiago’s personality 
also refers to his metamorphosis. He has the magic ability of transforming: His 
                                                 
28
 The substantive feature of the “magic realism” is that it laces fantastic or surrealistic 
elements in the otherwise everyday tone, conversational style descriptions. The “magic 
realism” has become a characteristic style in the 1960’s thriving Latin American 
literature, and it manifested in the works of such influential writers as Alejo Carpentier 
and Carlos Fuentes beside Márquez (Zamora-Faris 1995). 
29
 As for Bayardo San Román, his materialism and cold heartedness can be observed not 
only in his above analysed relationship with Angela Vicario. These characteristics are 
exposed by the metaphoric episode when Bayardo buys the most beautiful house of the 
town for Angela from the old Xiux. The elderly widow can not resist the money offered 
by Bayardo, but not much later he dies in pain of he has to leave the place where he has 
been happy (Chronicle, 34-37). Santiago Nasar’s materialism becomes clear in the 
scene of the wedding party where he is occupied only in counting the costs of it, and he 
repeatedly promises for his friends that his own wedding will be even more grandiose 
(Ivi, 16-17). 
  121 
favourite amusement is to dress the girls up in the bordello in each other’s 
clothes in such a tricky way that even they can not recognise themselves in the 
mirror (Ivi, 66). 
Summarising the educational experiences of the phase of re-
contextualisation, it can be said that, maybe not surprisingly at all, the students 
display only a moderate interest in the surveyed theoretical investigations 
comparing to the problem of responsibility. The feminist perspective usually 
mostly grabs their interest. It seems to be that law students prefer act, that is 
judge, to contemplate, that is understand difficult social situations: This feature 
of their habit, however, may be explained also by their age. 
 
 
Contextualisation 
 
Arriving in the last phase of our interpretation, as a provisional closing up 
of the hermeneutic circle, let us investigate how these earlier explored layers of 
meaning are relating to the author’s original intention, keeping in mind at the 
same time the above mentioned limits of this kind of undertaking. In other 
words, the authorial intention simply can never be determined exactly. One 
reason for this is that all the inner psychical motives and the outer compelling 
factors —beginning from the author’s social and financial position up to the 
spiritual climate of her age and especially of the contemporary literary life— 
forming the authorial intention, never appear directly in her work only in an 
indirect way ruled by the own laws of artistic creative work transforming reality 
into art. This reason gives an explanation for the widely known paradox of 
Márquez’s oeuvre: Meanwhile he has maintained a close friendship with Fidel 
Castro, one of the basic topics of his art has been the depiction of cruelty and of 
tyrannical power and of loneliness of the tyrant himself. A theme from which 
such great works as In Evil Hour, The Autumn of the Patriarch and The General 
in his Labyrinth has originated.       
Another substantial obstacle of determining the author’s intention is that 
the reader’s or interpreter’s own interests have an influence even on this kind of 
investigations. Our case is not an exception either: This explains the fact that in 
the following analysis, we shall devote special attention on those conditions that 
could have formed Márquez’s views on law. We shall investigate beyond this, 
with regard to the earlier presented theories, in the phase of re-contextualisation, 
the author’s personal relations to the patriarchal value-system presented in the 
novel and his opinion about man-woman connections in general. 
Nevertheless, before we start analysing these topics, it is worth asking the 
question, how far the reality of novel is distanced from that of author? In other 
words, how far the work can be seen as a “report” recording Márquez’s own 
personal experiences or as a “fiction” reflecting the author’s fantasy? The 
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answer is also important, because it helps us estimate how far the “message” of 
the work expresses the authorial intention. 
There are a lot of signs referring to that Márquez has tried to catch the 
social reality in this work; that is the emphasis lays here on the second part of 
the “magic realism”. In relation to his curriculum, this is supported by the fact 
that Márquez was working as a journalist in the first third of the period30 —
which was exactly thirty years long, between 1951 and 1981, according to the 
author’s memoires (Mendoza-Márquez 1997, fn. 68)— while the novel has 
been formed out, and his explicit intention was at that time to establish the 
literary genre of “report” which had been nearly unknown in the contemporary 
Columbian literature. Considering Márquez’s whole oeuvre from this point of 
view, we can find The Story of a Shipwrecked Sailor —which was published in 
1970 as a book but it had firstly appeared as a report series written for El 
Espectador, a Columbian newspaper, in 1955—– as an antecedent, and, from 
the period after the Chronicle, we can mention the News of a Kidnapping, 
published in 1996, as a return to the genre of report. The fact that the author 
exceptionally speaks in first person in the Chronicle also points towards the 
realism. This fact would not have got much importance in itself, but since 
several members of the Márquez family31 appear among the characters, too, 
notwithstanding it shows that there is indeed a close connection between the 
narrator of the novel and the author’s person. 
 Although, the striving after realism and the autobiographic inspiration is 
evidently present in the novel, still we do not have to underestimate the 
importance of authorial fantasy. For example, Márquez met his future wife, 
Mercedes Barcha Pardo, and merrily proposed her another time and under other 
circumstances than the wedding ceremonies described in the novel.32 (By the 
way, the question, to which we shall return yet below, instantly turns up: Why 
does Márquez insert such a personal detail in the plot at all?) Neither the time of 
the novel corresponds to the real time of the original events that took place in 
1951, while many sceneries of the Chronicle suggest the air of the 1930s, the 
years of Márquez childhood, a period which often appears as a background of 
his novels’ plot: The paddle-wheeler steamboat, the Model T Ford with official 
plates, the gramophone inlaid with mother-of-pearl, the spark-telegraph, the 
                                                 
30
 On Márquez’s life and works see Márquez 2003; Mendoza-Márquez 1997; Ruch 
2003. 
31
 First of all, the author’s mother, Luisa Santiaga Márquez, after whose figure Márquez 
has carved many women characters in his writings, but she appears in the first and only 
time in the Chronicle under her own name. Beside her, Márquez’s younger sister, 
Margot, and his two younger brothers, Enrique and Jaime, also appear in the novel.  
32
 Márquez met Mercedes Barcha Pardo, whose parents were friends of the writer’s 
parents, in the summer of 1946 at Sucre on a vacation that the two families spent 
together, and the merry proposition happened at a school ball.  
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clothes of the characters, etc. (Ivi, fn. 54). Moreover, as Márquez himself has 
declared it once, he has been waiting so long with writing the Chronicle, 
because he had to solve a purely aesthetic problem first, namely, how could he 
combine the different planes of time within the structure of the novel (Ivi, fn. 
68). 
However, we can not draw a clear borderline between “reality” (that is 
the reality of actual events and that of the author’s experiences) and fiction (the 
reality of the word depicted in the novel) at all, as it can neither be drawn 
between striving for reality and grabbing it artistically.33 That is why, although 
the “message” of the Chronicle true to the author’s opinion about the events, 
this message, maybe against the will of the author himself, will be much more 
complicated than it seems to be at the first sight. 
Now, let us take a look on how the image of law presented in the novels 
relates to the author’s experience and opinion in the light of the above 
considerations. First of all, we have to establish the fact that Márquez should 
not be seen as a lay person in law, since he studied law between 1947-1949 first 
at the National University of Bogotá and later at the University of Cartagena for 
his parents’ request. He certainly further enriched his knowledge about law with 
his professional experience derived from journalism in the next decade of his 
life. Consequently we have no reason to doubt the authenticity of the 
description of the legal process in the novel. Altogether with this, the authorial 
intention to criticise the legal process and generally the law’s above analysed 
weaknesses is also quite obvious. 
Márquez’s emotional relation to law, however, is not so unambiguous at 
all. He wrote (2003, ch. 5) about his studies in law with a determined rejection 
in his memoires, and, as we have seen, he wrote in a sarcastic tune about the 
lawyers’ “rigorous profession” in the Chronicle, too. However, he sketches the 
“happy new parent” investigating magistrate’s character with an undeniable 
sympathy at the same time, and it is not a hard task at all for us to realise the 
author’s alter ego in the character of the young beginner lawyer gifted-beaten 
with literary vein. Maybe, Márquez has seen in this way one of his own 
unrealised egos: He could become that kind of young man, if he had not 
revolted against his parents’ will, against the “law of father”, and had not 
chosen the journalism and literature instead of the lawyers’ “rigorous 
profession”. 
                                                 
33
 The Chronicle is an especially important work from this point of view, because it had 
carried this duality already in its birth: Since at the beginning, in the 1950s, Márquez 
wanted to write the story as a report, and he started to think about it in literary terms 
only later (Mendoza-Márquez 1997, fn. 68). In the meantime his literary conceptions 
about the genre of report and of novel had been changed, and he recognised that “both 
of them are children of the same mother.” (Márquez 2003, fn. 73)  
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Nevertheless, our whole picture about the novel is also reshaped in the 
light of the above insight: it can be seen that not one but two narrators are there 
in the novel. One is the journalist and novelist author’s character whose shape is 
clearly identifiable behind the voice of the narrator, and the other one is the 
lawyer’s blurred (because never realised) shape whose voice is speaking to us 
only from the pages of the fragmented trial record. 
Are we going too far, if we suppose that this ambivalent relation of the 
author to the law is not grounded only on his own personal, individual 
experiences? Is not this attitude of acceptance springing against rejection only 
from nostalgia felt by a grown man for his own unrealised chances, or from a 
belated inclination for accepting the “law of father”? Can be read out from this 
hidden affirmation of the law the experience, maybe unconscious for the author 
himself, that the peace of Columbia has often become the victim of war 
between the political oligarchies just because of the lack of the rule of law? 
The same ambivalence is characteristic for the author’s relation to the 
patriarchal value-system depicted in the novel, and generally for his opinion 
about the man-woman relationship. As the author himself has stated, the 
Chronicle is “an X-ray photograph of, and, at the same time, a judgement about 
the male-chauvinistic nature of our society.” However, it would be misleading if 
we read the novel as a critical pamphlet written in the spirit of feminism also 
because Márquez closed the above quoted statement with the following 
sentence: “About our society which is a matriarchal one, of course.” (Mendoza-
Márquez 1997, fn. 68) 
To solve this paradox, we have to examine more particularly the author’s 
opinion about the man-woman relationship that can be best reconstructed from 
his interviews and memoires. We can find there that, as for Márquez, the 
differences between the man’s and woman’s social roles are given by nature, 
although he regards the male-chauvinism, what he defines as “usurpation of 
other’s rights”, unrighteous, however, he thinks that the concept could be used 
for both genders. “For example there are feminists” —says Márquez— “who 
want to be men that indicates that they are simply frustrated male-chauvinists.” 
(Ibid.) 
Márquez would redress by no means the unrighteousness of the man-
woman relationship by the elimination of the differences between their roles in 
the name of an abstract equality. In the Chronicle, Márquez does not question at 
all the authority of heads of the families or the institution of marriage. Indeed 
we see that the ritual of marriage, so to say, against the meanwhile changed 
wills of the parties, successfully joins together Angela and Bayardo at the end. 
And maybe this is the reason, why Márquez has inserted his own personal 
experiences into the plot. He may have wanted to emotionally balance the 
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tragedy: While a marriage runs aground (provisionally) just at the same moment 
another relation, a happy one, begins.34 
One plausible reading is after all that Márquez criticises not the 
patriarchal value-system itself than rather the social inequalities distorting it and 
making it hypocritical. In his work we have seen what an important role was 
played by the social differences in the development of the tragedy. If we dig 
deeper, however, we shall find not the patriarchal value-system or the social 
differences but simply the cold-heartedness and the incapacity for love at the 
roots of all the miseries.35 On the other hand, the flaring up love can overcome 
on all obstacles, they sprang either from the social inequality or from the 
traditional patriarchal value-system: At last, the spouses rejoined twenty years 
after the tragedy in the Chronicle. Love can defy even the flying away time and 
the death —as Márquez has written this theme so amazingly in his Love in the 
Time of Cholera and in the Memories of My Melancholy Whores. 
Taking in account the didactic proceeds of the contextual interpretation, 
we have to establish the fact first that there have been up to now only a few 
students who would have chosen this approach for writing her essay. 
Theoretically this phase of interpretation helps to draw a fuller image of 
interpretational process, and to qualify the earlier presented theoretical 
perspectives.  Maybe a more important role of this phase, however, to intensify 
the vibration in the students’ mind bringing into play the dynamics of the 
contradiction between reality and imagination, identification and critical self-
distancing. The vibration which produces the keynote not only for legal 
profession and literature but generally for creative human life: The oscillation of 
human spirit between the painful experience of human life’s uncertainty and the 
discovery of freedom springing from just this uncertainty. This voice 
unavoidably sets us the task of self-determination.  Only I could never be sure 
that the students will resonate on this tune. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 At that certain ball when Márquez met Mercedes Barcha Pardo, who was only 
thirteen at that time, she declined his proposition saying that first she had to finish her 
school. But after this, she had been waiting fourteen years faithfully to be married by 
Márquez. 
35
 This statement is also supported by Márquez’s ideas about the nature of power and 
tyranny: “Power is nothing but a replacement of love.” (Mendoza-Márquez 1997, fn. 
68) 
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TOWARDS A HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH  
TO LEGAL METAPHOR 
by 
Alberto Vespaziani 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Normative language is metaphorical” (Giuliani 1970, 379; 1975).  With 
these words, Italian scholar Alessandro Giuliani called upon legal scholars to 
venture into the field of metaphor studies, in order to deepen their awareness of 
legal terms and doctrines. Legal practitioners and scholars work with words to 
resolve disputes and pursue justice, but also to obscure, mislead and further 
unspoken interests. The inevitable, sometimes insidious, use of metaphor 
reflects the ambiguous nature of law and of language; metaphors can be used to 
further communication and clarification, but also to produce disinformation and 
confusion: 
 
[t]he entire history of legal thought could be studied from the standpoint 
of language as a sequence of metaphors: it would be enough to examine 
any ordinary controversy in legal scholarship to see that the different 
arguments are conditioned upon the accepted metaphors, analogies and 
the use of examples. We can see the demonstration of Blumenberg’s 
theory of the existence of key terms as absolute metaphors, which 
cannot be broken down further into logical terms: The impossibility of 
agreeing on the meaning of the term “law” is an example of this fact. 
The job of legal analysis is the correction of metaphors and the 
clarification of language. (Giuliani 1970, 379)1 
 
So Giuliani suggests that legal experts ought to study rhetoric. The 
purpose of this is not to sharpen our oratorical skills or our ability to create and 
employ seductive metaphors.  The purpose in studying rhetoric derives from the 
fact that legal language is intrinsically metaphorical, for better or for worse.  
                                                 
1
 All translations in English are by the A. 
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The ethical task of legal thought thus consists in uncovering the ideological 
projects hiding behind —or even within— legal metaphors.  
The classic objection to the discussion of metaphors, raised by the 
traditional, professional, legal academic is that they are the concern of literature, 
maybe even philosophy, but have nothing to do with the life and practice of the 
law.2  Underlying this belief is the assumption that legal language may be 
cleansed of the sentimental imperfections of poetry and literature, of the base 
materialism of economics and of the senseless mental gymnastics of theory and 
philosophy. But this assumption is not only epistemologically naïve. It also 
serves ideologically to justify the legal profession’s project of manipulating the 
sentiments and interests of others for economic gain, political power and social 
privilege. 
The legal thinker that instead accepts Giuliani’s suggestion to travel 
down the uneven path of clarifying, reframing and correcting legal metaphors 
will have to critically examine the values underlying legal terms and 
expressions, as well as the power relationships implicit in legal doctrines’ 
choices of words. For example, if we ask “why do we say ‘sources of law’? 
Why do we use this a hydraulic metaphor?”, we will begin to analyze the 
presumed nature of the “product” of a legal norm; the norm originates 
somewhere underground, and then gushes out of a kind of mountain spring (a 
pristine place presumably, this site of political power condensation), ready to be 
bottled and delivered to judges, government lawyers and other faithful servants 
passively carrying out orders received from on high, without asking too many 
questions about their content or value.  Notice how the hydraulic metaphor of 
the source gives rise to the imperative and anthropomorphic metaphor of the 
“law-maker”, which leads to the bureaucratic and military metaphor of the civil 
servant. Similar considerations follow when expressions like “head” of state, 
constitutional “organ”, electoral “body” (to mention a few of the most obvious 
organic metaphors in constitutional law) are viewed through the lens of 
metaphor studies.   
Another classic objection that the serious legal scholar might make 
against the study of metaphors appeals to the correctness of the literal meaning 
as opposed to the vague arbitrariness of metaphor. A precise, professional judge 
might argue that when it comes to interpreting the meaning of a legal provision, 
                                                 
2
 The provocative aspect of metaphor studies has been well-described by Severo Sarduy 
(1981, 187): “Metaphor is the point at which language’s plot thickens, the point at 
which it takes on such importance as to render the rest of the sentance flat and innocent. 
Like a yeast bubbling at language’s continuous surface, metaphor confers a certain 
degree of denotative purity on all that comes near it. Purity. Let us underscore the moral 
implications of this word: metaphor as extraneous to the “nature” of language, like an 
illness; it impugns every rhetorical figure, dragging it into the forbidden zone, so much 
that Saint Thomas boasted of having no use for metaphors at all”. 
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we must focus on the original meaning of the text as intended by the legislator. 
This anti-hermeneutical presumption, which denies the relevance of 
interpretation in service of an idea of objective meaning and thus denies the 
interpreter’s own subjectivity, can be found in every legal culture, in every area 
of the law, at every level of legal sophistication and at every ideological 
extreme. 
 The myth or prejudice of literal interpretation is perhaps one of the most 
ideologically resistant metaphors: Its simple suggestion of an uncontaminated 
source of meaning in a distant act carried out by someone else, and its call to 
neutralize the subjectivity of decision-making, serve every jurist’s latent desire 
to escape from freedom.  Now, from the hermeneutic perspective, it is clear that 
there is literally no such thing as a literal interpretation. The sequence of l-e-t-t-
e-r-s does not produce nor does it evoke meaning. Literal interpretation suggests 
that normative language is like a mosaic, while a hermeneutical approach sees it 
more like an organism. To willfully not see the forest for the trees, as the literal 
approach does, means to effectively deny that a qualitative, ideological or 
strategic choice is being made. As anyone who has crossed the shadowy valley 
of translation knows, translating a phrase from one language to another is 
nothing like taking apart a mosaic and putting the pieces back together 
somewhere else; translating a legal concept from one cultural context to another 
is more like transplanting a whole tree in a different soil. Still, the belief persists 
that behind words there are things, that behind logic there is being, that behind 
abstract norms there are concrete interests, that behind appearance there is 
substance, that behind form there is content and that behind the metaphor there 
is the concept. These beliefs are so archetypal, and thus so deeply-rooted (and 
as such, they are advantageous, reassuring and forgiving) as to force a 
hermeneutical approach to justify itself again and again, to set forth its 
particular assumptions and announce its particular critical program: Normative 
language is metaphorical language; metaphorical language is ordinary language; 
and metaphor is not just a rhetorical form but the very structure of language. 
Moreover: the supposed opposition between a literal interpretation and a 
metaphorical one is itself a metaphor, the metaphor of language as a series of 
letters. 
While metaphor studies have flourished in semiotics, semantics, 
comparative literature, rhetoric and political theory (Rigotti 1989, 1992), Italian 
legal scholarship has not developed a specific interest in this subject. Beyond 
the comments of Giuliani, there have not been searching examinations of the 
use of metaphor in Italian constitutional discourse. The reasons for this 
prolonged silence can be located in: 1) the prevalence of positivism, which 
conceives of legal language as normative and imperative; 2) the prevalence of 
formalism, which seeks to purify forms of their content; and 3) the decline of 
rhetoric as an allied field of legal education. According to Giuliani (1970, 382): 
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The devaluation of metaphorical and figurative language has become a 
tacitly accepted dogma in modern legal thought: And it is the 
intersection of profoundly contrasting positions, which depart from 
realistic or nominalistic assumptions. This devaluation is connected to 
the corruption of the authentic dialectical tradition. At its root is a 
nervous suspicion of opinion and of any analysis that is not based on 
compelling, demonstrative evidence. This has produced the reduction of 
prescriptive language to imperatives, because only these forms of 
prescription seem to belong to the domain of the rational. The other 
forms remain irremediably consigned to the domain of persuasion, 
rhetoric and the irrational. 
 
According to Giuliani, the decline of metaphorical language in the law is 
the consequence of our expulsion from the dialectical paradise of antiquity. 
Apart from his dubious conceptualization of an “authentic” dialectical tradition 
(a curiously undialectical image of dialectic, so insulated from discussion, 
purified of contamination and restored to its ancient and original splendor), one 
can ask whether Giuliani’s Aristotelian conception of metaphor is satisfying, or 
whether instead the reduction of metaphor to a mere trope is not partially 
responsible for its consequent marginalization. 
 From the perspective of Italian constitutional scholarship, the first 
instinct of one who sets out to discuss metaphors and law is to put forward the 
canonical (as well as metaphorical) excusatio propter infirmitatem: the field is 
too vast to try to cover it in the scope of this examination, a complete study of 
the role of metaphors in law has yet to be written, the literature is endless… 
Richards (1967, 91) after having evoked the intuitions of Shelley and Bentham, 
and having “glanced for a moment at these deep waters into which a serious 
study of metaphor may plunge us”, located in the “fear of them […] one cause 
why the study has so often not been enterprising and why Rhetoric traditionally 
has limited its inquiry to relatively superficial problems”.  Moreover (Ivi, 115):  
 
The neglect of the study of the modes of metaphor in the later 19th 
Century was due, I think, to a general feeling that those methods of 
inquiry were unprofitable, and the time was not ripe for a new attack. I 
am not sure that it is yet ripe in spite of all that Coleridge and Bentham 
did towards ripening it. Very likely a new attempt must again lead into 
artificialities and arbitrarinesses. If so, their detection may again be a 
step on the road. In this subject it is bettter to make a mistake that can be 
exposed than to do nothng, better to have any account of how metaphor 
works (or thought goes on) than to have none. 
 
I would like to put forward a few considerations in favor of a 
hermeneutical conception of metaphor in legal discourse. The assumptions from 
which I proceed are that: Law is language, legal language is metaphorical, 
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metaphorical language is ordinary language, legal language is as specialized as 
it is common, the meaning of legal discourse can be grasped only through a 
process of interpretation, metaphors work by essentially transacting between 
contexts, and that comparative law —whose basic and difficult task is 
translation— is in a privileged position to study their function. Metaphor 
studies and translation studies intersect in the zone of critical hermeneutics: In 
contrast to the other approaches to metaphor, only hermeneutics is concerned 
with the historical embodiment of the subject which is interpreting a text. It 
takes two ideas to make a metaphor, and so there are no metaphors in the 
dictionary, but only in discourse. The function of a critical study of metaphor is 
to suggest a technique for liberating ourselves from the defects of the 
interpretative traditions that we have received but not interrogated. 
This paper will proceed in four steps: First, I will summarize the origins 
of the reduction of metaphor to a rhetorical trope, then I will discuss three main 
currents in modern metaphor studies: the semantic paradigm, the structuralist 
paradigm and the hermeneutical paradigm.3 
I intend to argue that (1) language in general, and thus legal language in 
particular, is constituted by a mobile army of metaphors, by metaphors that 
point to other metaphors; (2) a non-metaphorical language does not exist; and 
(3) there are a series of prejudices, laden with ideology and false conscience, 
that resist this hermeneutical vision, such as the illusions of an objective 
substance underlying subjective appearances, of an ontological reality 
underpinning linguistic formulations, of an economic structure giving rise to a 
legal superstructure and of scientific rigor that is superior to a poetic 
indeterminacy. 
The pioneer of contemporary metaphor studies, Hans Blumenberg, 
synthesized both the semantic and structural conceptions of metaphor while, in 
a Hegelian fashion, moving beyond them. While semantic views employed 
“paradigms” to focus on the mechanisms for displacing meaning, structural 
approaches studied the classifications of metaphor’s persuasive and coercive 
effects. For Blumenberg (1969, 114), by contrast, only a hermeneutic 
conception could do justice to the value of metaphor: A metaphor is not just an 
enunciation that can be reduced into concepts, nor a disciplinary strategy 
making use of manipulative rhetorics to subordinate individuals, but rather a 
point of condensation for historically-conditioned cultures and traditions. So, 
for example, European metaphor is more organic, while American metaphor is 
more mechanistic. The rhetorical origin of metaphor corresponds to its original 
                                                 
3
 Like all classifications, this one is ultimately arbitrary and subject to criticism. As 
Barthes reminds us (2006, 53): “The passion for classifying always seems Byzantine to 
one who does not share it […] and yet it is usually normal. The taxonomic option 
implies an ideological one: there is always a placed in the place of things: tell me how 
you classify and I will tell you who you are”. 
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ambiguity: “metaphor undoubtedly has its roots in the ambivalence of ancient 
rhetoric: the orator can let the truth ‘appear’ in its legitimate splendor, but can 
also make the false assume the same appearance as the truth”. 
The “literal meaning” is in fact the flood lands formed by the 
disaggregation and commingling of the old metaphorical rocks. According to 
Blumenberg, there are thus some archetypal metaphors, continually invoked in 
order to designate phenomena for which there is no specific figure and that 
cannot therefore be reduced to conceptual terms (such as law, the force of law, 
constitution, state, sovereignty). From the hermeneutical standpoint, metaphor’s 
value is not objective and intrinsic, but rather depends on the context in which it 
is inserted and on the tradition from which it emanates. 
In his masterpiece, The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur (1977, 6) argues for a 
hermeneutical conception: “metaphor presents itself as a strategy of discourse 
that, while preserving and developing the creative power of language, preserves 
and develops the heuristic power wielded by fiction”. “Through metaphor, 
subjectivity opens up to the tension of the truth, required by the fictitious aspect 
of the category or the concept. This is obviously a metaphorical, comparative 
truth, which interrogates the meaning of translation.” (Id. 1981, 152) 
In the great majority of studies dedicated to metaphor, be they rhetorical 
or semantic, we do not see a due respect paid to the insuperable contribution of 
Nietzsche’s early essay on truth and lying (Nietzsche 1976). A master of 
metaphor, Nietzsche reflects on the birth and development of language in the 
phase of his own life in which he left philology to pursue the fusion of poetry 
and philosophy that would mark his unmistakable style. Nietzsche imagines a 
scene very much like the beginning of 2001: A Space Odyssey: “In some remote 
corner of the universe, poured out and glittering in innumerable solar systems, 
there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge”. This fable 
imagines that the invention of language corresponds to the original sin of the 
claim to truth: The word is the result of three metaphorical leaps of translation: 
A nerve stimulus is translated into an image, an image into a sound, a sound 
into a word. Words cannot correspond to things, because they are the product of 
these leaps in the sensory realm. Even when comparing words in different 
languages that are supposed to mean the same thing, we come up against the 
ultimate impossibility of translation, and must disabuse ourselves of the false 
claim of actually grasping the noumenous, ontological essence of things: 
 
The different languages, set side by side, show that what matters with 
words is never the truth, never an adequate expression; else there would 
not be so many languages. The “thing in itself” (for that is what pure 
truth, without consequences, would be) is quite incomprehensible to the 
creators of language and is not at all worth aiming for. One designates 
only the relations of things to man, and to express them one calls on the 
boldest metaphors. A nerve stimulus, first transposed into an image —
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first metaphor. The image, in turn, imitated by a sound —second 
metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, 
right into the middle of an entirely new and different one. (Nietzsche 
1976) 
 
Nietzsche is not simply making the nihilistic argument that there is no 
truth. In emphasizing the importance of translation in the transformation of 
sounds into images and then into words, Nietzsche advances the paradoxical 
idea that the very “nature” of truth claims is metaphorical, that there is only 
metaphorical truth: 
 
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms —in short, a sum of human relations, which have 
been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, 
and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a 
people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is 
what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous 
power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as 
metal, no longer as coins. (Ibid.) 
 
While metaphorical creativity is the pulse of life, the conceptual order is 
created and imposed by subjects incapable of abandoning themselves to artistic, 
mythological or onirical ecstasy. The metaphorical style is a sign of the fullness 
of life, just as the “demonstrative” style points to its impoverishment. Nietzsche 
lavishes particular scorn upon those those who (like myself) make a profession 
out of scientific research, for having fled from metaphorical heights to seek 
refuge in dead concepts: 
 
We have seen how it is originally language which works on the 
construction of concepts, a labor taken over in later ages by science. Just 
as the bee simultaneously constructs cells and fills them with honey, so 
science works unceasingly on this great columbarium of concepts, the 
graveyard of perceptions. It is always building new, higher stories and 
shoring up, cleaning, and renovating the old cells; above all, it takes 
pains to fill up this monstrously towering framework and to arrange 
therein the entire empirical world, which is to say, the anthropomorphic 
world. Whereas the man of action binds his life to reason and its 
concepts so that he will not be swept away and lost, the scientific 
investigator builds his hut right next to the tower of science so that he 
will be able to work on it and to find shelter for himself beneath those 
bulwarks which presently exist. And he requires shelter, for there are 
frightful powers which continuously break in upon him, powers which 
oppose scientific truth with completely different kinds of “truths” which 
bear on their shields the most varied sorts of emblems. (Ibid.) 
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For Nietzsche, therefore, every metaphor is intuitive and singular and 
incommensurable, thus eluding any classification. Notwithstanding this, 
because the genial creator of metaphors does not learn from his own experience, 
reason seeks incessantly to reify metaphorical life in conceptual abstractions.  
Doing this, the rational mind imagines an ontological substance lying behind a 
nominalistic appearance and seeks refuge in a conceptual order, presented as 
objective, neutral or natural, but which is really arbitrary, value-laden and 
partial. A theory of metaphor is impossible because it reduces metaphor to 
theory when its very nature is metaphorical. 
What then is the point of speaking around, through or by means of 
metaphors? According to the Nietzschean teaching, “the new philosopher does 
not use metaphors in the rhetorical sense, but rather subordinates them to a 
correct language or a strategic aim: He uses non-stereotypical metaphors in 
order to reveal the deeper metaphors that constitute every concept” (Kofman 
1972, 31).  It is in this way that the hermeneutics of metaphor has a meaning for 
the law: The goal of legal analysis is to become aware of the metaphorical 
nature of normative language, to show the values contained and furthered by 
legal metaphors and to call attention to the abuse of metaphor committed by 
apparently neutral and impartial concepts. 
While rhetoric, semantics and structuralism do not need to consider the 
historical embodiment of the interpreting subject, hermeneutics regards the 
individual’s being in time and his critical evocation of his own traditions as 
necessarily creative of meaning. For a hermeneutical approach, the classi-
fication of legal metaphors can serve as a first step in a serious study of them.  
But the ultimate goal is to narrate the genealogies of legal metaphors and 
critically analyze the values that they serve. The genealogical reconstruction of 
a metaphor is not itself sufficient because “hardening and congealing of a 
metaphor guarantees absolutely nothing concerning its necessity and exclusive 
justification.” (Nietzsche 1976). So, in the face of historically embedded 
metaphors, we come back to considerations of the uses and disadvantages of 
metaphor for life (Id. 1983).  If the legal scholar is active and ambitious, he will 
tend to construct a monumental historicity; if he seeks to preserve and revere, 
he will tend to construct an antiquated historicity; if he suffers and seeks 
liberation, he will tend to construct a critical historicity. A critical hermeneutic 
of metaphor examines the history of legal doctrines, without instrumentalizing 
them to serve a contemporary debate nor venerating them for a glorious future. 
It renounces the aspiration of explaining how law is created and how it 
functions, in order to focus on metaphorical expressions’ potential for distortion 
and abuse.  
I would like to conclude with the important admonition of Richards 
(1936, 136): 
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It is an old dream that in time psychology might be able to tell us so 
much about our minds that we would at last be become able to discover 
with some certainty what we mean by our words and how we mean it. 
An opposite or complementary dream is that with enough improvement 
in Rhetoric we may in time learn so much about words that they will tell 
us how our minds work. It seems modest and reasonable to combine 
these dreams and hope that a patient persistence with the problems of 
Rhetoric may, while exposing the causes and modes of the misin-
terpretation of words, also throw light upon and suggest a remedial 
discipline for deeper and more grievous disorders. 
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A PATHOLOGY? TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE STRANGER 
by 
Irem Aki and  Wojciech Załuski 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Stranger by Albert Camus naturally attracts the attention of legal 
philosophers: This is arguably the most frequently commented novel by the 
proponents of the Law and Literature movement. (See, e.g., Weisberg 1975-
1976; Carroll 2004-2005; Posner 1998; Newman 2000, 87-117) The reason why 
The Stranger arouses so great an interest among legal scholars is that one of the 
important layers of this multilayered novel is a sophisticated critique of law or 
legal system. What is not clear, however, is how profound this critique is, i.e., 
how it should exactly be interpreted. The aim of our paper is to attempt to 
answer this question: we shall propose two different interpretations of this 
critique, compare them and try to decide which of them is more plausible. Let 
us briefly present these two interpretations. According to the first interpretation, 
The Stranger provides a non-radical critique of law:Iit reveals some pathologies 
of legal reasoning but does not imply that legal reasoning is inherently 
pathological, whereas according to the second interpretation, The Stranger 
provides a radical critique of law: It does much more than just reveal 
pathologies of legal reasoning —it implies that legal reasoning is inherently 
pathological. 
Before we turn to a more detailed presentation of these interpretations, let 
us mention some “non-legal” readings of The Stranger. For instance, the novel 
can be read as revealing threats which society poses for an individual, or as 
describing the alienation of human being in the modern world of powerful 
institutions and political systems, or as presenting the conflict between the 
Epicurean form of life (which can arguably be assigned to Mersault —the 
novel’s protagonist) and the conditions of the modern society. These readings of 
The Stranger seem neither mutually exclusive nor exclusive with the “legal” 
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readings to be presented in the following sections; in point of fact, in order to 
give justice to the novel’s richness, one would have to combine those “non-
legal” and “legal” readings in some way (the task which is beyond our scope in 
this article). 
 
 
2. Interpretation I: Pathologies of Legal Reasoning  
 
As we have already mentioned, the first interpretation asserts that The 
Stranger provides a non-radical critique of law: It points to some avoidable 
pathologies of legal reasoning. Let us now develop this interpretation at greater 
length. According to the dominant —and, arguably, plausible— account of 
legal reasoning, in the process of legal decision-making the duty of judge is to 
be “within law”. This means that a judge should base his/her legal decisions 
only on legal rules and principles. One type of rules excluded by this account of 
legal reasoning are various social conventions and other evidently extra-legal 
elements (e.g., the fact of having or not given religious convictions). There are 
two main reasons for the exclusion of such elements from among those 
elements that constitute the basis of legal verdicts. First, given the fact that 
social conventions are often not universally accepted by the members of a 
society and may change relatively fast, to let them be allowed for in the process 
of legal reasoning would arguably violate such important principles of law as 
objectivity and predictability, and, consequently, the principle of the rule of law. 
Second, social conventions do not have a moral character: Their infringements 
do not constitute mala in se, or, to put it alternatively, they do no harm to other 
people. Now, one admissible way of reading The Stranger is that this novel 
provides a critique of legal reasoning in so far as it is based on this kind of 
conventions. Mersault —the aforementioned novel’s protagonist— committed 
a crime, homicide. However, in the course of legal proceedings Mersault is in 
fact judged also for his having failed to comply with social conventions 
unrelated to his crime, e.g., for his not having behaved properly, i.e., in 
accordance with social conventions, after his mother’s death, or for his firm 
rejection to accept any religious convictions. The questions posed to Mersault in 
the course of legal proceedings clearly illustrate this problem; it may be 
worthwhile presenting some of those questions.  
Mersault’s lawyer finds it important to know whether the charge of 
Mersault’s callousness during his mother’s funeral is true:  
 
“You must understand,” the lawyer said, “that I don’t relish having to 
question you about such a matter. But it has much importance, and, 
unless I find some way of answering the charge of “callousness,” I 
shall be handicapped in conducting your defense.” (Camus 1946, 41) 
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Mersault can hardly discern the connection between his case and his 
mother’s funeral,but the lawyer insists that from the standpoint of the law such 
a connection exists: 
 
“When I suggested that Mother’s death had no connection with the 
charge against me, he merely replied that this remark showed I’d never 
had any dealings with the law.” (Ibid.) 
 
Indeed, the lawyer’s remark was true. It is confirmed by the further course 
of the legal process. During the process of Mersault is more or less openly 
accused of not loving his mother, not shedding tears on her funeral, having a 
liaison with a woman just after the funeral. To put it generally: He is accused of 
flouting social conventions which in fact have nothing to do with his crime.  
 Mersault was finally sentenced to death. It is clear that extralegal social 
conventions unrelated to his crime played an important role in passing this 
sentence. This is pathology of legal reasoning —an obvious violation of the rule 
of law. The rule of law requires that legal rules and principles upon which legal 
verdicts are to be passed should be defined as precisely as possible. It is clear 
that they cannot be defined with absolute precision —contrary to what some 
positivistic legal philosophers have claimed. However, it seems equally clear 
that this legal basis cannot be defined as broadly and vaguely as it is in fact 
defined in the course of Mersault’s process. 
Three additional points may be in order here. First, our first “legal” 
interpretation of The Stranger does not imply that extra-legal elements should 
never be allowed for by judges in the course of legal process. It is clear that 
some of them should be to some extent: It is impossible to pass a just verdict 
focusing on an accused person’s deed alone and neglecting his personality 
traits, for the simple reason that the knowledge of personality traits is often 
indispensable for defining the very character of the deed (say, whether it was 
premeditated or not); and in order to determine these traits, it may be necessary 
to know how the person tends to behave in various situational contexts. 
However, these elements should not become a basis for legal decisions as they 
in fact do in the course of Mersault’s process. Second, this interpretation does 
not imply any answer to the question as to how great is Mersault’s guilt, or, to 
put it another way, who “he really is”: A passionate and disinterested truth 
seeker (the first reading), or, rather, an alienated man, deeply estranged from the 
society and living an empty and unreflective life (the second reading). The first 
reading, arguably closer to Camus’ intentions, implies the view of society as a 
threat to an individual which bars, by imposing on him various arbitrary 
requirements and expectations, his free and full development. On this reading, 
which does not seem very plausible to us, Mersault is a hero of truth who 
refuses to accept falsities which the society requires its members to accept and 
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is sufficiently courageous tell unpalatable truths, e.g., “All normal people, I 
added as on afterthought, had more or less desired the death of those they loved, 
at some time or another.” (Camus 1946, 41) Third, this interpretation does not 
imply that legal reasoning is necessarily bound to be pathological: If it is 
conducted correctly, it can be non-pathological —it can lead to just decisions. 
This is the reason why we have dubbed “non-radical” the critique of law under 
this interpretation: It does not imply that legal reasoning is “by nature” or 
inherently pathological. 
 
 
3. Interpretation II: Legal Reasoning as a Pathology 
 
We have already mentioned that according to the second interpretation 
The Stranger provides a radical critique of law: It points at an unavoidable 
pathology of legal reasoning. This interpretation of The Stranger’s critique of 
law can be called “radical”, as it assumes that legal reasoning is inherently 
pathological: it always —or at least usually— leads to unjust decisions. The 
source of legal reasoning’s pathological character lies in its generality —its 
being based on general rules intended to apply to classes of situations similar in 
all relevant aspects. However, according to this interpretation, such classes do 
not exist: Each concrete situation from such a putative class is in fact different 
from any other situation from this class not only in its irrelevant aspects but also 
in its relevant aspects. In other words, each situation to be decided by law 
constitutes its own —one-element— class. This means, in consequence, that no 
general rules can ever be rightly applied to concrete situations. Each situation 
needs to be judged according to a unique rule constructed by a judge only with 
the intention to decide this concrete situation. A judge should examine each 
concrete case in its uniqueness and concreteness, and not through the prism of 
abstract and general rules, since the latter perspective leads inevitably or almost 
inevitably to unjust judgments. The conception of ethics which can be appealed 
to buttress this critique of law is “situational ethics”. According to this 
conception of ethics any view of ethics assuming that normative reasoning 
consists in the application of general and abstract rules to concrete cases is 
deeply mistaken, as it neglects the complexity of concrete cases —the 
complexity on account of which these cases’ essential features can never be 
captured by this kind of rules. Since situational ethics was accepted by many 
existentialist thinkers (though it should be stressed that it is doubtful whether 
this conception of ethics can be ascribed to Camus), the second interpretation 
can be called “existentialist”, whereas the first interpretation can be called “non-
existentialist”, as it does not rely on any specifically existentialist assumptions. 
What arguments can be put forward to support the claim that The Stranger can 
be interpreted along the above presented line? Arguably, one of the most 
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striking impressions the readers of The Stranger are likely to have while getting 
to know the story of Mersault is the impression of great incongruence between 
the concrete situation of Mersault and the law according to which he is judged  
—between the individual case of Mersault and general legal categories to which 
the prosecutor and the judge must fit this case. The following quotation is 
relevant here:  
 
At one moment, however, I pricked up my ears; it was when I heard 
him saying: “It is true I killed a man.” He went on in the same strain, 
saying “I” when he referred to me. It seemed so queer… It seemed to 
me that the idea behind it was still further to exclude me from the case, 
to put me off the map. so to speak, by substituting the lawyer for 
myself. Anyway, it hardly mattered; I already felt worlds away from 
this courtroom and its tedious “proceedings.” (Camus 1946, 65)  
 
This incongruence, so this second interpretation goes, does not stem 
merely from the fact that legal reasoning made by legal actors who deal with 
Mersault’s crime is based on extralegal social conventions which have little to 
do with this crime (as the first interpretation suggests) but from the inherent 
feature of legal reasoning, its generality and abstractness. These features of law 
make it function in a way highly disconnected from human reality. Law is, then, 
a dehumanizing entity, as it objectifies human subjects. Clearly this radical 
interpretation admits of a more and less extreme reading. The former one 
implies that legal systems, for the aforementioned reasons, can never generate 
just verdicts with respect to concrete cases, whereas the latter reading implies 
that legal systems, for the aforementioned reasons, usually generate unjust 
verdicts, and that if they generate just verdicts, it happens as if “by luck” or 
“contingently”.   
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The problem of the plausibility of the two interpretations, with which we 
would like to deal in this section, falls into two more specific questions. The 
first question is about which of the two interpretations is “more true” to the 
novel, i.e., better reflects the author’s intentions. The second question is about 
which of the two interpretations implies more plausible claims about the law. 
Let us deal successively with these two questions.  
As for the first question, it may be plausibly argued that the second 
interpretation is “more true” to Camus’s intentions (though, to repeat the point 
made in the preceding section, it is rather doubtful whether situational ethics —
one of the conception of ethics which can be used to justify this interpretation— 
can be assigned to Camus): If Camus did intend to convey any legal-
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philosophical message in The Stranger, it was rather the message that the law 
—as a system of general and abstract rules and a manifestation of the 
dehumanizing power of political institutions— may constitute a threat to 
individuals than the message that judges ought not to take into account in the 
process of legal-decision making social conventions and other extra-legal 
elements.  
Before we tackle the second question, let us at first emphasize that a 
detailed analysis of these two interpretations as the claims about the law goes 
beyond the scope of this article. We shall just confine ourselves to formulating 
several general remarks without developing them at greater length. As we have 
already noticed in Section 2, the first interpretation seems to convey an apt 
message about the law: legal verdicts should be passed upon as precisely 
determinate a basis as the characteristics of legal discourse (e.g., the vagueness 
of legal language, the role of values in legal reasoning) allow. This is a simple 
requirement flowing directly from the idea of the rule of law. However, the 
claim about the law implied by the second interpretation (both in its more and 
less extreme form) seems to be untenable. This is so because this claim seems to 
rely on the presupposition that that law is unnecessary for maintaining social 
order —that law is in fact superfluous or redundant. This extravagant claim can 
be refuted by a commonsense argument that there seems to be no better way of 
maintaining order in large societies than by means of formal law (i.e., composed 
of general and abstract rules and secured by institutionalized sanctions). Having 
said this, though, we would like to note that one can find a “rational core” or 
“plausible core” also in the second interpretation. This core is a simple intuition 
which says that legal verdicts should be as adequate to concrete cases —as little 
removed from them— as it is possible.  
At the end of this article, let us devote a few words to the problem of the 
compatibility of the two interpretations as the claims about the law. Clearly, 
these two interpretations, when taken literally, are not compatible because the 
first one assumes that the law is not inherently pathological (it may have some 
defects but these defects are removable), whereas the second one assumes that it 
is inherently pathological. However, it is possible to combine the requirement 
with regard to law that stems from the first interpretation with the “rational 
core” of the second interpretation. Thus constructed “compound” requirement 
with regard to law can be expressed in the following manner: legal verdicts 
should be passed upon as precisely determinate a basis as possible and should 
be as adequate to concrete cases —as little detached from human reality— as 
possible. Clearly, the realization of this requirement is difficult, as these two 
demands —the demand of the generality and the demand of concreteness— 
remain in a strong tension, and finding a “golden mean” between them (the task 
to be realized jointly by legislators and judges) is more like an art than as some 
kind of mechanical process. 
  143 
 
 
References 
 
Camus, A. 1946. The Stranger. Trans. S. Gilbert. New York: Vintage Books. 
Carroll. D. 2004-2005. Guilt by “Race”: Injustice in Camus’s The Stranger. 
Cardozo Law Review 26: 2331-2344. 
Newman, D. 2000. Existentialism and Law: Toward a Reinvigorated Law and 
Literature Analysis. Saskatchewan Law Review 67: 87-117. 
Posner, R. 1998.  Law and Literature. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Weisberg. R. 1975-1976. Comparative Law in Comparative Literature: The 
Figure of the “Examining Magistrate” in Dostoevsky and Camus. Rutgers 
Law Review 29: 237-258. 
 
  144 
  145 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS  
 
 
Vera Karam de Chueiri is full professor of Law, Federal University of Paraná 
Law School – Brazil: vkchueiri@uol.com.br 
 
José Manuel Aroso Linhares is associate professor of Philosophy of Law, 
University of Coimbra – Portugal: linhares@fd.uc.pt  
 
Mônica Sette Lopes is associate professor of Law, Federal University of Minas 
Gerais – Brazil: msl@pib.com.br 
 
Alessia Magliacane conducts research at Université Paris 1 Sorbonne – 
France: alessiamagliacane@gmail.com 
 
M. Paola Mittica is reasercher and lecturer of Sociology of Law, University of 
Urbino – Italy: maria.mittica@uniurb.it 
 
Marzio Pieri is full professor of Italian Literature, University of Parma – Italy: 
marzio.pieri@unipr.it  
 
István H. Szilágyi is associate professor of Philosophy of Law, Catholic 
University Pázmány Péter, Budapest – Hungary: kopi@jak.ppke.hu 
 
Alberto Vespaziani is associate professor of Comparative Public Law, 
University of Molise – Italy: alberto.vespaziani@unimol.it 
 
Wojciech Załuski is adjunct lecturer of Philosophy of Law, Jagiellonian 
University, Krakow – Poland: zaluskiwojciech@gmail.com; while Irem Aki 
conducts research at Ankara University – Turkey:  iremaki@gmail.com 
 
 
